2024 FOCAC Beijing Summit: A new chapter?

By Yun Sun, Brookings, November 5, 2024

The 2024 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation is by any measure the most significant diplomatic event for China this year. Being in Beijing at the time, I was struck by the magnitude of resources, policy priority, and importance attached by the Chinese government to this signature event. High-end hotels were blocked off for the dozens of delegations from African countries. Roads were closed during the rush hour to make way for their motorcades. And security measures were enhanced across the board from airports to hotel elevators—all at the expense of the host government.

The FOCAC Summit takes place every three years, with its location alternating between Beijing and an African capital city. China’s announced action items, financing commitments, and policy priorities are often viewed as indicators of the future direction for China-Africa relations over the next three years. This year’s 2024 FOCAC Summit proved to be no exception. Chinese President Xi Jinping announced 10 partnership actions for China-Africa relations for 2025-2027, including civilizational exchanges, trade prosperity, industrial chain cooperation, connectivity, development cooperation, health, agriculture, people-to-people exchanges, green development, and security.

China’s $50.7 billion financial commitment

Since the first FOCAC in 2006, the world has witnessed China’s rapidly-growing financing commitment to Africa at the FOCAC summits: $5 billion in 2006, $10 billion in 2009, $20 billion in 2012, $60 billion in 2015, and $60 billion in 2018. A closer look at the data also shows a noticeable hike in 2013, which is when the Belt and Road Initiative was launched. Much of this financing was in the form of loans, which contributed to the narrative of China’s “debt diplomacy” in Africa and has been widely criticized for contributing to the debt distress many African countries are facing, especially since the COVID-19 pandemic.

However, since the pandemic, and due to its own economic slowdown, repayment concerns, and reputational costs, China has seen a gradual reduction in its financing commitments. For example, at the 2021 Dakar FOCAC, China committed only $40 billion in financing ($20 billion less than the previous FOCAC). In addition, the Chinese government significantly reduced the loan credits offered to Africa, cutting them in half as compared to the previous FOCAC commitment made in 2018.

China’s renewed financial commitment during the 2024 FOCAC summit is therefore interesting in several aspects. Despite widely spread pessimism about China’s own economic slowdown and resources running low, China’s financial commitment to Africa grew by 25% at this year’s FOCAC compared to three years ago. The $50.7 billion commitment includes $10 billion in investment, $10.7 billion in aid, and $30 billion in credit lines. The investment will be made by Chinese companies but supported and promoted by the government through preferential policies on financing and subsidies. The aid will cover things from capacity building to medical assistance, which is a traditional line item.

The rebound in loan credits offered is especially surprising considering the debt sustainability issues that many African countries have run into. The devil will be in the details, as it all depends on what these credits will be used to support. In the past, China had prioritized hard infrastructure projects including transportation networks (e.g., railways, roads, and bridges) backed by local natural resources. In October 2023, China claimed that its state-owned enterprises had implemented more than 1,600 infrastructure projects in Africa. In this year’s FOCAC Summit, China committed to only 30 connectivity infrastructure projects across Africa over the period 2025 to 2027. It therefore appears that China is shifting away from hard mega-infrastructure projects.

New priorities and consistencies

This change in course raises an important question—i.e., what is China pivoting to? In the 2024 financing commitment, there is no specification that the $30 billion in credit lines will be reserved for African governments or entities, which is different from the 2021 commitment. During the 2021 Dakar FOCAC, $10 billion was specifically reserved for African financial institutions as credits to support local African companies.

The ambiguity in this year’s commitment seems to imply that as long as the projects are related to Africa or performed in Africa, the recipients do not have to be African. Indeed, $30 billion in credit is not a small figure. Given that most of the 2024 10 partnership actions announced by President Xi are focused on capacity-building and development projects, one has to wonder about where the bulk of the credit will be going.

Reading between the lines, many of the action items will potentially be carried out by Chinese entities, but in collaboration with African partners. This includes the industrial chain cooperation, such as on the China-Africa digital technology cooperation centers. The action items also include green technology projects, a China-Africa forum on peaceful use of nuclear technology, 30 joint labs in science and technology, satellite remote sensing, and support for African countries’ participation in the international lunar research station project and China’s lunar and Martian exploration. They could also include China’s logistical and financial support for the development of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

If one compares the nine programs announced at the 2021 FOCAC with the 10 partnership actions announced this year, there is strong continuity between the two, including health, agriculture, trade facilitation, investment (connectivity, development, and supply chain), digital economy, capacity building, green technology, people and cultural exchanges, and peace and stability. Most of these categories also appeared in the 2018 FOCAC Summit. This suggests that China’s general approach toward Africa has strong consistency and continuity. The challenge lies in identifying new and emergent growth areas that could shape the future trajectory of China’s priority in Africa.

