By Parisa Hafezi and Bozorgmehr Sharafedin

DUBAI/LONDON- Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani rejected the resignation of Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif on Wednesday, bolstering a moderate ally long targeted by hardliners in factional struggles over the 2015 nuclear deal with the West.

Zarif - a U.S.-educated veteran diplomat who helped craft the pact that curbed Iran’s nuclear programme in return for sanctions relief - announced his resignation on Monday.

Two days later, he was back with his position strengthened by the president’s endorsement as well as a chorus of support from moderate lawmakers, a senior Revolutionary Guards commander and, implicitly, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

“As the Supreme Leader has described you as a ‘trustworthy, brave and religious’ person in the forefront of resistance against widespread U.S. pressures, I consider accepting your resignation against national interests and reject it,” Rouhani said in a letter published on state news agency IRNA.

Zarif’s departure would have deprived Iran of its most skilled diplomat, a patient negotiator able to strike a landmark deal with often hostile Western powers.

His knowledge of the West - gained during years of studying in the United States and then representing Iran at the United Nations - helped him build a rapport with American officials despite decades of animosity between Washington and Tehran.

After U.S. President Donald Trump abandoned the nuclear deal in May last year and reimposed U.S. sanctions, Zarif came under fire from opponents who accused him of selling out his country.

It was unclear whether Zarif’s resignation announcement, and the expressions of support which followed, were orchestrated. But allies said the last two days’ events would give him political ammunition against hardliners.

“There is no one to replace Zarif as the foreign minister. And the establishment knows that,” said one of Zarif’s allies, speaking on condition of anonymity.

“The establishment needs Zarif and Zarif needs the establishment’s support. And the reactions after his announcement, showed the consensus over the importance of having him as Iran’s foreign minister,” the ally added.


Khamenei, who stays out of day to day politics, has not publicly commented on Zarif’s resignation. But it is almost certain that Rouhani would have needed a green light from the man with ultimate authority in Iran.

Zarif’s move thrust the schism between Iran’s hardliners and moderates into the open, effectively challenging Khamenei to pick a side.

Zarif gave no specific reasons for his resignation. But allies said he had quit after coming under increasing pressure over the nuclear deal and other issues.

“He resigned because he loves his country. Because some extremists inside Iran, could not tolerate Zarif’s achievements in foreign policy and were blocking him in every turn,” said a source close to Zarif and the office of the Supreme Leader.

“No matter how hard Zarif tried, he could not resolve some problems because they needed the approval of parliament, Guardian Council and so on.”

The council vets legislation passed by parliament for compliance with Iran’s constitution.

On Wednesday, Zarif thanked Iranians for their support. “As a modest servant I have never had any concern but elevating the foreign policy and the status of the foreign ministry,” he said in an Instagram post.

After Rouhani’s announcement, Zarif signed two agreements in Tehran with Armenia, television footage showed, continuing his duties as Iran’s top diplomat.

Senior Revolutionary Guards commander Qassem Soleimani said Zarif was the main person in charge of Iranian foreign policy and he was supported by Khamenei.

Iranian Oil Minister Bijan Zanganeh, another moderate, on Wednesday denied reports by a hardline lawmaker that he had also resigned, the Iranian Students’ News Agency (ISNA) reported.


Main News


BUCHAREST - French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel have cautioned against an escalation in the dispute over Iran's nuclear deal after Tehran said it would stop abiding by parts of the deal and U.S. President Donald Trump said he was open to talks with Iranian leaders.

Tehran on May 8 said it had stopped observing limits on its nuclear activities agreed under the 2015 deal until they find a way to bypass renewed U.S. sanctions. The same day, the U.S. envoy for Iran, Brian Hook, accused Tehran of resorting to "nuclear blackmail."

Macron, speaking in Romania ahead of an EU summit on May 9, told reporters that "Iran must remain in this agreement, and we must do everything we can to ensure that it stays in."

He urged the agreement's signatories not to "get caught up in any escalation" and to "jointly watch over our collective security."

For her part, Merkel said the EU wants to avoid an escalation, adding that Tehran must recognize that it is in its own interests to remain committed to the nuclear deal.

"Our hand remains outstretched at this point; we want to continue to push for a diplomatic solution," Merkel said after the EU meeting.

Trump did not address Iran's latest move. But he told reporters at the White House that he wants the Iranian leadership to contact him.

"What I would like to see with Iran, I would like to see them call me," Trump said.

Amid rising tensions between the two countries, Trump said Washington was not looking for a conflict with Tehran.

"I want them to be strong and great, to have a great economy," Trump said, adding that "we can make a fair deal."

Macron said the landmark 2015 deal curbing Iran's nuclear ambitions is "a good agreement" but added that it should be completed with other pacts governing Iran's missile development and its potentially destabilizing role in the Middle East.

His statement came shortly after the European Union and three European powers issued a joint declaration urging Iran to respect the deal.

The EU's foreign policy chief, Federica Mogherini, and the foreign ministers of Britain, France, and Germany said they still backed the accord but rejected "ultimatums" from Tehran to keep it alive.

"We reject any ultimatums and we will assess Iran's compliance on the basis of Iran's performance regarding its nuclear-related commitments" under the agreement, the European statement said.

Iran has said its move was in response to the sweeping unilateral sanctions that Washington has reimposed since it quit the agreement one year ago. The reimposing of sanctions has dealt a severe blow to Iran's economy.

The EU powers say they "regret the reimposition of sanctions" by the U.S. and remain "determined to continue pursuing efforts to enable the continuation of legitimate trade with Iran."

They were "determined to continue pursuing efforts to enable the continuation of legitimate trade with Iran" in an effort to keep the deal afloat, the statement added.

But it said that Iran must at the same time "implement its commitments under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) in full as it has done until now and to refrain from any escalatory steps."


BERLIN - European countries said on Thursday they wanted to preserve Iran’s nuclear deal and rejected “ultimatums” from Tehran, after Iran relaxed restrictions on its nuclear program and threatened moves that might breach the 2015 international pact.

Iran’s announcement on Wednesday, related to curbs on its stockpiling of nuclear materials, was in response to U.S. sanctions imposed following President Donald Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the accord with Tehran a year ago.

Iran’s initial moves do not appear to violate the accord yet. But President Hassan Rouhani said that unless the world powers which signed the deal protect Iran’s economy from U.S. sanctions within 60 days, Iran would start enriching uranium beyond limits set in the agreement.

“We reject any ultimatums and we will assess Iran’s compliance on the basis of Iran’s performance regarding its nuclear-related commitments ...,” read a statement issued jointly by the European Union and the foreign ministers of Britain, France and Germany, co-signatories of the deal.

“We are determined to continue pursuing efforts to enable the continuation of legitimate trade with Iran,” they said, adding that this included getting a special purpose vehicle aimed at enabling non-dollar business with Iran off the ground.

In response, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said in a Twitter post that EU countries should uphold their obligations in the nuclear deal with Iran and normalize economic ties despite U.S. sanctions, “instead of demanding that Iran unilaterally abide by a multilateral accord”.

The nuclear deal required Iran to curb its uranium enrichment capacity to head off any pathway to developing a nuclear bomb, in return for the removal of most international sanctions. A series of more intrusive U.N. inspections under the deal have verified that Iran is meeting its commitments.

Iran has always denied that it was seeking a nuclear weapon and says it wants to abide by the nuclear deal.

The Trump administration argues that the nuclear deal was flawed because it is not permanent, does not address Iran’s missile program and does not punish Iran for what Washington considers meddling in regional countries.

U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo alluded to that in a statement on Thursday.

“To date the regime’s default option has been violence, and we appeal to those in Tehran who see a path to a prosperous future through de-escalation to modify the regime’s behavior,” Pompeo said.

“Our restraint to this point should not be mistaken by Iran for a lack of resolve,” Pompeo said.


Trump, who has previously expressed a willingness to meet Iranian leaders to no avail, on Thursday renewed that appeal in an impromptu news conference at the White House.

“They should call. If they do, we’re open to talk to them,” Trump said.

He also said he could not rule out a military confrontation given the heightened tensions. Trump declined to say what prompted him to deploy the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier group to the region over what was described as unspecified threats.

In an MSNBC interview, the Iranian ambassador to the United Nations Majid Takht Ravanchi said: “All of a sudden he decided to leave the negotiating table ... What is the guarantee that he will not renege again?”

He dismissed U.S. allegations of an Iranian threat as “fake intelligence” comparing it to the run-up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.

The commander overseeing U.S. naval forces in the Middle East told Reuters on Thursday that American intelligence showing a threat from Iran will not prevent him from sending an aircraft carrier through the vital Strait of Hormuz, if needed.

“I am not in a war-plan footing and have not been tasked to do so,” U.S. Vice Admiral Jim Malloy, commander of the U.S. Navy’s Bahrain-based Fifth Fleet, said in a phone interview. “However we are absolutely ready to respond to any aggression against the United States, partners in the region, or our interests.”

The Trump administration has ratcheted up sanctions this month, effectively ordering all countries to halt all purchases of Iranian oil or face their own sanctions.

The move creates a dilemma for Washington’s European allies which say they share its concerns about Iranian behavior but think the Trump administration’s tactics are likely to backfire.

The European allies believe Trump’s campaign to isolate the Islamic Republic plays into the hands of Tehran hardliners and undermines pragmatists within the Iranian leadership who want to open the country up to the world.

French President Emmanuel Macron on Thursday called for the nuclear deal to be extended to cover other issues of concern to the West, such as Iran’s regional policies and ballistic missiles, rather than jettisoned.

“Leaving the 2015 nuclear agreement is a mistake because it is undoing what we have already done. That’s why France is remaining and will remain a part of it and I deeply hope that Iran will remain,” Macron said.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel said the EU wants to avoid an escalation in the dispute and Tehran must recognize that it is in its own interests to remain committed to the deal.

European countries have tried to develop a system to allow outside investors to do business with Iran while avoiding falling foul of U.S. sanctions. But in practice this has failed so far, with all major European firms that had announced plans to invest in Iran saying they would no longer do so.

A spokesman for Iran’s Atomic Energy Organisation said on Thursday Tehran’s goal was to bring the agreement “back on track”.

But Tehran has also maintained that it will leave the deal, known as the JCPOA, unless it receives more economic support as envisaged by the 2015 pact.

“We have not left the JCPOA so far, but we have put such a move on our agenda and that would happen step by step,” Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi was quoted as saying by state-run PressTV on Wednesday night.

Supporters of the nuclear deal, including Trump’s predecessor Barack Obama and European allies, say the pact extends the time it would take Iran to make a nuclear weapon if it decided to do so, and guarantees that it would be caught.

Lifting sanctions, they argue, would show ordinary Iranians the benefits of cooperating with the world and make it more difficult for hardliners to roll back reforms.


By Gabriela Baczynska and Luiza Ilie

SIBIU, Romania - Fighting climate change, safeguarding the rule of law and finding a modern model for growth must be at the heart of the European Union, the bloc’s leaders agreed in Thursday talks meant to show unity despite the damage from Brexit.

However, their informal gathering in the Romanian town of Sibiu did not produce clear decisions on how to achieve the ambitious goals, underscoring divisions in the EU along multiple fault lines and setting up battles ahead.

The leaders of all members except Britain met on Europe Day in Sibiu, which has German and Hungarian roots, 15 years after the EU’s expansion east finally consigned to history the Iron Curtain that had divided Europe since World War Two.

Ahead of European Parliament elections on May 23-26, the 27 leaders also had a first look at assigning the bloc’s most powerful jobs later this year.

“In 15 days, some 400 million Europeans will choose between a project ... to build Europe further or a project to destroy, deconstruct Europe and return to nationalism,” Macron told the gathering.

“Climate, protection of borders and a model of growth, a social model... is what I really want for the coming years.”

On climate change, France and eight other EU countries proposed getting to “net-zero greenhouse gas emissions” by 2050 and the bloc will now fight about how to frame and finance any transition to more environmentally-friendly policies.

“Nothing has changed when it comes to divides and different opinions about it,” said the chairman of the talks, European Council President Donald Tusk who used to be the prime minister of Poland, one of the biggest EU stallers on climate reforms.

“What is new is this very fresh and energetic pressure,” he said of youth protests growing in Europe to demand radical action to safeguard the planet. “There is no future for politicians without this sensitivity and imagination.”

German Chancellor Angela Merkel, mindful of her country’s powerful car industry, refused to endorse the French-led proposal entirely but backed spending a quarter of the EU’s next joint budget for 2021-28 on climate and energy efficiency.

A report released on Thursday by the World Wide Fund (WWF) and Global Footprint Network sharply criticized the EU, saying its members consumed the Earth’s resources faster than they can be renewed.

The leaders pledged to protect the rule of law at a time when the governments in post-communist members Poland, Hungary and Romania stand accused of undercutting democracy.

Divided over issues ranging from democratic standards to migration, the EU is grappling with the prospect of Britain’s departure, a wave of populism, and external challenges from China to Russia to the United States.

It is also lagging behind in areas from artificial intelligence to cyber security, and is scrambling to keep alive a troubled nuclear deal with Iran.

But the leaders signed off on a declaration promising to “defend one Europe”, “stay united, through thick and thin” and “always look for joint solutions” ahead.


Tusk announced another summit on May 28, two days after the European Parliament vote, to let the national leaders agree on appointing new people to hold the EU’s top roles until 2024.

This will involve fierce horse-trading over names to head the European Council, which brings together national leaders, the executive European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Central Bank and the joint diplomatic service.

All five posts are up for grabs later this year and the outgoing European Parliament has already picked its favorites for the Commission job including a conservative German, Manfred Weber, and a Dutch socialist, Frans Timmermans.

Many national leaders, however, want to keep control of the opaque process to themselves.

Agreement on top roles took three summits the last time round but Tusk said he wanted the new leadership in place in July and was ready to go for a majority vote if unanimity was missing.

Hungary’s eurosceptic Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras spoke against Weber.

