Three’s a crowd: Why Egypt’s and Somalia’s row with Ethiopia can embolden al-Shabaab
By Corrado Čok, European Council on Foreign Relations, 07 November 2024
Somalia’s new defence pact with Egypt has angered Ethiopia, undermining coalition efforts to contain al-Shabaab, a Jihadist group. European diplomats can help revert this dangerous path
On Sunday, a central Mogadishu military base – home to officials from the African Union (AU), United Nations, and other international agencies – came under mortar attack. At least two people were killed and several more injured. Al-Shabaab, the jihadist group seeking to topple Somalia’s government, quickly claimed responsibility, underscoring its relentless campaign of violence across the country.
Despite some progress in the federal government’s military campaign against al-Shabaab in recent years, it has never gained the upper hand. The group remains in control of large swathes of the centre and south of the country. And due to infighting in the anti-al-Shabaab coalition – comprising federal, state, and international partners – this area could soon expand.
Somalia desperately needs to build a cohesive political and military response. But a new defence pact between Mogadishu and Cairo may threaten the country’s stability by further straining relations with Ethiopia. These tensions could undermine the future of the AU’s peacekeeping mission in the country, ATMIS, of which Ethiopia is the main contributor. The pact could also pit Somalia’s federal government against its states, widening a power vacuum that al-Shabaab and other armed groups in the country are primed to exploit.
Somalia’s security quagmire
Since 2007, successive AU peacekeeping missions have led combat operations against al-Shabaab on the ground, working with US and Turkish air support to help hold liberated areas. At the end of this year, however, the ATMIS’s mandate will expire. Diplomats are working around the clock to ensure a new, downsized AU mission takes over in 2025, but issues over funding and staffing cast a shadow on Somalia’s security for the foreseeable future.
Ethiopia forms the backbone of the military effort against al-Shabaab. Partly through ATMIS, and partly through bilateral agreements with Somalia’s federal government, Ethiopia has 8,000-10,000 troops deployed in central and southern Somalia. These efforts are also key for Ethiopia to protect its own border from al-Shabaab incursions. Now, however, the Egypt-Somalia defence pact risks damaging the fragile political and military balance by openly challenging Addis Ababa.
Egypt’s and Somalia’s respective relations with Ethiopia have soured in recent years, bringing their own security cooperation closer together. For Cairo, its rivalry with Addis Ababa stems from the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile River which threatens Egypt’s water security. For Mogadishu, Ethiopia’s signing of a memorandum of understanding with the authorities of the breakaway region of Somaliland was seen to undermine Somalia’s sovereignty. In response, Somalia publicly called on the Ethiopian army to leave the country.
To fill that vacuum and put more pressure on their common adversary, Ethiopia, the defence pact calls on Egypt to deploy some 10,000 troops to Somalia – half through the next AU mission and half bilaterally. But Cairo is unlikely to deploy this many troops. It has not put boots on foreign soil for decades, has little knowledge of the Somali context, and is facing a deep financial crisis. Besides this, the AU will not endorse a plan that blatantly antagonises Addis Ababa. And yet, Egypt has sent two weapons shipments into Somalia, much to the neighbouring Ethiopian government’s alarm.
The consequences of brinkmanship
Egypt’s and Somalia’s deteriorating relations with Ethiopia could have two dangerous ramifications for the fight against al-Shabaab. First, the Somali attempt to sideline Ethiopian troops and replace them with Egypt’s is hindering the planning for ATMIS’s new mandate. This is because Addis Ababa remains the major troop contributor of the current mission, with no realistic replacement and deep security interests in Somalia that it is reluctant to give up. If the next AU mission does not materialise, the resulting security vacuum could create the conditions for al-Shabaab to conquer key areas of the country and destabilise the entire region.
The second issue concerns the political stability of Somalia. The country’s fraught state-building process already suffers from division between the federal and state governments. Now, Egypt-Ethiopia tensions are further splintering the country. In June, top officials from Jubaland and South West state opposed the federal government’s call for Ethiopian troops to withdraw as this would have left parts of their states undefended.