The reality of China-Africa trade relations

Trade is a pressing issue that China has to address. Trade promotion and facilitation were a priority in 2021, and that prioritization continues in 2024. Based on the FOCAC commitment this year, China is removing all tariffs on imports from least developed countries, including 33 African countries. China has also committed to expanding market access for African agricultural products and deepening cooperation in e-commerce. In addition, Beijing expressed the will to enter economic partnership framework agreements with Africa to provide “long-term, stable, and predictable institutional guarantees” for China-Africa trade and investment.

These commitments happen to reveal an inconvenient truth about the imbalance in China-Africa trade relations. It is well known that China has been the largest trading partner of Africa since 2009. But it is much less well known that China has also consistently been running a trade surplus with Africa since 2015, and the gap has been growing substantially.

In 2015, due to subdued global prices for major commodities, China’s trade surplus vis-à-vis Africa was as high as $38 billion. This gap further increased to $45.9 billion in 2022 and to an astounding $63 billion in 2023. So far, 2024 appears to be continuing this trend. For the first six months of this year, China ran a trade surplus against Africa of $23.7 billion.

The data defies the conventional wisdom that China primarily sees Africa as the source for raw materials and natural resources. In actuality, Africa has been a bigger target for Chinese exports as a market. When being challenged on the trade imbalance between China and Africa in late 2021, the Chinese Vice Commerce Minister Qian Keming insisted that overall China-Africa trade has been largely balanced since 2000.

What he neglected to mention is that the first 15 years of China’s cumulative trade deficit, vis-à-vis Africa, have been offset by a growing trade surplus since 2015. China exports finished products (textiles, machines, and electronics) to Africa and primarily imports raw materials, including crude oil, copper, iron ore, and agricultural products. Judging from the trade pattern, Africa has not improved its position in the global supply chain, and the continent remains primarily an exporter of raw materials and natural resources.

This reality runs in contradiction with two Chinese narratives—that China prioritizes Africa’s industrialization and the growth of African exports. These two issues are related. Just like the Chinese vice commerce minister pointed out: “Africa must have things to sell (for China to buy).” Unless and until Africa develops sufficient industrial capacity to improve its position in the global supply chain, the trade imbalance between China and Africa is unlikely to see a solution any time soon. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that China promised $10 billion to support the growth of African exports in the 2021 FOCAC. This line item has disappeared from the 2024 commitment, suggesting that China’s emphasis on promoting African exports to China may not be as resolute as it claims.

Promotion of the China Model?

In China-Africa relations, the term “exchanges of governance experience” (交流治国理政经验) often carries a unique connotation. Despite the term “exchange”, the information flow is usually one way, where China promotes and spreads its own governance model to Africa. China has had decades of experience in training African political parties and government elites. The 2024 FOCAC Summit seems to suggest a keen interest in strengthening this particular effort. According to the plan, China will establish a China-Africa development knowledge network and 25 China-Africa Studies Centers. It will train “political talents” through its leadership academies in Africa, such as the Mwalimu Julius Nyerere Leadership School in Tanzania, which is nicknamed “China’s first political school in Africa”. China also plans to invite 1,000 African political party representatives to visit China and deepen the exchange of experiences in party and state governance.

While this effort is not new, it is striking to see China promoting it in such a public and glorified manner, to the extent that “exchanges of governance experience” is listed as the first and foremost priority among the 10 partnership actions. At the same time, it may not be surprising, given that the Chinese government continues to hone the angle of China being the alternative development model to liberal democracy. However, given the obstacles China’s own development model has encountered in recent years, it will be interesting to see if and how China continues to showcase confidence in the irrefutability and replicability of its path.

Concluding thoughts

It has been 24 years since the first FOCAC Summit was held in Beijing. Since then, China-Africa relations have morphed through several modalities. From the supplier of raw materials to fuel China’s growth as the world factory to the recipient of Chinese loans for infrastructure projects, the market that Chinese manufacturers target, and the destination of Chinese capacity-building programs and trade facilitation efforts—Africa has indeed become China’s partner in many domains.

While both parties have mutually benefited from the relationship, the economic and development challenges Africa faces have not been eased or mitigated. From debt stress to trade imbalance, from structural deficiencies to climate change, the continent continues to lag behind. To be sure, China is not responsible for all Africa’s quagmires, but China’s exceptionalism in Africa is losing some of its luster. And this is particularly true given the many debt restructurings that China has had to go through with African nations in the midst of the debt sustainability crisis. From trade to finance, from technology to global supply chains, it is hard to conclude that Africa’s position has improved significantly from its engagement with China.

Nevertheless, China remains one of the most consequential actors on the continent. As such, the FOCAC Summit will continue to draw the world’s attention and elicit global scrutiny when it convenes every three years. But as China struggles to regain economic growth at home and to expand exports abroad, including in Africa, many more expectations have yet to be met.

Author

Yun Sun: Nonresident Fellow - Global Economy and Development, Foreign Policy, John L. Thornton China Center, Africa Growth Initiative

Disclaimer

Opinions expressed here are the author's own, and do not necessarily reflect those of CEMAS board.