He did, however, get the backing of Merkel and Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz. Macron, the leaders of Luxembourg and Lithuania opposed the idea of following the parliament’s choice.

Other names in the hat include Brexit negotiator Frenchman Michel Barnier, or Margrethe Vestager, Denmark’s current commissioner who imposed hefty fines on global tech giants Google and Apple.




Rovaniemi, Finland - The participants at the Arctic Council meeting in Finland's far northern town of Rovaniemi have failed to issue a final declaration reportedly due to a U.S. refusal to mention climate change.

At the start of the council's 11th ministerial meeting, Finnish Foreign Minister Timo Soini said the final joint declaration was "off the table" and would be replaced by ministerial statements. He provided no explanation.

According to participants, member states were unable to reach an agreement, with the United States alone refusing to mention climate change in the final text.

Temperatures in the Arctic region are rising twice as fast as in the rest of the world, prompting the accelerated melting of the polar cap and opening huge untapped energy and mineral resources to commercial exploitation.

This is the first time the Arctic Council, which has been holding ministerial meetings every two years since 1996, failed to present a final declaration.

The meeting was supposed to come up with a two-year agenda to balance the challenges of climate change with sustainable development.

"The hang-up here right now is America making it hard to make a final agreement," Sally Swetzof of the Aleut International Association, one of six organizations representing the Arctic's indigenous peoples, told the media.

The Arctic Council consists of the United States, Russia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden.

In a speech in Rovaniemi on the eve of the meeting, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said President Donald Trump's administration "shares your deep commitment to environmental stewardship" in the Arctic. But he said collective goals were not always the answer.

"They are rendered meaningless and even counterproductive as soon as one nation fails to comply," he said.

Pompeo also criticized China, which holds observer status, and Russia, slamming their "aggressive behavior" in the Arctic.




GAZA - The military wing of the Palestinian Hamas resistance movement says it successfully "overcame" Israel's so-called Iron Dome missile system during its recent confrontation with the Tel Aviv regime thanks to its new rocket-launching tactic.

Abu Obeida, a spokesman for the Ezzedine al-Qassam Brigades, said in a social media post on Monday that the fresh rocket-launching tactic had overwhelmed the so-called Iron Dome missile system, leading to the deaths and injuries of numerous Israelis in two days.

"The Qassam Brigades, thanks to God, succeeded in overcoming the so-called Iron Dome by adopting the tactic of firing dozens of missiles in one single burst," he said.

"The high intensity of fire and the great destructive ability of the missiles that were introduced by the Qassam [Brigades]… succeeded in causing great losses and destruction to the enemy," Obeida noted.

Israeli aerial assaults on Gaza prompted the most intense fighting between the regime and the Palestinian resistance fighters since Tel Aviv's bloody war on the blockaded enclave in 2014.

In retaliation, the Palestinian fighters fired around 700 rockets from Gaza into the occupied territories, killing four Israeli settlers and injuring at least 80 others over the weekend.

In the course of Israel's seven-week war in 2014, five Israelis died and 67 others were wounded.

Israeli media reported that the "Iron Dome" intercepted only 240 of the projectiles, adding that some 35 rockets and mortar shells had struck populated areas over the course of Saturday and Sunday.

In an interview with The Jerusalem Post, former head of Israeli military intelligence's research department, Yaakov Amidror, revealed that the "Iron Dome" had failed to intercept all the missiles launched from Gaza due to a number of reasons.

According to him, one of the key issues was that some of the rockets were launched from a very close range, giving the Israeli system next to no time to react and intercept them.

He added that in general the rockets launched from the Gaza Strip are not unique and are "within the capabilities of the Iron Dome."

Another reason for the failure, the military expert explained, is the system's peculiar design, which makes it ignore missiles aimed at areas it deems empty or uninhabited.

'Israel changed rules of engagement in Gaza'

Meanwhile, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has claimed that the Tel Aviv regime changed the rules of engagement in Gaza in the past few days.

"We have changed the rules of the game, and Hamas understands this very well. With that, it is clear that this is not the end of the campaign, and I therefore gave instructions to prepare for what will come next, and gave directives to leave armored and artillery forces around the Gaza Strip," he said.

Netanyahu further said Israel had officially renewed its old policy of targeted killings of "senior terrorists," a term he used in referrence to members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad resistance groups, and claimed that the Tel Aviv regime had killed "dozens of them" over the weekend.

On Sunday, the Israeli military specifically targeted a Hamas member in Gaza, Hamed Ahmed Khudari, by bombing his car, marking the first targeted killing since the 2014 Gaza war.

The fresh Israeli aggression killed 27 Palestinians and wounded dozens of others in the attacks. Two pregnant Palestinian women and two infants were among the dead.

The two-day Israeli onslaught also demolished or damaged hundreds of Palestinian homes in Gaza.

The conflict came to a halt on Monday following a ceasefire between the two sides. Tensions erupted on Friday after the killing of four Palestinians, two in an Israeli air raid on Gaza and two during the regime's live fire at anti-occupation protests.

Meanwhile, Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri said that although the recent flare-up in Gaza had come to an end, the wider conflict would continue.

"The resistance managed to deter" the Israeli military, he said, according to Israeli Kan public broadcaster.

"Our message is that this round is over, but the conflict will not end until we regain our rights," he said.

The ceasefire, however, has angered Israelis, who say they are tired of having to run to shelters.

"In a month, in two weeks, in a month and a half, it will all happen again – we achieved nothing. I think Israel needs to strike them very, very hard so that they learn their lesson," said Haim Cohen in Ashdod, located 25 kilometers north of the Gaza Strip.

In Ein Hashlosha, a kibbutz about a mile and a half from Gaza, Meirav Kohan, 46, said she was shocked and disappointed at the truce.

"This is a war of attrition" she said, adding the Tel Aviv regime "is not looking for a long-term solution to bring us peace. There's no policy. We're just pawns in a game."

Israel says its warplanes targeted some 350 sites in the Gaza Strip. The tiny coastal territory has been under Israeli land, air and sea blockade for over a decade.



GENEVA - A lack of health funding in Gaza means 1,700 people shot by Israeli security forces may have to have amputations in the next two years, Jamie McGoldrick, the U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator for occupied Palestinian territory, told reporters on Wednesday.

McGoldrick said 29,000 Palestinians had been wounded in protests in the past year, and 7,000 of them had gunshot wounds, mostly in the lower legs.

“You’ve got 1,700 people who are in need of serious, complicated surgeries for them to be able to walk again,” McGoldrick said.

“These are people who have been shot during the demonstrations and who are in need of rehabilitation, and very, very serious and complex bone reconstruction surgery over a two year period before they start to rehabilitate themselves.”

Without those procedures, all these people are at risk of needing an amputation, he said.

The U.N. is seeking $20 million to fill the gap in health spending.

A lack of funding to the World Food Program and UNRWA, the U.N. humanitarian agency that supports Palestinians displaced by the 1948 war of Israel’s founding, also meant there could be an interruption of food supplies for 1 million people.

“If that stops, there is no alternative for people to bring food in from any other sources, because they don’t have purchasing power,” McGoldrick said.

WFP spokesman Herve Verhoosel said a severe lack of funds meant WFP had cut aid for 193,000 people this year in the West Bank and Gaza, with 27,000 getting nothing and the rest getting only $8 per month instead of the usual $10.

Some 2 million Palestinians live in Gaza, the economy of which has suffered years of Israeli and Egyptian blockades as well as recent foreign aid cuts and sanctions by the Palestinian Authority, Hamas’ West Bank-based rival.

People’s prospects were “precarious”, McGoldrick said. Gaza families averaged $4,000 of debt, while salaries averaged $400 per month, but 54 percent of the population was unemployed.

The health system was impoverished, with unpaid salaries and dilapidated equipment, and many medical professionals had left if they could find opportunities elsewhere.

One teaching hospital was now only teaching trauma medicine, McGoldrick said, but the doctors on the ground did not have the technical ability to carry out the treatment required for the people at risk of amputation.

There have already been 120 amputations, 20 of them in children, in the past year, he said.

By Nidal al-Mughrabi and Ari Rabinovitch

GAZA/JERUSALEM - A surge in deadly violence in the Gaza Strip and southern Israel petered out overnight with Palestinian officials reporting that Egypt had mediated a ceasefire on Monday ending the most serious spate of cross-border clashes for months.

The latest round of fighting erupted three days ago, peaking on Sunday when rockets and missiles from Gaza killed four civilians in Israel. Israeli strikes killed 21 Palestinians, more than half of them civilians, over the weekend.

Two Palestinian officials and a TV station belonging to Hamas, Gaza’s Islamist rulers, said a truce had been reached at 0430 a.m. (0130 GMT), apparently preventing the violence from broadening into a conflict neither side seemed keen on fighting.

Israel did not formally confirm the existence of a truce with Hamas and its allied Gaza faction Islamic Jihad, militants that it, like much of the West, designates as terrorists.

Officials in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government spoke in more general terms of a reciprocal return to quiet, with one suggesting that Israel’s arch-enemy Iran - a major funder for Islamic Jihad - had been behind the Gaza escalation.

Suffering under renewed U.S. sanctions and Israeli strikes against its military assets in Syria, Iran may have seen stoking Palestinian violence as a way of telling Israel, “we will get back at you through (Islamic) Jihad and Gaza”, Israeli Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz told the Israeli radio station 90 FM.

Israel’s military said that more than 600 rockets and other projectiles - over 150 of them intercepted - had been fired at southern Israeli cities and villages since Friday. It said it shelled or carried out air strikes on some 320 militant sites.

The violence abated before dawn, just as Gazans were preparing to begin the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.

Rocket sirens in southern Israel, which had gone off continuously over the weekend, sending residents running for cover, did not sound on Monday and there were no reports of new air strikes in Gaza.

Egypt and the United Nations, who have served as brokers in the past, had been trying to mediate a ceasefire.


The violence began when a sniper from the Palestinian militant group Islamic Jihad fired across Gaza’s fenced border at Israeli troops on routine patrol, wounding two soldiers, according to the Israeli military.

A Palestinian man is seen through the rubble of an apartment block that was hit by an Israeli air strike, in the northern Gaza Strip May 6, 2019. REUTERS/Mohammed Salem
Islamic Jihad accused Israel of delaying implementation of previous understandings brokered by Egypt in an effort to end violence and ease the economic hardships of blockaded Gaza.

This time both Islamic Jihad and Hamas appeared to see some leverage to press for concessions from Israel, where annual independence day celebrations begin on Wednesday and with the Eurovision song contest due to kick off in Tel Aviv - the target of a Gaza rocket attack in March - next week.

Some 2 million Palestinians live in Gaza, the economy of which has suffered years of Israeli and Egyptian blockades as well as recent foreign aid cuts and sanctions by the Palestinian Authority, Hamas’ West Bank-based rival.

Israel says its blockade is necessary to stop arms reaching Hamas, with which it has fought three wars since the group seized control of Gaza in 2007, two years after Israel withdrew its settlers and troops from the small coastal enclave.

One of Islamic Jihad’s leaders in Gaza said on Sunday that the group was trying to counter efforts by the United States to revive peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.

U.S. President Donald Trump’s Middle East team has said it will unveil its peace plan in June, after Ramadan is over. Peace negotiations have been moribund since 2014.

“What the resistance is doing now is the most important part of confronting Trump’s deal. We all have to get united behind the decision by the resistance to fight,” Islamic Jihad’s Jamil Eleyan said in a statement.

Israeli military spokesman Lieutenant-Colonel Jonathan Conricus said that over the past few weeks Islamic Jihad had been trying to perpetrate attacks against Israel in order to destabilize the border. “This isn’t some local initiative, it is part of a strategic choice to escalate matters,” Conricus said.

During the eight-year civil war in Syria, Iran’s military has built a presence there backing President Bashar al-Assad.

Israel regards Iran as its biggest threat and has vowed to stop it from entrenching itself in Syria, its neighbor to the north, repeatedly bombing Iranian targets in Syria and those of allied Lebanese Hezbollah militia.

Trump’s national security adviser John Bolton said on Sunday the administration was deploying a carrier strike group and bombers to the Middle East in response to troubling “indications and warnings” from Iran and to show the United States will retaliate with “unrelenting force” to any attack.



GAZA - Israel killed two Hamas militants in air strikes on Gaza on Friday, and two Palestinian protesters were killed in clashes with Israeli forces along the enclave’s border.

The strikes were a response to gunfire from southern Gaza that wounded two Israeli soldiers, the Israeli military said.

Hamas, the Islamist group that rules the Palestinian enclave, said two members of its armed wing had been killed and three wounded when Israel bombed one of its positions in central Gaza.

Later on Friday, two Palestinians shot by Israeli troops while taking part in weekly protests along the border died of their wounds, Gaza health officials said.

The Israeli military said some 5,200 Palestinians had amassed along the frontier, but did not immediately provide further comment.

The protesters are demanding an end to a blockade imposed by Israel and Egypt, and want Palestinians to have the right to return to land from which their families fled or were forced to flee during Israel’s founding in 1948, which Israel rejects.

More than 200 Gazans have been killed by Israeli troops since the ‘Great March of Return’ started on March 30 last year, according to Gaza health officials. An Israeli soldier was also killed by a Palestinian sniper.

Egyptian mediators, credited with brokering a ceasefire after a Hamas rocket attack north of Tel Aviv in March set off a burst of intense fighting, have been working to prevent a new escalation.

Hamas said in a statement on Thursday that its Gaza chief, Yeyha Al-Sinwar, had traveled to Cairo for talks on efforts to maintain calm along the border and alleviate Palestinian suffering.

Some 2 million Palestinians live in Gaza, whose economy has suffered years of blockades as well as recent foreign aid cuts. Unemployment stands at 52 percent, according to the World Bank.

Israel says its blockade is necessary to stop weapons reaching Hamas, which has fought three wars with Israel in the past decade.