South West state, where Ethiopia’s military presence and influence is particularly strong, also criticised the deal with Egypt. These intra-Somali frictions could be the final blow to the country’s state-building process, further fragmenting political and military action which al-Shabaab is set to exploit. The risk of this could be heightened if, once deployed, Ethiopian or Egyptian troops support opposing Somali clans.
Either scenario – a hindered AU mission and a splintering Somali state – could pave the way to a new al-Shabaab expansion, with sweeping, disruptive consequences. Ethiopia would be dragged deeper into a conflict with the terrorist group along its borders, destabilising its own fragile equilibrium. It would also disrupt European humanitarian programmes and risk the lives of European military staff stationed in Somalia. Kenya, a key Western ally and investment partner for Europe, may also suffer from spillover effects as al-Shabaab already has a robust foothold in the country’s north-east.
Lastly, a stronger al-Shabaab would embolden other groups such as Islamic State’s new Somali branch and arms smuggling networks, creating chaos for pirate groups to exploit, as they recently did during Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. Such instability would pose yet another serious threat to maritime routes in the western Indian Ocean which are vital to Europe.
A possible (and necessary) European response
The European Union and its member states have poured billions into Somalia’s security over the years. The EU has deployed two political-military missions to help with security training, has led an anti-piracy operation, and has been the major financial contributor to AU peacekeeping missions. Meagre progress has fatigued European donors, but turning away now would undermine years of financial and security commitments.
Given its investments and presence in Somalia, the EU is well placed to help rein in tensions by initiating mediation efforts. Italy could lead the bloc in this effort, thanks to its influential role in the country resulting from historical ties and key contributions to EU missions. The United Kingdom leads Somalian diplomatic efforts at the UN and actively supports the Somali security sector, making it a valuable partner for the EU and Italy. Together, the EU, Italy, and the UK will also need to obtain the backing of Washington in this initiative, since the US remains a critical actor in Somalia.
While immediate mediation between Cairo and Addis Ababa has very little chance of success given the failed attempts around the Nile dam crisis, the EU and its partners could work with influential allies, chiefly Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, which are both looking to deepen their own influence through security initiatives in Somalia. Ankara and Abu Dhabi not only handle substantial programmes of training and financial support for Somali security actors, they also enjoy close ties to Somalia’s federal government and state governments, respectively. They also hold sway in Cairo and Addis Ababa through large investments and cooperation initiatives and do not support the defence pact.
Europeans should look to better coordinate with Turkey and the UAE to press Egypt and Ethiopia to avoid pulling Somalia apart. At the same time, the EU and its partners should put their weight behind the ongoing Turkish mediation between Somalia and Ethiopia that was recently launched in Ankara to help mitigate tensions between the two nations.
The EU, along with Italy and the UK, could also look to promote greater coordination and reconciliation between the different EU, Emirati, and Turkish security initiatives. This is essential to boost the effectiveness of international security efforts and reduce the space for regional players or for Somali actors themselves to play international divisions to their advantage. An immediate focus of this approach should be the setting up of coordination frameworks between European diplomatic and military representatives and their Turkish and Emirati counterparts. These could include meeting regularly in Mogadishu and in respective capitals to build common ground between Europeans and their two partners, collaborating on political and military initiatives in Somalia, and joining forces to help fund the next AU mission. The coordination frameworks could aim at gradually aligning messages to other local and regional actors, especially Egypt and Ethiopia, and potentially setting up joint coordination structures with the Somali army.
Finally, the EU has huge leverage it can fall back on. Its funding of ATMIS is the only thing holding the line against al-Shabaab. No actor in the Horn of Africa or the Middle East wants an Afghanistan scenario for Somalia, so the EU threatening to pull the plug could be the one thing that will force all capitals towards mediation.
Without prompt action, al-Shabaab, alongside Islamic State’s Somali branch and arms smugglers, could soon capitalise on domestic and international divisions, risking a significant security failure in a country crucial for the stability of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.
Disclaimer
The European Council on Foreign Relations and CEMAS Board do not take collective positions. ECFR and Cemas publications only represent the views of their individual authors.