Cairo’s mediation had helped persuade Israel to lift some restrictions on the movement of goods and people in and out of Gaza and expand the Mediterranean zone where Gazans can fish.

But Israel scaled back the zone this week in response to rocket fire from Gaza, a spokeswoman for its military liaison agency with the Palestinians said.

Palestinian militants fired a barrage of rockets toward Israeli cities and villages on Saturday, drawing air strikes from Israeli aircraft, the Israeli military said.

There were no reports of Israeli casualties as many of the rockets were intercepted and rockets alerts sent residents running to their shelters.

The flare-up followed the killing in an Israeli air strike on Friday of two militants from the Islamist Hamas group which rules Gaza.




North Africa

By Hamid Ould Ahmed

ALGIERS - Tens of thousands of protesters demanding the removal of Algeria’s ruling elite gathered in the capital Algiers for a 12th successive Friday, defying attempts by the army to ease tensions ahead of presidential election.

The demonstrators are pushing for radical change by seeking the departure of senior figures, including politicians and businessmen, who have governed the North African country since independence from France in 1962.

“They all go,” read a banner held up by protesters draped in national flags gathered in central Algiers, which has seen a succession of large anti-government marches since Feb. 22.

“We will not give up. The battle will continue,” said a 37-year-old school teacher, marching with his wife and two children.

The demonstration was peaceful but smaller than those that have shaken Algiers over the past weeks. This is the first protest since the start of the holy month of Ramadan.

Thousands of protesters also took to the streets in other cities, including Oran, Tizi Ouzou and Constantine, chanting anti-government slogans, witnesses said.

After 20 years in power, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika quit on April 2 under pressure from protesters and the army, but demonstrations have continued, seeking the removal of all officials belonging to the old guard and the introduction of political reforms.

Protesters are also demanding the resignation of interim president Abdelkader Bensalah, the head of the upper house of parliament who has replaced Bouteflika for 90 days to oversee a July 4 presidential election.

The army, the north African country’s most powerful institution, has sought appeasement by meeting a number of protesters’ demands including launching anti-graft probes against people suspected of misuse of power and public funds.

Last week, Bouteflika’s youngest brother, Said, and two former intelligence chiefs were placed in custody by a military judge over “harming the army’s authority and plotting against state authority”.

At least five businessmen, including the country’s richest man, Issad Rebrab, who is active in food industry and sugar refining, have been detained for alleged involvement in corruption scandals.




By Aziz El Yaakoubi

DUBAI - The United Arab Emirates said on Thursday that “extremist militias” were controlling the Libyan capital which its ally Khalifa Haftar is fighting to capture from forces allied to Libya’s internationally recognized government.

The UAE, along with Egypt, support Haftar who they see as a bulwark against Islamist militants in North Africa. A 2017 U.N. report said the Gulf Arab state has provided his eastern-based Libyan National Army (LNA) with military and logistical support.

Haftar’s offensive launched more than three weeks ago to seize Tripoli has all but wrecked U.N.-backed efforts for a peace deal between the rival factions to end eight years of conflict.

“Priority in Libya (is) to counter extremism/terrorism and support stability in long drawn out crisis,” UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash said in a Twitter post.

“Abu Dhabi agreement offered opportunity to support the U.N.-led process. Meanwhile extremist militias continue to control capital and derail search for political solution.”

Abu Dhabi, which has voiced support for U.N. peace efforts, last February hosted talks between Prime Minister Fayez Seraj and Haftar, the military commander of Libya’s eastern half, where the two agreed on the need for national elections.

The assault by the LNA, the biggest military confrontation in Libya since the 2011 toppling of leader Muammar Gaddafi, stalled on Tripoli’s stoutly defended southern outskirts last week. But fighting has intensified again, with both sides using artillery.

The U.N. report issued in June 2017 said Haftar’s forces had received aircraft and military vehicles from the UAE, which also built up an air base at Al Khadim, allowing the LNA, which is allied to a parallel government based in the eastern city of Benghazi, to gain air superiority by 2016.

A Gulf source has told Reuters that the UAE had provided logistical support to Haftar to safeguard Egypt’s security following cross-border militant attacks.

“Today, he (Haftar) is his own man and trying to achieve his own goals,” the source said.

Since the Tripoli offensive began, 376 people have been killed in the fighting, including 23 civilians, and 1,822 wounded, 79 of them civilians, according to latest United Nations figures. More than 45,000 people have fled their homes.

By Tom Westcott, Freelance journalist and regular contributor to The New Humanitarian

22 April 2019

‘Libyans feel they are now facing the same future as Syria or Yemen’

As fighting on the outskirts of Libya’s capital heads into its third week and shows no signs of abating, the casualty count is rising, some aid organisations are moving expatriate staff out of the country, and it’s only getting worse for civilians on the ground.

“Humanitarian needs are growing by the day,” said Rabab al-Rifai, communication coordinator for the International Committee of the Red Cross in Libya. “A large-scale escalation of violence in an urban area like Tripoli, which counts over one million inhabitants, could have dramatic consequences. The situation in and around the city has evolved rapidly over the past two weeks, and fears of yet another protracted conflict are on the rise.”

Violence broke out in the southern and southeastern outskirts of Tripoli a fortnight ago, as the Khalifa Haftar-led Libyan National Army (LNA), loyal to the country’s eastern-based governing bodies, launched an offensive to take control of the city from the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA).

The battle – the latest in a complex series of civil conflicts that followed the 2011 ouster of Muammar Gaddafi – comes on the back of years of UN-led efforts to broker a settlement between rival Libyan governments.

The World Health Organisation says 254 people have been killed and 1,228 wounded, while more than 32,000 people have been displaced since 4 April, including some 7,300 children.

This weekend saw several airstrikes in Tripoli, shortly after US President Donald Trump reportedly expressed support for Haftar, and the UN now says humanitarians can’t access some parts of the city due to clashes and shelling.

Growing needs, limited access

In addition to distributing food and other essentials to displaced people across the city, the ICRC is bringing supplies for treating the war wounded to hospitals in the city and field hospitals further out, said al-Rifai.

The dramatic escalation in medical needs has put a burden on aid agencies and hospitals, given that Libya’s crumbling healthcare system is already often unable to handle basic care.

Médecins Sans Frontières said its “teams have remained on the ground responding to medical needs”, including delivering aid to shelters for displaced people and supplies to three hospitals.

The UN says it is also delivering food, medical supplies, and other items, but residents of the capital’s southern suburbs, which have seen some of the most sustained fighting and are hard for humanitarians to enter safely, said little help had reached them.

“We have seen no visible movement of international organisations in our area, although some local organisations helped people,” said Mohamed, a resident of a village south of the capital recently taken by the LNA.

Libyans have been mobilising via social media, requesting blood donations and encouraging their fellow citizens to offer spare rooms to people who have had to flee their homes.

Fadiel Fadel, a Tripoli-based civil society activist, criticised the delivery of humanitarian aid by international organisations as “very weak, even with all these people fleeing”.

Detained migrants thrust onto front lines

Migrants and refugees remain in serious danger.

The UN’s refugee agency said on Friday that it had moved a total of 539 refugees away from the fighting and evacuated 163 on a flight to Niger, but it still estimates that more than 3,000 migrants and refugees, including children, are in detention centres near front lines.

“Over 3,000 refugees and migrants trapped in detention centres are at a severe risk of being caught in the crossfire,” said MSF’s field communication coordinator Jason Rizzo. “These people are unable to seek safety on their own, and their provision of food, water, medical care, and other essential services has deteriorated from already poor levels seen before the fighting.”

Three detention centres are in the direct vicinity of fighting, while several others in Tripoli’s south and southeastern suburbs are now dangerously close to the clashes.

“The Qasr bin Gashir detention centre is now on the other side of front lines in an area of active fighting, and our medical teams have been unable to reach the nearly 900 people who are trapped there,” Rizzo said. “MSF is calling for all refugees and migrants in Tripoli detention centres to be immediately evacuated out of the country due to the severe life-threatening risk amidst the worsening conflict.”

There are an estimated 670,000 migrants and refugees in Libya, and those who are not in detention and have been displaced by the violence in Tripoli “continue to face discrimination… [in accessing] collective shelters”, according to the UN.

International withdrawal

Within days of the outbreak of violence, international organisations began pulling their expatriate staff out of Tripoli due to safety concerns, although some remain on the ground.

Safa Msehli, information officer for IOM, the UN’s migration agency, said that “as it stands IOM maintains its operations in Libya,” but added that the security situation remained unpredictable.

“Although local staff are still active, international presence has been seriously minimised and all non-essential staff… have already been evacuated,” said a Libyan employee of a major international NGO, speaking on condition of anonymity because they were not authorised to speak to the media. “You can’t blame them,” the NGO employee added, noting that the agencies were likely looking to avoid an international crisis or a rescue mission.

The point was reinforced by ICRC’s al-Rifai. “There is no doubt that our strength lies in our Libyan colleagues, who have been working to respond to the needs of the populations over the past two weeks in various parts of Tripoli,” he said.

The international community has been in this position before. During Tripoli’s last major outbreak of violence, a five-week militia-led conflict in 2014 that left civilian infrastructure and the international airport destroyed, most major NGOs and Western embassies pulled out of Libya.

Five years later, much of the aid operation is still headquartered in Tunisia, and a return to Libya since mid-2017 has been slow and cautious.

Although NGO press officers refer to current staff movements to Tunisia as “temporary”, the earlier exodus left many Libyans feeling abandoned by the international community, and now they are concerned the shift is a sign they are in for a repetition of the ruinous 2014 conflict.

“Libyans are not happy about the withdrawal of embassies and international NGOs, which many view as caring about themselves but not Libyans,” said Fadel. “I’m not exaggerating when I say Libyans feel they are now facing the same future as Syria or Yemen.”

The New Humanitarian, 22 April 2019

GENEVA - The United Nations (UN) has warned against the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Libya as fierce fighting rages on between rival forces for control of the capital, Tripoli.

UN humanitarian coordinator for Libya Maria do Valle Ribeiro issued the warning in an interview with AFP late Sunday, amid clashes that continue in and around Tripoli between forces loyal to Libya's internationally-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) and those allied with the so-called Libyan National Army (LNA) led by renegade general Khalifa Haftar.

"As long as the situation continues, even if it just stagnates and continues like this, we can expect to see a continuing deterioration," Ribeiro told AFP. "When we see the use of air power, the indiscriminate shelling of densely populated areas, it is very difficult to be optimistic."

The UN official made the remarks after the GNA reported that air raids by the LNA had killed four people and wounded 20 others in Tripoli a day earlier.

"We continue to call for a respect of civilians, we continue to call for humanitarian pauses and most of all we continue to hope that the situation can return to a more peaceful settlement of the crisis," Ribeiro said.

The UN official also voiced concern over a breakdown in basic services, including electricity and water supplies, and said more relief funds were needed for the oil-rich African country.

GNA decries UN 'silence' on Haftar attacks

Separately on Sunday, the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord held the UN Security Council responsible for refraining from taking action regarding attacks carried out by Haftar's forces on the Libyan capital.

The GNA "holds the UN mission and Security Council responsible for their silence and complacency towards the actions of the criminal Haftar," the government said in a statement.

It went on to say that since the Libyan renegade general failed to make progress on the ground, he has resorted to seek support from "foreign air forces to strike civilians and the unarmed in the city".

Libya has been divided between two rival governments - the House of Representatives based in the eastern city of Tobruk and the GNA headed by Libyan Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj in Tripoli.

The 75-year-old Haftar who enjoys the loyalty of a group of armed militia and backing from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt has taken upon himself to protect the government in Tobruk.

Armed forces and militia loyal to the GNA have been fighting back.

Libya's crisis began to escalate on April 4 when forces loyal to Haftar launched a deadly campaign to invade and conquer Tripoli.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has recently said that intensified fighting for control of Tripoli was turning the densely-populated residential areas of Tripoli into "battlefields."

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), the fighting has so far killed at least 278 people and wounded more than 1,300 others. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) also reported that about 39,000 people have been displaced by the clashes.

Libya has been the scene of increasing violence since 2011, when former dictator Muammar Gaddafi was toppled from power after an uprising and a NATO military intervention.

His ouster created a huge power vacuum, leading to chaos and the emergence of numerous militant outfits, including the Daesh terrorist group.



Research Papers & Reports

By Ted Reinert, Brookings, 08 May 2019

Between May 23 and May 26, citizens of the (for now) 28 countries of the European Union will elect 751 members to the European Parliament. Together, the national contests will send representatives from dozens of parties to be sorted into at least seven somewhat unwieldy party groups, influence the composition of the European Commission slated to take office in November, and shape EU policy in a treacherous period. There are dozens of subplots, from the ambiguous political loyalties of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán to the likely return to public office of 82-year-old former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi as a member of European Parliament (MEP) for Forza Italia.

The election results will have immediate national political implications.

With Brexit delayed amidst gridlock and indecision in U.K. Parliament, the British electorate will have a chance to weigh in at the ballot box for the first time in two years. Nigel Farage’s new platform, the Brexit Party, will contend with Labour and the Conservatives to top the polls. Meanwhile, ChangeUK, formed by centrist defectors from Labour and the Conservatives, represents a new offering.
French President Emmanuel Macron will be looking for a show of strength for his La République En Marche (LREM) to buttress his reform agenda after months struggling with the Yellow Vests protests; Marine Le Pen’s National Rally will be looking to send the opposite signal.
A bad result for Germany’s Social Democrats, nationally and in simultaneous state elections in their stronghold of Bremen, could weaken an unenthusiastic grand coalition in Berlin and hasten the end of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s political career.
Italy’s governing Five Star Movement and League both aim to form new party groups around themselves, with the League’s far-right European Alliance of Peoples and Nations looking rather more successful than Five Star’s more abstract group.
Poland’s opposition has a chance to make political gains ahead of national elections in the fall in which it will try to dislodge Law and Justice (PiS), which has systematically weakened checks and balances since returning to power with an absolute majority in 2015.
At the European level, the three largest groups—the center-right European People’s Party (EPP), the center-left Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), and the liberal Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) in partnership with LREM—are together estimated to win something like 55 percent of the seats.

So nationalists are unlikely to win the European election or choose the new EU executive. But they will have a stronger presence and stronger influence than in the past.

The main groupings are themselves somewhat fractured and include problem children. The EPP has wrestled for years with the inclusion of Fidesz, the authoritarian-minded party of Viktor Orbán, in its ranks. Under external and internal pressure ahead of the European Parliament elections, it suspended Fidesz. President Trump, however, will welcome Orbán to the White House next week at the height of the campaign. Meanwhile, the S&D has frozen relations with Romania’s ruling Social Democrats (PSD), which has been doing its best to block the country’s former chief anti-corruption prosecutor Laura Codruţa Kövesi from leading the new European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO).

These elections are the second in which Europe is seeing a race between lead candidates nominated for the Commission presidency by the different party groups, known as the Spitzenkandidat system. This approach directly links the European Parliament elections to the subsequent formation of the EU’s executive, but doesn’t have universal buy-in. While the EPP’s Jean-Claude Juncker won the job this way in 2014, it may not work this time for Manfred Weber, a member of the Bavarian Christian Social Union who has led the EPP in the Parliament for five years, or Frans Timmermans, first vice president of the European Commission and the candidate of the S&D. A broader governing coalition may require a compromise candidate, and Macron has tried to position himself to be king- or queen-maker.

The postponement of Brexit to October 31 means that determining the basic framework of future economic relations between the European Union and the United Kingdom and preventing the return of a hard border to the island of Ireland will continue to dominate the EU agenda as the new Parliament takes office and the new executive is formed. Given British and continental hesitation to allow the default no-deal exit, the knotty problem could yet be kicked further down the road.


By Ted Reinert, Brookings, 08 May 2019

Between May 23 and May 26, citizens of the (for now) 28 countries of the European Union will elect 751 members to the European Parliament. Together, the national contests will send representatives from dozens of parties to be sorted into at least seven somewhat unwieldy party groups, influence the composition of the European Commission slated to take office in November, and shape EU policy in a treacherous period. There are dozens of subplots, from the ambiguous political loyalties of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán to the likely return to public office of 82-year-old former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi as a member of European Parliament (MEP) for Forza Italia.

The election results will have immediate national political implications.

With Brexit delayed amidst gridlock and indecision in U.K. Parliament, the British electorate will have a chance to weigh in at the ballot box for the first time in two years. Nigel Farage’s new platform, the Brexit Party, will contend with Labour and the Conservatives to top the polls. Meanwhile, ChangeUK, formed by centrist defectors from Labour and the Conservatives, represents a new offering.
French President Emmanuel Macron will be looking for a show of strength for his La République En Marche (LREM) to buttress his reform agenda after months struggling with the Yellow Vests protests; Marine Le Pen’s National Rally will be looking to send the opposite signal.
A bad result for Germany’s Social Democrats, nationally and in simultaneous state elections in their stronghold of Bremen, could weaken an unenthusiastic grand coalition in Berlin and hasten the end of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s political career.
Italy’s governing Five Star Movement and League both aim to form new party groups around themselves, with the League’s far-right European Alliance of Peoples and Nations looking rather more successful than Five Star’s more abstract group.
Poland’s opposition has a chance to make political gains ahead of national elections in the fall in which it will try to dislodge Law and Justice (PiS), which has systematically weakened checks and balances since returning to power with an absolute majority in 2015.
At the European level, the three largest groups—the center-right European People’s Party (EPP), the center-left Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), and the liberal Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) in partnership with LREM—are together estimated to win something like 55 percent of the seats.

So nationalists are unlikely to win the European election or choose the new EU executive. But they will have a stronger presence and stronger influence than in the past.

The main groupings are themselves somewhat fractured and include problem children. The EPP has wrestled for years with the inclusion of Fidesz, the authoritarian-minded party of Viktor Orbán, in its ranks. Under external and internal pressure ahead of the European Parliament elections, it suspended Fidesz. President Trump, however, will welcome Orbán to the White House next week at the height of the campaign. Meanwhile, the S&D has frozen relations with Romania’s ruling Social Democrats (PSD), which has been doing its best to block the country’s former chief anti-corruption prosecutor Laura Codruţa Kövesi from leading the new European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO).

These elections are the second in which Europe is seeing a race between lead candidates nominated for the Commission presidency by the different party groups, known as the Spitzenkandidat system. This approach directly links the European Parliament elections to the subsequent formation of the EU’s executive, but doesn’t have universal buy-in. While the EPP’s Jean-Claude Juncker won the job this way in 2014, it may not work this time for Manfred Weber, a member of the Bavarian Christian Social Union who has led the EPP in the Parliament for five years, or Frans Timmermans, first vice president of the European Commission and the candidate of the S&D. A broader governing coalition may require a compromise candidate, and Macron has tried to position himself to be king- or queen-maker.

The postponement of Brexit to October 31 means that determining the basic framework of future economic relations between the European Union and the United Kingdom and preventing the return of a hard border to the island of Ireland will continue to dominate the EU agenda as the new Parliament takes office and the new executive is formed. Given British and continental hesitation to allow the default no-deal exit, the knotty problem could yet be kicked further down the road.


By Constanze Stelzenmüller, 09 May 2019

Editor's Note: While at times weak or problematic, recent criticism of Germany hints at the larger truth that Germany must begin to understand the responsibility it bears in Europe and on the world stage in order to confront the challenges that face it, argues Constanze Stelzenmüller. This post originally appeared in the Financial Times.


North Korea, China, Iran, Cuba, Venezuela: America currently has disputes with a lot of countries. Europeans, meanwhile, have done quite well at keeping their heads down. A U.S.-EU trade truce is still holding. And NATO’s 70th anniversary festivities in Washington came and went in early April without tweet fireworks from the president threatening U.S. withdrawal.

There was one notable exception to this queasy peace, however: Germany.

At a think-tank event during the NATO celebrations, vice-president Mike Pence castigated Germany for its inadequate defense spending and for being a “captive of Russia.” A few weeks later, presidential daughter-in-law Lara Trump opined on Fox Business that Angela Merkel’s welcome of refugees in 2015 had been Germany’s “downfall” and “one of the worst things to ever happen” to the country.

Germany is, in fact, having a bit of a moment in the roiling imagination of the Trumpian nationalist right. It has been denounced as “selfish” and “America’s worst ally” by Ted Bromund, a scholar at the Heritage Foundation. Jakub Grygiel, until last year a member of the State Department’s policy planning staff, called it “a source of fear and resentment.” And Michael Anton, a former senior White House adviser for strategic communications, just published an essay on the “Trump Doctrine” which contends that the EU is “a fraud” and Germany “treats the EU as a front organization.”

Then of course there is President Trump himself, who has a famously bad chemistry with Chancellor Merkel and, in the words of the New Yorker magazine, an “obsession” with her country. It certainly features regularly in his tweets.

But even Brookings scholar Robert Kagan—who is a colleague and a friend, and, more importantly, neither a nationalist nor a Trumpian—recently chimed in on the topic with an essay in the magazine Foreign Affairs. He notes that today’s Germany is a product of specific characteristics of the postwar order: the U.S. security commitment to Europe, free trade, democracy promotion, and multilateralism—all of which are being questioned by the Trump administration. And Kagan worries that a failure of the European project might see the return of the “German question.”

Where to start? It’s a wild guess, but I suspect Ms. Trump probably hasn’t visited Germany lately. If she had, she would have found that its efforts to come to grips with the influx of more than a million refugees nearly four years ago have had mixed results. Deporting those who can’t claim asylum has been a struggle, and so has integrating those who can stay. But a remarkable 400,000 now have jobs or are in training. “Downfall” is a term most Germans associate with 1945, not 2015.

As for the new prophets of nationalism, their grasp of European history and politics is sketchy and riddled with errors. There also seems to be some confusion about what version of Germany they would prefer to the current one. Presumably, it should be less liberal, and less powerful. But they seem to dislike it both when it’s being liberal (by taking in refugees) and when it’s acting out of national self-interest (as with the Nord Stream 2 Russian gas pipeline, for example). And if its power is the bigger problem, wouldn’t a diminished or isolated Germany negatively affect Europe’s economic health? Wouldn’t that make it more difficult for it to take on a greater defense burden?

Kagan, in contrast, genuinely admires Germany’s democratic transformation and hopes that it lasts “forever.” But remember all that ordnance dropped by the Allies during the second world war now dormant in German soil? “Think of Europe today,” he writes, “as an unexploded bomb, its detonator intact and functional, its explosives still live.” It’s a troubling choice of metaphor, because it questions the reality of homegrown change and agency in postwar Europe. If America leaves, the jungle returns. And, with it, the undead ghosts of European and German history.

But a weak or problematic critique can point to a stark truth. No nation has profited more handsomely from the postwar European order than Germany. None has a greater interest in preserving it. The Berlin Republic shows little sign of understanding the responsibility it bears, and the urgency of the challenge.

The real risk to Europe’s prosperity and safety is not an aggressively selfish Germany, but one that is in denial, or else seeks to hedge against a bullying and erratic America with the help of authoritarian powers like Russia and China.


By Eric Rosand, 06 May 2019

Editor's Note: Religion plays a much greater role in policy responses to counter violent extremism than the research indicates it should, writes Eric Rosand. This piece was originally published as part of a series by Georgetown University's Berkley Center on Religion, Peace, and World Affairs.


As dozens of countries develop national frameworks for countering violent extremism (CVE), they now have the benefit of research to help guide their strategies and policymaking. But despite this more sophisticated understanding of the multiplicity of factors that fuel radicalization and recruitment, policies and programs to counter violent extremism are too often driven by political factors and other considerations rather than data and other evidence. Nowhere is this more apparent than when it comes to the role of religion in CVE, where religion plays a much greater role in policy response than the research indicates it should.

What Does the Research Show?

There is little empirical evidence that religion (or ideology) is a main motivator for violent extremism; radicalization is primarily a social issue that can provide opportunities for drivers that are more fundamental, but often less visible. Case studies have typically implicated non-religious and non-ideological grievances such as corruption, injustice, economic inequality, and political discrimination. Those who are recruited into militant groups or radicalized to extremist violence are typically not motivated by religion, but rather view religion as way to address their grievances and deliver the promise of adventure, belonging, or becoming a hero.

This is not to suggest that religion and ideology are not a factor, particularly after an individual has become radicalized or “indoctrinated.” Rather, it is recognizing that it is typically a small part of the violent extremism and thus CVE story.

Research Smesearch…

Despite these findings, religion is the focus of far too many CVE policies and programs of governments in countries in the Gulf and in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Emphasis is typically placed on promoting “moderate” or “peaceful” interpretations of Islam. This includes cracking down on (non-violent) religious groups that the ruling elite view as espousing extremist views, and this is often done with the support or encouragement of Western governments, which are at the same time funding much of the research on CVE and calling for more evidence-based, data-driven CVE policies and programs.

For example, despite the U.S. State Department and USAID’s emphasis on data and analytics and championing of a global network focused on generating and sharing more local research on the drivers of violent extremism (RESOLVE), U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, like his boss, subscribes to an overly simplistic view that the “twisted,” “radical Islamist” ideology lies at the root of the jihadi violence and that the problem would be solved if more political and religious leaders would “denounce” it. This view largely mirrors those of governments in the MENA and Gulf regions, which are replete with close U.S. counterterrorism partners and countries facing threats of extremist violence within their borders.

A cursory review of the CVE sections in the most recent U.S. State Department Country Reports on Terrorism underscores how most MENA and Gulf countries’ CVE efforts focus almost entirely on religion or ideology, despite the existing evidence and data on what drives violent extremist recruitment and radicalization.

The section on Egypt highlights the work of Dar Al-Iftaa, an official body that issues religious edicts, trains muftis, and leads on CVE messaging in religious channels. It notes how the Supreme Council for Media Regulation issued a list of 50 religious scholars authorized to curb aberrant fatwas and to counter extremist and radical ones. The report on Algeria notes steps to “de-politicize” and “de-ideologize” mosques and how the government monitors mosques for security-related offenses and prohibits the use of mosques as public meeting places outside of regular prayer hours. The Morocco section focuses on the work of the Rabita Moammadia of Ulamas, a council of 47 Muslim clerics that issues fatwahs to discredit religious interpretations promoted by violent extremist groups and coordinates with the Ministry of Religion to develop youth-centric CVE programs. It touts the work of Mohammad VI Institute for Training of Imams, which, often with Western donor support, trains imams from countries in the Sahel and beyond, focusing on delivering a “moderate religious curriculum to create community religious leaders that disrupt Islamist ideology.”

Saudi Arabia’s entry is dominated by counter-ideology efforts, whether through the Center for Ideological Warfare or the Global Center for Combating Extremist Ideology (or Etidal in Arabic) that President Donald Trump helped inaugurate in May 2017. Apart from noting its hosting of Hedayah, the international CVE center of excellence in Abu Dhabi, which focuses its attention outside the region, the UAE section is similarly focused on religious- and ideology-focused CVE initiatives.

Why Does Politics Trump Evidence When It Comes to Religion and CVE?

So what accounts for this incongruence? Politics too often trumps evidence when it comes to CVE, particularly in this part of the world.

First, (over)emphasizing religion and ideology (as well as foreign policy issues) conveniently allows the focus to remain on the behavior and propaganda of the violent extremists and not on socioeconomic or political conditions in a society where the government might bear some responsibility. As Rice University’s Annelle Sheline has noted, certain governments prefer to emphasize religious or ideological reasons to ignore or obscure their own failures, such as lingering governance deficits that might include lack of service delivery and corruption.

Second, as H.A. Hellyer has argued, religion and ideology are attractive targets for political leaders and policymakers looking for simple solutions to a challenge: they want to demonstrate to their supporters that they understand the threat and are doing something about it, even if misguided.

Third, for much of the nearly two decades since 9/11, the United States and, albeit to a lesser extent, other governments in the West have prioritized the building and strengthening of counterterrorism cooperation with Muslim-majority countries. During this period, the main areas of focus have been on a) intelligence sharing; b) military and law enforcement cooperation; and c) getting “moderate” religious leaders and institutions in the Muslim world to speak out against “warped” interpretations of Islam that were used by some to justify some extremist violence. Whereas the first two areas involve some form of collaboration between the West and Muslim-majority countries, when it comes to the religious dimension, for legal and other reasons, the West has been essentially dependent on Muslim-majority countries for action. Injecting evidence and data on the actual drivers of violent extremism in counterterrorism and CVE dialogues with these countries—particularly given what this means in terms of government (mis)behavior—risks undermining the broader security relationship with them.

Imagine the challenges of trying to build a global coalition to defeat the so-called Islamic State if the United States had sought to include a focus on addressing the structural drivers of violent extremism and what is fueling the feelings of marginalization, exclusion, alienation, and unfair treatment that can make individuals susceptible to ISIS and other extremist propaganda? This helps explain why 74 countries in the global coalition have focused all of their CVE attention on “countering Daesh’s propaganda.”

Although we can expect the ever-growing body of evidence-based, contextualized research on the drivers of violent extremism to shed more light on the limited role that religion and ideology are playing, we should not be so naïve as to expect that this will influence the degree to which these issues are featured in CVE policies and programs.



PRETORIA - The African National Congress was set to easily win South Africa’s election on Saturday but with a lower vote share reflecting anger at corruption scandals and racial inequalities that remain entrenched a generation after the party took power.

With 99.9 percent of voting districts counted following Wednesday’s election, the ANC led with 57.5% of the vote. The main opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) was on 20.79% and the leftist Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) had 10.78%

It would be the worst electoral performance by the late Nelson Mandela’s former liberation movement, which has governed South Africa uninterrupted since the country’s first free election marked the end of white minority rule in 1994.

The ANC’s victory will secure it enough seats in parliament to give President Cyril Ramaphosa another five years in office but may leave him short of ammunition to battle party rivals who oppose his reforms to galvanise the economy and counter graft.

The ANC had not previously won less than 60% of the vote in a national election. Two results are still to come from nine provincial polls also held on Wednesday.

Ramaphosa, who replaced scandal-plagued Jacob Zuma as president in 2018, had sought to re-engage ANC voters whose support was eroded by faltering efforts to address corruption, unemployment and disparities in housing, land and services.


By Nafisa Eltahir

DUBAI - After spearheading the rallies that toppled former President Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s main protest group is now locked in a stand-off with the country’s new military rulers that is testing its clout as a political force.

The Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) gained widespread support during more than four months of protests and it has helped win a string of apparent concessions from the military council that took over from Bashir on April 11.

But as the unionists and activists in the SPA try to chart a course to full-fledged democracy, they are coming up against a powerful rival that has shown little sign yet that it is willing to move aside for a civilian-led transition.

Frustrated by a lack of progress, the Declaration of Freedom and Change Forces (DFCF), a broad coalition of opposition groups headed by the SPA, called on Wednesday for a campaign of civil disobedience to crank up the pressure on the military.

“We have all options open from now on,” Ahmed Rabie, an influential SPA member, told Reuters. “If (the council) insists on holding on to power, we are going to consider this a military coup, and we will escalate our tactics, peacefully.”

The SPA has said such a campaign would likely focus on mass strikes, which have been successful in previous uprisings in post-independence Sudan. Strikes called by the SPA before Bashir’s fall met with limited success, but workers may be less cowed following his removal.

It may also call for a boycott of non-essential goods and public services in a bid to starve the government of tax revenue, and intensify rallies and sit-ins across Sudan.

The biggest ongoing sit-in, which began on April 6 outside the Defence Ministry in Khartoum, has become the focal point of the uprising.

The Transitional Military Council (TMC) has said it will not use force to end the sit-in. But the SPA could be undermined by maneuvering due to its lack of political experience.

“The politicking is starting. This is a terrain that the professionals association might not be as well-equipped for as it seems,” said Sudanese analyst Magdi el-Gizouli.


To try to placate protesters the TMC replaced its first head after one day, dismissed senior allies of Bashir, announced anti-corruption measures and moved to restructure security and intelligence agencies.

Bashir, who is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for alleged war crimes in Darfur, is in prison in the capital Khartoum.

But while the DFCF wants a transitional body led by civilians to steer a four-year transition, the TMC has indicated that it wants to retain overall control of any joint military and civilian sovereign council.

As talks between the two sides have dragged on, the SPA has accused the military leaders of expanding their powers.

The TMC has said it is open to more dialogue and that elections could be held after six months if there’s no agreement on an interim government - well ahead of the end of the council’s planned two-year transition.

The SPA’s civil disobedience could put pressure on the military council given Sudan’s economic vulnerability. The country is already suffering from spiraling inflation and shortages of cash and basic goods.

But its rivals in the TMC have powerful and wealthy backers.

The TMC’s leaders, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, have ties to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which together promised Sudan $3 billion to support the central bank and provide fuel, wheat and medicine.

Dagalo, commonly known as Hemedti, controls the feared Rapid Support Forces, which fought in Darfur and are participating in the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. They are also deployed across Khartoum.

“This is an army establishment and they don’t want to lose control,” said Sudanese writer and commentator Reem Abbas. “There’s a lot of things at stake: resources, land, immunity for war crimes.”


The SPA, by contrast, was formed in 2016 from unofficial parallel trade unions outside the state apparatus representing doctors, lawyers, journalists and other professions.

It was campaigning for higher wages when demonstrations against Bashir, triggered by a deepening economic crisis, spread across Sudan from Dec. 19 and propelled the SPA into the role of protest coordinator. It has since expanded to include more than 20 unions.

The SPA’s non-political image was key to its success in ousting Bashir after three decades in power, said Rabie, a high school physics teacher from the Haj Yousif neighborhood on the outskirts of Khartoum.

Despite its large following, the SPA says it will not become a political party. It has no leader or strict hierarchy and, until recently, operated largely underground.

That could leave a vacuum.

Under Bashir, opposition parties’ activities were limited and membership dwindled. Analysts say they still have much work to do to become effective political forces.

The opposition also faces a challenge presenting a united front. The DFCF is made up of a wide range of political parties, civil society associations and armed groups from across Sudan and they have already made conflicting statements about their approach to the negotiations.

Many protesters believe the SPA shouldn’t be negotiating with the military at all, chanting: “Civilian rule is the decision of the people.” The SPA has sought to reassure them, saying it will act as a guarantor of the revolution and democracy during the transition.

“We always work hard to get democracy in this country and then we lose it,” said Rabie, who was jailed from Jan. 4 until shortly after Bashir’s downfall. “We worked hard to get it, and, God willing, we can protect it.”



By Mfuneko Toyana and Wendell Roelf

JOHANNESBURG/CAPE TOWN - The African National Congress faced its toughest electoral test on Wednesday as it sought to reverse a slide in support from voters frustrated by graft and racial inequalities a generation after it won power in South Africa’s first all-race poll.

South Africa is holding parliamentary and provincial elections amid frustration with a lack of progress 25 years after Nelson Mandela’s ANC swept to power at the end of white minority rule in 1994.

Queues built up at polling stations through the morning. Some polling stations around Johannesburg opened late or did not have voting materials.

Officials have said the results could be announced on Saturday.

The national election is the first under President Cyril Ramaphosa, who replaced scandal-plagued Jacob Zuma as head of state in February 2018 after four years as his deputy.

Opinion polls suggest the ANC will again win a majority of the 400 seats in the National Assembly, but analysts have predicted its margin of victory will fall.

“I’m a member of the ANC but I didn’t vote for them this time,” said construction worker Thabo Makhene, 32, in the commercial hub of Johannesburg.

“They need to catch a wake-up. The way they run the state, mishandling state funds, they’ve lost their morals.”

Pete Mokokosi, a 77-year-old pensioner, said he felt South Africans needed change, a better economy, education and jobs.

“The weather changes everyday, why can’t we?” he said as he waited to vote in Soweto.

In Cape Town, Anneke du Plessis, 43, who works at a media company, said her vote was to end corruption.

“We have to unite and stop this downward spiral. This is the most important vote since 1994,” she said.

Some voters said they would back the ruling party.

“They have made mistakes before but this time we have the right man,” said Alpheus Zihle, 69, a pensioner in Alexandra township in Johannesburg who said he would vote for the ANC.


The ANC’s biggest challengers are the main opposition party the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the leftist Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF).

The ANC won 62 percent of the vote in 2014’s parliamentary election, down from 2009 and far short of its best result, 69 percent in 2004 under President Thabo Mbeki.

Analysts have put that falling support down to corruption allegations against government officials, a slowing economy with one of the highest unemployment rates in the world, and demands from black citizens for more equitable distribution of land.

Ramaphosa - who became ANC leader after narrowly defeating a faction allied with Zuma - has promised to improve service delivery, create jobs and fight corruption. But his reforms have been held up by divisions and opposition within his own party.

“Reforms will remain at best one-step-forward, one-step-back and so potential growth will not rise,” Peter Attard Montalto, head of capital markets research at Intellidex, said in a note.

Africa’s most industrialized economy grew at an estimated 0.8 percent in 2018 after recovering from a recession in the first half of the year when a drought hit farming, although blackouts at power utility Eskom continue to drag on activity. Growth is forecast at 1.5 percent this year.


The center-right DA won 22 percent of the parliamentary vote in 2014. It appointed its first black leader Mmusi Maimane in 2015 and made headlines by leading coalition victories in local government elections in Pretoria and Johannesburg a year later.

But splits within the party could see its support wane.

“Fear says to us let’s stick with what we know, hope says let’s bring change,” Maimane said after casting his ballot in the township of Soweto in Johannesburg where he grew up.

The EFF’s leader Julius Malema, a fiery orator who formed the party in 2013 after he was expelled from the ANC, cast his vote in the northern city of Polokwane.

“If you need change, the EFF is the way to go,” said Malema, whose party won 6 percent of the vote in 2014, making it the third-largest presence in parliament.

It wants to nationalize mines and banks, and played a key role in holding Zuma to account for spending state money on non-security upgrades to his private residence.

Hundreds of people covered in blankets and coats in the chilly winter morning gathered outside a polling station in Soweto, where Ramaphosa cast his vote.

“We’ve made mistakes, but we are sorry about those mistakes, and we are saying our people should re-invest their confidence in us,” the president said. “We are going to correct the bad ways of the past,” he said.

JUBA - The South African government on Monday signed an oil production agreement with South Sudan, signalling intent to pump money into Juba’s nascent petroleum industry that has almost stalled over conflict.

The deal known as the Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement (EPSA) will see Pretoria’s state-owned Strategic Fuel Fund (SFF) granted permission to explore oil in an area known as Block B2, which is in the wide oilfields of the Muglad basin that straddles both Sudan and South Sudan.

The exploration is to take about six years and SFF will enter a joint venture with local petro company Nilepet for aerial exploration, seismic tests as well as drill wells when oil is found.

Last year, South Africa’s Department of Energy pledged to invest $1 billion into South Sudan’s petroleum industry, with the aim of securing affordable energy supplies for South Africa.

The countries are now in talks to set up a 60,000 barrel per day refinery to supply oil products to the local market in South Sudan, as well as to secure exports to Ethiopia and other neighbouring countries.

The B2 area includes productive parts of the Muglad Basin and is part of the 120,000 kilometre square block Block B which was split into three in 2012.

There has been much interest in South Sudan’s Block B acreages since the entry of Oranto Petroleum to Block B3 in 2017.

Much of South Sudan’s oil and gas blocks are yet to be fully explored and resources assessed.

South Sudan has the third-largest oil reserves in sub-Saharan Africa, estimated at 3.5 billion barrels, with just 30 percent of the country explored.

The deal, coming at a time South Sudan is facing uncertainty over the transitional government of national unity, protected the social pillars of oil production.

The South African firm will be required to train local people for oil production and management, give back to hosting communities and ensure local women benefit from their work.

A dispatch from Juba issued after the signing ceremony celebrated the agreement as one way to foster stability for a country that hasn’t known peace since independence in July 2011.

“We expect to discover more oil and help us boost our economy,” said Petroleum Minister Ezekiel Lol Gatkuoth who signed the agreement with South Africa's Energy Minister Jeff Radebe.

“The SFF’s commitment can help us raise production levels which have fallen recently.”

South Sudan’s oil production peaked to 350,000 barrels per day but dipped to under 150,000 as conflict forced producers to abandon wells.

Mr Radebe said the deal would strengthen energy security for South Africa.

“We are bullish about this strategic opportunity into Block B2. It provides South Africa with a chance to further strengthen its energy security while entering one of the top three most lucrative onshore oil and gas markets in Africa. Investment is key to guaranteeing the economic progress of South Sudan,” Mr. Rabede said

As officials prepare for a transitional government, the local Petroleum ministry says it expects the production to rise from 270,000 barrels per day.

The products are often exported in crude form through the pipeline to Sudan.

According to the deal’s legal advisors Centurion, the arrangement means South Sudan could be involved in exploring more oil fields.

“The potential discoveries can be quickly and cheaply tied into existing infrastructure,” said NJ Ayuk, CEO of Centurion Law Group.

“South Sudan’s ability to attract, retain, and leverage energy investment is key for an inclusive and sustainable economic growth,” Mr Ayuk, also Executive Chairman of continental lobby African Energy Chamber said in a dispatch on Monday.


Par Robert Malley, President & CEO de Crisis Group


Crisis Group estime qu’il est important de se pencher sur l’interaction entre genre et conflit. Mais ce faisant, il faut éviter des écueils conceptuels. Parmi ceux-ci : les femmes ne sont pas seulement des victimes. Elles ont également le pouvoir de choisir et d’agir.

En octobre dernier, l’Ethiopie a nommé sa première présidente, seule dirigeante d’un Etat africain aujourd’hui. Dans de nombreux parlements nationaux, du Mexique au Rwanda, les femmes sont désormais aussi nombreuses, voire plus nombreuses que les hommes. L’un des processus de justice transitionnelle récents les plus significatifs, en Tunisie, est supervisé par une femme. Voilà pour les bonnes nouvelles. Mais à côté de leurs progrès évidents dans les hautes sphères du pouvoir, les femmes continuent d’être les premières victimes des conflits et la cible principale des violences sexuelles. Elles rejoignent aussi plus ouvertement les mouvements insurgés, contribuant à alimenter des conflits violents qui sont traditionnellement considérés comme l’apanage des combattants masculins. Et, sur la scène internationale, des patriarches populistes arrivent au pouvoir dans plusieurs pays, avec des discours empreints d’hostilité quant à l’idée même des droits des femmes et de l’égalité hommes-femmes.

Bref, en cette période de grands bouleversements de l’ordre mondial, la question du genre est au premier plan de nombreuses contestations politiques, qu’il s’agisse des luttes de pouvoir sur la scène politique américaine ou d’Etats fragilisés par un conflit récent en Afrique et au Moyen-Orient. Pour célébrer la Journée internationale des femmes, Crisis Group a publié cette semaine une courte série de textes visant à définir une vision plus nuancée et à mieux comprendre les interactions entre les dynamiques de genre, les conflits et la violence politique, ainsi que certains des défis complexes auxquels nous sommes confrontés lorsque nous travaillons sur ce sujet. Bien des choses ont changé depuis que le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies a adopté sa résolution 1325 sur les femmes, la paix et la sécurité, il y près de vingt ans.

Les identités de genre façonnent les conflits

La prise de conscience progresse à travers le monde quant à la façon dont les identités de genre – ce que signifie être une femme ou un homme « idéal » dans une société donnée, et les responsabilités et aspirations que cela implique – façonnent et parfois même déterminent l’émergence et le déroulement des conflits liés à l’accès aux terres, au pouvoir et aux ressources. Dans un contexte où les citoyens sont déçus par leurs gouvernements, en raison par exemple d’une répression féroce ou de la corruption, des groupes militants savent exploiter le vide laissé par l’incapacité de l’Etat à aider les jeunes à se marier. Ils se positionnent ainsi comme de meilleurs alliés pour remplir une importante attente sociétale et accéder à un marqueur social clé, à savoir la capacité d’être un époux ou une épouse. Les Etats eux-mêmes utilisent parfois la question sensible de l’honneur et des violences sexuelles comme moyens de punir et de réprimer les opposants politiques, hommes et femmes. Et de la Somalie à l’Afghanistan, les mouvements insurgés remettent souvent en cause la légitimité des gouvernements centraux en présentant les sujets de l’égalité hommes-femmes ou du statut des femmes comme imposées par l’Occident.

A Crisis Group, nous nous penchons de plus en plus sur l’interaction entre la question du genre et les dynamiques de conflits. Mais nous croyons aussi qu’il importe d’adopter une approche prudente et nuancée, en considérant précisément ce qu’implique une perspective de genre et, surtout, certains des écueils conceptuels auxquels elle devrait prendre garde. Nous cherchons à analyser comment les hommes et les femmes vivent les effets de la corruption, de l’effondrement de l’Etat, de la violence des bandes criminelles et des déplacements. Nous soulignons le rôle, parfois discret et occulté, que jouent les femmes pour promouvoir le dialogue entre belligérants, et nous essayons de pousser pour leur participation lorsque des négociations de paix sérieuses sont lancées.

Nous nous intéressons au rôle des femmes non seulement comme victimes, mais aussi en tant qu’actrices des conflits, dotées du pouvoir de choisir et d’agir. En effet, les femmes et le militantisme, et les dilemmes auxquels nous sommes confrontés lorsque nous cherchons à mieux comprendre l’influence des femmes dans les groupes insurgés, constituent l’un des principaux fils conducteurs de nos recherches et de notre analyse. C’est d’autant plus important au moment où l’Etat islamique est en train de perdre son dernier bastion dans le Nord de la Syrie et où de nombreux gouvernements font face au retour de leurs citoyennes ayant fait partie du groupe. Ils doivent en effet décider de poursuivre en justice ou de réhabiliter des femmes dont le degré de culpabilité et d’implication dans l’évolution du groupe et les atrocités qu’il a commises est mal connu.

Reconnaitre l’influence et la place centrale des femmes au sein des groupes militants exige une évaluation nuancée de leurs différents niveaux de responsabilité.
Comme notre travail de terrain entrepris ces dernières années le démontre, nombre d’autres sociétés et d’Etats font face à des défis similaires avec leurs propres groupes insurrectionnels et les guerres auxquelles ils participent. Que ce soit dans le contexte du mouvement Boko Haram dans le Nord-Est du Nigéria ou de l’emprise tenace d’Al-Shabaab dans de nombreuses régions de Somalie, les femmes rejoignent puis quittent les groupes armés, alors que leurs propres vulnérabilités sociales et leurs doléances se confondent souvent avec les griefs plus larges et les divisions que ces groupes reflètent et exploitent. Les femmes ont joué un rôle crucial dans l’émergence de plusieurs de ces mouvements armés : par exemple, de nombreuses femmes somaliennes ont initialement rejoint le mouvement Al-Shabaab pour se protéger des violences claniques. Au Nigéria, les militants de Boko Haram ont réussi à attirer des femmes en quête d’indépendance et de perspectives en leur offrant une éducation religieuse et un choix matrimonial dans un contexte de corruption, de pauvreté et de déliquescence de l’Etat. Plus récemment, nous examinons le rôle actif, opérationnel et de soutien que jouent les femmes dans ces insurrections, en intégrant cette connaissance à nos évaluations des groupes eux-mêmes et des stratégies que nous proposons pour contrer leur attrait.

D’autres difficultés existent. Reconnaitre l’influence et la place centrale des femmes au sein des groupes militants exige une évaluation nuancée de leurs différents niveaux de responsabilité. Le dilemme est de mieux comprendre l’implication des femmes sans passer d’une vision binaire à une autre, en considérant les femmes soit comme des épouses passives de jihadistes, soit comme de dangereuses combattantes coupables des pires atrocités d’un groupe militant, à égalité avec les combattants masculins. Notre travail au Nigéria en particulier a tenté de répondre à cette question en inscrivant dans l’histoire du groupe Boko Haram – au-delà de ses victimes que le mouvement #BringBackOurGirls a mises au premier plan – celle de femmes ayant consciemment gonflé les rangs du mouvement tout en souffrant elles-mêmes de sa cruauté.

Ceci n’est qu’un aperçu de notre projet Genre, paix et sécurité, que nous sommes résolus à développer et à approfondir.

Notre commentaire du 6 mars se penche sur l’espace de plus en plus restreint pour l’activisme des femmes en Amérique latine et ailleurs. Notre récit « Our Journeys » du 5 mars explore la place croissante de la société civile en Irak à travers les témoignages de jeunes hommes et femmes qui inventent de nouvelles façons de faire entendre leur voix aux niveaux social et politique. Ce n’est que le début de notre travail sur le sujet, qui se poursuivra au cours de l’année à venir et au-delà.



Après vingt mois d’affrontements, Yaoundé et les séparatistes campent sur leurs positions.  Entre la sécession voulue par les séparatistes et la décentralisation en trompe-l’œil que propose le gouvernement, des solutions médianes doivent être explorées pour conférer plus d’autonomie aux régions.

Que se passe-t-il ? Le conflit dans les régions anglophones du Cameroun s’est embourbé. Il n’existe aucun dialogue entre Yaoundé et les séparatistes, qui campent sur leurs positions : l’un mise sur une victoire militaire et refuse toute discussion sur la forme de l’Etat, les autres exigent l’indépendance.

En quoi est-ce significatif ? En vingt mois, le conflit a fait 1 850 morts, 530 000 déplacés internes et des dizaines de milliers de réfugiés. L’intransigeance des belligérants risque de générer de nouvelles violences et de prolonger le conflit, qu’aucun camp ne semble en mesure de remporter militairement dans la courte durée.

Comment agir ? Acteurs camerounais et internationaux devraient pousser les deux camps à des concessions en menaçant de sanctions ceux qui feraient obstacle au dialogue et en récompensant les moins intransigeants. A terme, le gouvernement devra améliorer le cadre légal de la décentralisation afin d’accorder une plus grande autonomie aux communes et régions.


Au Cameroun, la crise anglophone s’est embourbée. Après vingt mois d’affrontements, 1 850 morts, 530 000 déplacés internes et des dizaines de milliers de réfugiés, le pouvoir et les séparatistes campent sur des positions inconciliables. Les séparatistes vivent dans l’utopie d’une indépendance prochaine. Le gouvernement, quant à lui, se berce d’illusions quant à la possibilité d’une victoire militaire à court terme. Les modérés et les fédéralistes, qui bénéficient pourtant de la sympathie d’une majorité de la population, peinent à s’organiser. Pour sortir de cette impasse, les acteurs camerounais et internationaux devraient faire pression sur le gouvernement et les séparatistes. Entre la sécession voulue par les séparatistes et la décentralisation en trompe-l’œil que propose Yaoundé, des solutions médianes doivent être explorées pour conférer plus d’autonomie aux régions.

La crise sociopolitique née en octobre 2016 dans les régions anglophones du Nord-Ouest et Sud-Ouest s’est muée fin 2017 en conflit armé. Sept milices armées sont actuellement en position de force dans la majorité des localités rurales. Les forces de sécurité ont mis du temps à organiser leur riposte, mais depuis mi-2018, elles infligent des pertes aux séparatistes. Elles ne parviennent pourtant pas à reprendre entièrement le contrôle des zones rurales, ni à empêcher les attaques récurrentes des séparatistes dans les villes.

Il n’existe actuellement aucun dialogue entre Yaoundé et les séparatistes. Ces derniers exigent un débat avec l’Etat sur les modalités de la séparation, en présence d’un médiateur international. Le pouvoir refuse toute discussion sur la forme de l’Etat et la réforme des institutions. Il propose en revanche une décentralisation qui ne confère ni un financement adéquat, ni une autonomie suffisante aux collectivités territoriales décentralisées (communes et régions), et prévoit d’organiser les premières élections régionales de l’histoire du pays cette année. Loin de résoudre le conflit en cours, cette solution de façade risque au contraire de générer de nouvelles violences.

Des initiatives locales de dialogue tentent de se mettre en place. En particulier, des responsables religieux anglophones (catholique, protestant et musulman) ont annoncé en juillet 2018 un projet de conférence générale anglophone, envisagé comme une première étape avant un dialogue national inclusif. Une grande partie des anglophones y est favorable. Initialement réticents, certains séparatistes semblent à présent s’ouvrir à l’idée, à condition que la conférence débouche sur un référendum d’autodétermination qui donnerait le choix entre fédéralisme et indépendance. Mais face à l’opposition du pouvoir, les organisateurs de la conférence ont déjà dû la repousser deux fois : d’août à novembre 2018 d’abord, puis à mars 2019. Elle n’a toujours pas pu se tenir.

Si certains séparatistes se montrent intransigeants, d’autres pourraient accepter un dialogue avec l’Etat camerounais en présence d’un médiateur international, sur le fédéralisme ou une décentralisation effective, qui conférerait une autonomie et un financement adéquat aux régions, et garantirait le respect des spécificités anglophones en matière judiciaire et éducative. De même, si le gouvernement camerounais semble exclure le fédéralisme, il pourrait peut-être consentir au régionalisme ou à une décentralisation effective, qui passerait par une modification du cadre législatif.

Pour ouvrir la voie à des pourparlers, les belligérants doivent faire des concessions réciproques à même de rétablir un minimum de confiance et d’enrayer la spirale de la violence. Le gouvernement devrait soutenir la conférence générale anglophone, qui devrait permettre aux anglophones de se mettre d’accord sur leurs représentants à un éventuel dialogue national tout en redonnant une voix aux anglophones non séparatistes. Dans le cadre d’un discours réconciliateur, le président camerounais devrait reconnaitre l’existence du problème anglophone et la légitimité des revendications exprimées par les populations anglophones ; ordonner des enquêtes sur les abus des forces de sécurité ; prévoir des compensations pour les victimes et s’engager à reconstruire les localités détruites ; et libérer les centaines d’activistes anglophones actuellement détenus, y compris des figures importantes du mouvement séparatiste. Les séparatistes devraient renoncer à leur stratégie de villes mortes le lundi et de boycott de l’école, et exclure de leurs rangs les combattants qui ont commis des abus contre les civils.

La combinaison de pressions internes et internationales pourrait amener le gouvernement et les séparatistes à de telles concessions. Au niveau international, l’idée serait de récompenser les parties qui acceptent de modérer leurs positions et de sanctionner celles qui maintiennent une ligne plus intransigeante. L’Union européenne et les Etats-Unis, en particulier, devraient envisager des sanctions ciblées contre les pontes du pouvoir et les hauts gradés qui continuent de faire obstacle au dialogue (interdictions de voyages, gels des avoirs), et les séparatistes qui prônent ou organisent la violence (poursuites judiciaires). La procureure générale de la Cour pénale internationale devrait ouvrir des enquêtes préliminaires sur les abus des deux parties, afin de souligner que la poursuite des violences aura des conséquences judiciaires. Mais les acteurs internationaux, divisés sur la position à adopter et les mesures à prendre, doivent d’abord se mettre d’accord sur une position commune, du moins parmi les pays occidentaux.

Au niveau interne, les francophones et anglophones camerounais qui prônent des solutions de compromis doivent se mobiliser pour faire pression sur les séparatistes et le gouvernement. En particulier, les fédéralistes doivent faire front commun pour peser sur les discussions. Ils devraient continuer le dialogue avec les séparatistes pour les encourager à modérer leurs positions, et augmenter la pression sur les pouvoirs publics pour qu’ils s’ouvrent aux séparatistes prêts à un compromis. Ils doivent enfin mener une campagne internationale en faveur d’une solution pacifique à la crise.

Une fois la confiance instaurée, des discussions préparatoires seront nécessaires entre émissaires du gouvernement, des fédéralistes et des séparatistes ; elles devraient avoir lieu à l’étranger. Durant ce processus, les acteurs internationaux, notamment les Etats-Unis, la Suisse, le Vatican, les Nations unies, l’Union européenne (en particulier la France, l’Allemagne et le Royaume-Uni) et l’Union africaine, doivent continuer à encourager le gouvernement au dialogue, y compris en proposant de financer et de soutenir les rencontres préparatoires.

Ils pourraient aussi, au cas où un dialogue a lieu, aider à financer les compensations aux personnes victimes d’abus, la reconstruction dans les régions anglophones, le retour des réfugiés et des déplacés, et le désarmement et la démobilisation des ex-combattants. Vu le niveau d’acrimonie entre les parties, la présence d’un médiateur international sera nécessaire au cours des discussions préparatoires et lors du dialogue national. Plusieurs pays, institutions et organisations internationales ont proposé leur médiation depuis le début du conflit. Les Nations unies, l’Union africaine, l’Eglise catholique et la Suisse semblent les mieux placées pour jouer ce rôle, car les parties au conflit les perçoivent comme moins partisanes.

Les discussions de fond entre les trois parties devraient se dérouler au Cameroun, ce qui exigerait des garanties de non-arrestation des représentants des séparatistes. Le gouvernement devrait, au cours de ces négociations, se montrer prêt à réviser la Constitution pour accorder une plus grande autonomie aux régions ou approfondir sensiblement le cadre légal de la décentralisation. Ces améliorations pourraient notamment inclure l’élection des présidents des régions et des conseils régionaux au suffrage universel direct ; l’instauration d’administrations régionales disposant d’une grande autonomie financière et administrative ; et l’augmentation des compétences et des ressources des communes. Le gouvernement pourrait par ailleurs entreprendre des réformes institutionnelles et de gouvernance pour mieux prendre en compte les spécificités des systèmes éducatif et judiciaire des régions anglophones.

Plus largement, le conflit en cours met en lumière les carences du modèle de gouvernance centraliste camerounais et interpelle les autorités gouvernementales sur deux préoccupations essentielles : la nécessité d’une meilleure prise en compte des minorités, des héritages coloniaux et des spécificités culturelles ; et le besoin d’une redistribution plus juste et équitable des richesses du pays. La solution pérenne réside dans le dialogue et le consensus, qui sont indispensables pour mener les réformes institutionnelles et de gouvernance dont le Cameroun a besoin.

CRISIS GROUP, Nairobi/Bruxelles, 2 mai 2019

Pour le text integral, visiter:

Une vague de protestations a mis fin à vingt ans de règne de Bouteflika amenant l’Algérie à la croisée des chemins. Le régime devrait lancer des réformes substantielles et entamer un dialogue avec les représentants des manifestations afin d’éviter un cycle de protestation de masse et de répression policière entraînant chaos et violence.

Que se passe-t-il ? Le 2 avril, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, le président algérien, vieillissant et malade, a démissionné sous la pression de l’armée. Cette démission est le résultat de cinq semaines de protestations de rue contre son cinquième mandat dans le cadre des élections présidentielles, initialement prévues à la mi-avril.

En quoi est-ce significatif ? La fin des vingt ans de règne de Bouteflika ouvre une période d’incertitude. Jusqu’à présent, le régime est resté en place et a intensifié ses mesures répressives pour convaincre les manifestants de rentrer chez eux et d’accepter une transition dont il fixerait les termes. Mais les protestataires se méfient des promesses du gouvernement intérimaire et réclament des changements plus fondamentaux.

Comment agir ? Le régime et les manifestants devraient s’attacher à la non-violence et lancer un dialogue visant à établir une feuille de route pour une transition que les protestataires, les dirigeants du système et les représentants des différents secteurs de la société accepteraient dans ses grandes lignes, pour éviter que la répression policière n’entraine chaos et violence.

I. Synthèse

Il a fallu cinq semaines de manifestations de rue pour mettre fin au règne d’Abdelaziz Bouteflika, contrecarrant ainsi son dessein de briguer un cinquième mandate de chef de l’Etat. Mais aujourd’hui, trois semaines plus tard, une impasse se profile alors que les manifestants et les forces de sécurité sont en désaccord sur le rythme et le contenu de la transition politique. Des figures clés du régime rejetées par la rue restent au pouvoir, ce qui encourage les manifestants à prôner une rupture nette avec le passé : le départ de toutes les figures de l’ère Bouteflika et l’élaboration d’une nouvelle constitution. En réponse, les autorités ont interdit toutes les manifestations, à l’exception de celles qui ont lieu le vendredi, et expriment de nouveau leur assurance. Pourtant, les protestations ne cessent de s’amplifier. Les dirigeants algériens devraient donc donner des signaux clairs que des changements réels sont en cours : renvoi de gouverneurs, dissolution du parlement et report des élections présidentielles. Ils devraient surtout engager immédiatement un dialogue avec des dirigeants de la société civile acceptés par les manifestants. L’objectif serait de parvenir à un accord sur les grandes lignes d’une transition politique qui permettrait de rétablir la confiance et de prévenir l’entrée dans un cycle de violence incontrôlée. Le changement en Algérie doit venir de l’intérieur, et non de l’extérieur : toute ingérence étrangère risque aujourd’hui de saper la légitimité de la transition en cours.

II. Un tournant répressif

Le 2 avril, Ahmed Gaid Salah, chef d’état-major de l’armée et vice-ministre de la Défense, a obtenu la démission de Bouteflika en raison de son incapacité à remplir ses fonctions de président, conformément à l’article 102 de la Constitution. Les manifestants ont crié victoire, mais ils ont vite réalisés que ce changement était cosmétique. Bouteflika avait disparu mais le régime (le pouvoir) était toujours là : en la personne d’Abdelkader Bensalah, chef de l’Assemblée nationale (chambre haute du Parlement), aujourd’hui président par intérim ; de Nourredine Bedoui, nouveau Premier ministre désigné à la mi-mars à l’issue de la chute du précédent gouvernement, au sein duquel il exerçait la fonction de ministre de l’Intérieur ; de Tayeb Belaiz, président du Conseil constitutionnel (qui a démissionné le 16 avril), ancien ministre de l’Intérieur ; et de Gaid Salah lui-même, architecte de cette transition, assis sans ambages au sommet du pouvoir.

Aux yeux des manifestants, le remplacement de Bouteflika par Bensalah, lequel a rapidement annoncé une élection présidentielle pour le 4 juillet, était une insulte de plus. Si cette décision était conforme à la Constitution, laquelle prévoit des élections dans les 90 jours suivant le départ du président en exercice, les manifestants, qui tiennent les rues depuis le 22 février, y ont vu une manœuvre du régime pour dissoudre leur mouvement (hirak) et ignorer leur demande de refonte du système.

Le départ forcé de Bouteflika, loin de mettre fin à ces protestations, a encouragé les Algériens à réaffirmer leur objectif de rupture avec le système.

En réponse, les autorités ont interdit toutes les manifestations, à l’exception de celles du vendredi. Durant la semaine du 8 au 11 avril, la police a fait tout son possible pour réprimer les protestations dans la capitale, en particulier celles des étudiants. Elles ont agi plus fermement qu’au cours des semaines précédentes, en utilisant canons à eau, grenades lacrymogènes, balles en caoutchouc, et, pour la première fois, bombes assourdissantes, ainsi qu’en arrêtant des dirigeants de marches protestataires. Malgré tout, les manifestants ont réussi à reprendre la Grande Place de la Poste, le lieu de rassemblement emblématique du mouvement dans la capitale, qu’ils avaient brièvement perdu face à la police.

En prévision de la huitième marche hebdomadaire, le vendredi 12 avril, la police a envoyé des renforts à Alger, tandis que des unités de la gendarmerie nationale se sont déployées à la périphérie de la capitale, notamment à ses points d’accès, pour empêcher les manifestants des villes environnantes, telles que Béjaïa, Bouira, Tizi Ouzou, Blida et Tipaza, de rejoindre leurs compatriotes. Le jour même, d’énormes manifestations se sont déroulées dans 26 des 48 provinces algériennes, y compris à Alger, où des centaines de milliers de personnes sont descendues dans la rue. Malgré des contre-mesures répressives, les protestataires n’ont montré aucun signe de faiblesse. Au contraire, une semaine plus tard, le vendredi 19 avril, de nouvelles marches aussi imposantes ont eu lieu.

Le 12 avril était le premier jour depuis le début du mouvement le 22 février que les manifestants exprimaient ouvertement leur hostilité envers l’armée en lançant des slogans tels que « Gaid Salah, dégage ! », et « Nous avons dit tous ! C’est tous !» – référence au clan Bouteflika et à son entourage. Selon les protestataires, le fait que Gaid Salah impose le rythme et le contenu de la transition équivaut à trahir leur cause. Et le chef militaire a nourri activement cette perception. Dans un communiqué du 10 avril, par exemple, il déclarait que des « parties étrangères » avaient infiltré le mouvement de contestation – un constat que les manifestants considéraient comme visant à discréditer leur mouvement. Salah avait également qualifié d’« irréaliste » l’exigence des manifestants d’une rupture totale avec le système et insisté pour que la légalité constitutionnelle soit strictement respectée. Jusque-là, nombreux étaient ceux qui considéraient Salah comme un partisan de leur cause, notamment après son discours du 26 mars, dans lequel il avait déclaré que Bouteflika devait démissionner.

III. Le point de non-retour ?

Jusqu’à présent lors des manifestations, aucune organisation ou leadership ne se démarque. Aucune personnalité politique ne s’est fait remarquer ou n’a pris la parole en public ; les seules voix qui se sont fait entendre sont celles des citoyens ordinaires. Des syndicats indépendants, des associations de défense des droits de l’homme et des groupes de jeunes – tous capables de mobiliser de leur côté – ont efficacement remplacé les partis politiques d’opposition, dont certains ont parfois fait partie du gouvernement et que les manifestants associent au pouvoir, en tant que voix politique de la dissidence algérienne. Les protestataires exigent une transmission du flambeau à une nouvelle génération, de nouveaux visages qui n’ont jamais fait partie du système ou qui n’en ont jamais été proches.

Le manque de leadership identifiable parmi les protestataires facilite les mobilisations de masse mais ne permet pas de formuler clairement un ensemble de revendications qui seraient acceptées dans leur globalité. Les partis politiques tentent de profiter de cette faiblesse pour opérer un retour en force. Ils se sont notamment emparés de la question des élections présidentielles du 4 juillet. Le 16 avril, plusieurs partis d’opposition, des partis de centre gauche aux islamistes – le Rassemblement pour la culture et la démocratie, le Mouvement de la société pour la paix et le Parti pour la justice et le développement – ont publié une déclaration commune appelant à un boycott des élections tant que les autorités ne conduiront pas des réformes concrètes, créant notamment une commission électorale indépendante garantissant un dépouillage électoral transparent et équitable. Le 18 avril, certaines personnalités politiques ont rencontré le président par intérim, Bensalah, lequel les a invités à participer à un

dialogue national, dont l’objectif serait de créer une instance indépendante chargée de préparer ces élections. Les manifestants, soutenus par les organisations de la société civile, craignent cependant que ce dialogue ne soit une ruse – que le gouvernement ne le conduise exclusivement avec les partis et associations, qu’il a domestiqué depuis longtemps.

Les marches des 12 et 19 avril étaient l’occasion pour les Algériens d’exprimer leur opposition à toute forme d’initiative émanant de Bensalah ainsi que d’autres figures du régime. Bien que celui-ci ait recouru à des méthodes plus répressives et ait durci sa rhétorique (en dénonçant des ingérences étrangères au sein des manifestants et en enjoignant ses derniers à éviter d’entraver les initiatives de sortie de crise), ce durcissement de position semble pour l’heure produire le contraire de l’effet escompté : il n’a fait que pousser les protestataires à continuer leur combat. Un certain nombre d’organisations de la société civile et de personnalités politiques, dont de nombreux anciens militants de gauche qui avaient démissionné de leur formation respective à l’issue de leur cooptation par le régime au cours de la décennie précédente, ont exprimé leur indignation face à la brutalité des méthodes policières.

Le mouvement de protestation n’a fait que s’amplifier, d’autres forces s’étant jointes à la mêlée : des généraux de l’armée envoyés à la retraite anticipée ces dernières années ; des officiers de sécurité frustrés par le démantèlement du Département du renseignement et de la sécurité en 2015 ; des hommes d’affaires empêchés de maximiser leurs profits par les membres du clan Bouteflika. Beaucoup ont décidé de peser de tout leur poids sur le mouvement de protestation, ouvertement ou en coulisse, et l’encouragent maintenant à s’étendre dans d’autres secteurs, y compris le système judiciaire et le mouvement syndical, pour exercer une plus grande pression sur le régime dans une optique de changement politique plus radical.

Des manifestations ont également lieu dans la région de Kabylie (berbérophone) du pays, mais les revendications qui y sont formulées ne sont pas différentes de celles des autres villes. C’est la première fois depuis l’indépendance en 1962 que le pays connait une telle unité dans la demande de changement de régime. Les manifestants entonnent en cœur : « pas de Berbères, pas d’Arabes, pas d’ethnie ou de religion ! Nous sommes tous algériens ! »  Les médias sociaux sont saturés d’appels à la grève générale visant à paralyser les centres économiques névralgiques du pays, ce qui porterait atteinte aux intérêts vitaux des dirigeants du gouvernement, des hauts gradés de l’armée et des hommes d’affaires étroitement liés au régime.

Le mouvement s’est développé de manière plutôt désordonnée, chaque localité ayant ses propres méthodes de lutte et revendications. Le 12 avril, douze syndicats autonomes se sont joints aux manifestations. Le lendemain, des groupes d’universitaires, des journalistes et d’autres activistes ont appelé la population à former des comités de citoyens pour entamer une transition démocratique. Une association de magistrats a annoncé qu’elle boycotterait l’encadrement de la prochaine élection présidentielle.  De même, le 16 avril, 130 maires de la région nord (sur 1 500 dans l’ensemble du pays), appartenant principalement au parti historique d’opposition Front des forces socialistes, majoritairement kabyle, ont annoncé leur refus de participer à l’organisation du scrutin présidentiel du 4 juillet dans leurs communes. Le 17 avril, des avocats ont organisé des défilés dans différentes villes, appelant à « l’indépendance de la justice » et au « respect de la souveraineté du peuple ». Le 14 avril, les travailleurs du secteur pétrolier et gazier se sont mis en grève pour soutenir le mouvement, notamment à Hassi Messaoud (cœur de l’industrie fossile du pays) et à Hassi Rmel dans la région de Laghouat.

L’ensemble de ces développements incite les Algériens ordinaires à affirmer que le mouvement de protestation a atteint le point de non-retour. Le rythme des événements suggère qu’ils n’arrêteront pas de protester, même si la répression s’intensifie, tant que les autorités n’auront pas adressé des signaux clairs indiquant qu’elles sont prêtes à rompre avec le passé – même si les conséquences de cette rupture demeurent insaisissables.

IV.Comment agir ?

En l’absence de signaux clairs indiquant que le régime est en train de démanteler son propre appareil, le dangereux cycle de protestations de masse entrainant des réponses répressives suscitant à leur tour des mobilisations plus importantes va probablement se poursuivre. Les revendications des manifestants demeurent mal définies, mais semblent – du moins, pourraient – viser le départ complet de tous les caciques du régime. Dans une déclaration publiée le 18 mars, un groupe de 22 organisations de la société civile a décrit les principales étapes d’une transition, incluant le départ du président par intérim, la création d’une haute commission pour la transition, composée de personnes « ayant une autorité morale » et largement acceptée par la population, la mise en place d’un gouvernement de transition, lequel organiserait un dialogue réunissant l’ensemble des secteurs de la société ainsi que des représentants du mouvement protestataire, l’élection d’une assemblée constituante, la rédaction d’une nouvelle constitution ramenant le pays vers la légalité constitutionnelle.

Si les organisations qui portent ces revendications ne sont pas entachées de soupçons de proximité avec le régime, elles semblent représenter principalement la classe moyenne urbaine éduquée. Les revendications des autres secteurs de la société varient selon la localité et le groupe qui les formulent. Certains groupes ont mentionné la nécessité de signaux du pouvoir annonçant clairement son intention de se réformer. Parmi ces signes : le limogeage de gouverneurs, le report des élections présidentielles, la dissolution du parlement et l’établissement d’un gouvernement d’union nationale. Des syndicats de travailleurs et organisations de la société civile seraient en train de rédiger des propositions quant à la composition d’un futur gouvernement de ce type. Mais excepté le désir palpable de rupture avec le passé, aucun sens de la coordination étroite ou consensus large n’émerge.

Le régime a profité de l’absence de direction unifiée du mouvement pour tenter de le coopter et de le diviser – sous couvert d’une campagne anti-corruption réglant des comptes internes. En avril, les forces de sécurité ont arrêté Ali Haddad, l’ancien président du Forum des chefs d’entreprise algérien, et les quatre frères milliardaires, Kouninef, dans le cadre d’une vraisemblable croisade anti-corruption. Les cinq hommes d’affaires étaient des piliers du régime, sans être pour autant des proches de Gaid Salah. Les accusations de corruption qui pèsent contre eux sont identiques à celles portées par le passé contre des personnalités au sein de l’armée, dans ce que beaucoup considéraient à l’époque comme un règlement de compte et qui, comme le note un ancien haut fonctionnaire, « n’a en rien changé le système ».

Plus tard au cours de ce mois, les forces de l’ordre ont arrêté Issad Rebrab, un milliardaire considéré comme la personne la plus riche d’Algérie – exemple frappant d’un Etat qui poursuit des hommes d’affaires qui ont longtemps soutenu les opposants de Bouteflika. Au lieu de rassurer les manifestants sur la disposition des autorités à combattre le fléau de la corruption, que ce soit dans le camp des partisans de Bouteflika ou dans celui de ses opposants, beaucoup pensent que cette campagne anti-corruption est un prétexte pour que le régime reprenne pied, se lance dans une purge interne ou quelque chose de similaire, sans pour autant faire quoi que ce soit de concret afin d’éradiquer la corruption en son sein même.

Si ce stratagème échoue, à savoir si les citoyens continuent de s’assembler dans les rues pour réclamer une refonte complète du système, le régime pourrait choisir d’intensifier ses mesures répressives afin de décourager les Algériens, autres que les militants purs et durs, de participer aux manifestations, puis de sévir contre les récalcitrants. Mais dans le contexte actuel, de telles réponses dissuasives ne risquent pas de mettre un terme aux mobilisations de masse.

Face au risque d’un affrontement sanglant et déstabilisant, la meilleure voie à suivre devrait comporter les trois éléments suivants : un engagement mutuel en faveur de la non-violence ; un dialogue régime-citoyen qui englobe les principaux secteurs de la société ; et, à travers cette discussion, l’avancement vers la satisfaction des principales demandes des protestataires, tels que décrites plus haut, tout en garantissant au régime qu’il ne sera pas la cible de représailles l’acculant à une impasse.


L’Algérie de l’après-Bouteflika se trouve à une étape charnière. Elle pourrait s’engager sur la voie de réformes substantielles et de mesures originelles capables de changer le système. Sans quoi, le régime pourrait renouer avec ses tendances autocratiques et répressives. Ce dernier scénario finirait par entraîner l’effondrement du régime, mais le coût humain n’en serait que trop élevé.

L’option la plus sûre et la plus raisonnable serait l’établissement d’un dialogue ouvert entre le régime et des représentants du mouvement sur les conditions d’une transition globalement acceptable. Celle-ci prendrait en considération les préoccupations les plus immédiates des manifestants tout en garantissant au régime que des représailles ne le viseraient pas. Elaborer et mettre en œuvre une telle transition tient de l’impossible, mais maintenant que l’Algérie s’est lancée dans l’après-Bouteflika, il ne semble pas y avoir de meilleure alternative.

CRISIS GROUP, Alger/Bruxelles, 26 avril 2019



De plus en plus clivant, le processus de décentralisation tunisien risque d’alimenter les tensions sociales et politiques. Pour qu’il tienne ses promesses de réduction des inégalités socio-régionales et d’amélioration des services publics, il doit faire l’objet d’un nouveau compromis prévoyant notamment le renforcement des services territoriaux de l’Etat.

 Que se passe-t-il ? En Tunisie, la décentralisation progresse sur le plan politique : des conseils municipaux ont été élus et la démocratie s’ancre au niveau local. Mais ce processus omet de renforcer les services territoriaux de l’Etat. Cela nourrit les résistances des hauts fonctionnaires et contribue au blocage de l’action publique.

En quoi est-ce significatif ? Faute de tenir ses promesses en termes de réduction des inégalités socio-régionales et d’amélioration des services publics, cette réforme accentue la crise de confiance envers la classe politique et risque d’alimenter les tensions sociales et politiques et la nostalgie à l’égard du régime de Ben Ali.

Comment agir ? Des consultations doivent réunir divers acteurs pour parvenir à un nouveau compromis sur ce processus et éviter qu’il ne soit vidé de sa substance. Le gouvernement devrait renforcer les compétences humaines des services territoriaux de l’Etat et les promoteurs internationaux de la décentralisation devraient accroitre leur soutien technique et financier.


En Tunisie, le processus de décentralisation est de plus en plus clivant. En cours depuis l’adoption d’une nouvelle Constitution en janvier 2014, il permet à l’Etat central de céder des pouvoirs aux acteurs et institutions à des échelons inférieurs dans la hiérarchie politico-administrative et territoriale. Mais en se focalisant sur la démocratisation du pouvoir local au détriment du renforcement de l’Etat aux niveaux régional et local, il suscite des résistances. Faute de tenir ses promesses de réduction des inégalités socio-régionales, cette réforme, telle que conduite actuellement, risque d’alimenter les tensions sociales et politiques et la nostalgie à l’égard du régime autoritaire de Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali (1987-2011), dans un contexte de détérioration des conditions de vie et de crise de confiance envers la classe politique. Les acteurs politiques tunisiens doivent parvenir à un nouveau compromis sur la décentralisation, et les partenaires du pays devraient la soutenir sur le plan technique et

financier. Il s’agit notamment d’accroitre les capacités de l’Etat à mettre en place des politiques publiques et à améliorer la qualité de ses services.

La focalisation sur la démocratisation du pouvoir local résulte d’un malentendu né du soulèvement de 2010-2011 : observateurs et acteurs politiques ont interprété les revendications comme une « demande de moins d’Etat central », considérant qu’il étouffait le dynamisme économique et politique des régions. Or, si les manifestants rejetaient le régime autoritaire, ils ne demandaient pas nécessairement un Etat moins fort. Cette analyse erronée a conduit à reléguer au second plan la consolidation de l’Etat et de ses services publics aux niveaux régional et local.

 Ainsi, si la décentralisation progresse sur le plan politique, avec l’élection de conseils municipaux en mai 2018 et l’ancrage de la démocratie au niveau local, elle est loin de satisfaire la demande d’« Etat de justice », c’est-à-dire d’un Etat qui respecte « la dignité » des citoyens quelle que soit leur origine sociale et régionale, et mène des politiques publiques au service du bien commun.

Huit ans après la chute de Ben Ali, la situation macroéconomique s’est dégradée. Dans nombre de localités, les services publics et sociaux sont quasi inexistants. Les réseaux clientélistes se sont multipliés avec l’émergence de nouveaux acteurs. Des élus locaux, notamment, se disputent les restes de la machine clientéliste de l’ancien régime à des fins électorales. Or les ressources que distribuent ces réseaux se tarissent, ce que la relative tolérance à l’égard de l’économie informelle ne compense qu’en partie. Les troubles sociaux risquent donc de s’accroitre.

Le gouvernement n’a pas encore fixé les nouvelles procédures de coordination et de coopération entre les acteurs des politiques publiques aux niveaux régional et local. Les modalités de transfert des compétences de l’administration centrale et territoriale vers les collectivités locales (les conseils régionaux n’ont pas encore été élus) demeurent floues et suscitent de nombreuses interrogations parmi les experts. Enfin, les ressources financières des communes et le niveau de formation de leurs agents sont toujours aussi faibles.

Le manque de consolidation des services territoriaux de l’Etat nourrit les résistances des hauts fonctionnaires. Cela nuit au travail des communes et complique la tâche des élus locaux, incapables de juguler la détérioration du contexte socioéconomique.

Résultat : le processus de décentralisation accroit les attentes légitimes des citoyens envers des services publics de meilleure qualité, sans pour autant les satisfaire. Il renforce ainsi la crise de confiance envers la classe politique, y compris les élus locaux. Il réveille par ailleurs les réflexes anti-islamistes de hauts responsables de l’Etat alors que le parti An-Nahda a conquis près du tiers des municipalités après le scrutin communal de mai 2018. Il alimente enfin la nostalgie à l’égard du régime autoritaire et risque d’exacerber les tensions sociales et politiques.

Pour élargir le consensus autour de cette réforme et éviter une mise en œuvre bancale :

    Le parlement, la présidence de la République et le gouvernement devraient organiser une série de consultations réunissant élus locaux, organisations de la société civile, hauts fonctionnaires, responsables politiques et syndicaux, sur les modalités concrètes de poursuite de la décentralisation : procédures de coordination et de coopération entre acteurs publics sur le plan régional et local d’une part, clarification des aspects juridiques, techniques et financiers relatifs au futur transfert de compétences aux collectivités locales de l’autre. Les gouverneurs, qui verront nécessairement du pouvoir et des ressources leur échapper, ne doivent pas être les grands perdants de cette réforme. Afin de coordonner plus efficacement l’action publique au niveau régional, ils devraient bénéficier de davantage de pouvoir hiérarchique et décisionnel sur leurs services territoriaux (déconcentration et délégation de pouvoirs).
    Le gouvernement devrait initier une stratégie de développement des territoires en partenariat avec les acteurs régionaux et locaux, publics et privés, et œuvrer à améliorer les prestations de services publics sur le plan régional et local. Pour ce faire, il devrait renforcer les compétences humaines des services territoriaux (formation continue, incitations à la mobilité de fonctionnaires compétents, par exemple via des primes pour les agents exerçant dans les zones marginalisées).
    Le gouvernement devrait renforcer les capacités des cours des comptes et tribunaux administratifs sur tout le territoire, placer l’agent comptable en charge du recouvrement des taxes et redevances locales ainsi que la police municipale sous l’autorité des communes, et créer la Haute instance des finances locales dans les plus brefs délais.
    Vu l’austérité budgétaire, les promoteurs internationaux de la décentralisation devraient augmenter le montant du soutien prévu au futur Fonds d’appui à la décentralisation, de péréquation et de solidarité entre les collectivités locales, et appuyer techniquement la Haute instance des finances locales. En particulier, la Banque mondiale, le Programme des Nations unies pour le développement (PNUD), le Conseil de l’Europe, la mission de l’Union européenne en Tunisie, l’Agence française de développement (AFD), l’Agence de coopération internationale allemande pour le développement (GIZ) et le Centre international de développement pour la gouvernance locale innovante (CILG-VNG International), peuvent jouer un rôle important.

Pour lintegralite du rapport vister:

Crisis Group, Tunis/Bruxelles, 26 mars 2019