Moldova Divided: Easing Tensions as Russia Meddles and Elections Approach

International Crisis Group, 21 August 2024

Moldovan officials are worried that Russia may try manipulating divisions between the capital and two dissident regions ahead of October polls. These fissures have widened as Chisinau draws closer to the West. To reduce frictions, the government should reach out anew to the regional authorities.

 

What’s new? As Moldova has turned to the West following Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine, it has also toughened its approach toward two regions – breakaway Transnistria and autonomous Gagauzia – that have courted Russian support. With a presidential election and a referendum on EU membership approaching, Moldova’s divisions have deepened amid Russian meddling.

Why does it matter? Russia is interfering in the pre-vote process and fanning internal discord, as it seeks to foil Moldova’s EU aspirations and destabilise its politics with the goal of recapturing lost influence. Failure to address these issues could have implications for Moldova’s future stability.

What should be done? The Moldovan government’s heavy-handed treatment of Transnistria and Gagauzia has led to greater internal tensions and appears counterproductive. Moldova’s international partners, especially the EU, should encourage it to expand dialogue with Transnistria, and seek new channels of engagement with Gagauzia, with a view toward negotiating a settlement of long-running disputes.

I. Overview

As key votes in October approach, Moldovan officials are increasingly concerned about Russian meddling and its impact on the country’s stability. Officials in Chisinau, the Moldovan capital, worry that Russia is manipulating decades-old internal divisions to make trouble in the run-up to the 20 October presidential election and a same-day referendum on the country’s aspirations to join the European Union. Russia has long sought to extend its influence by sowing discord between Chisinau and two dissident regions: Transnistria, which broke away in a brief secessionist war in 1992; and Gagauzia, which gained broad autonomy in 1994.

But as Moldova has drawn closer to the West, Chisinau’s tactics to rein in these regions have pushed tensions higher. With encouragement from Western partners, Moldovan authorities should begin using a lighter touch – seeking a settlement of internal disputes, even as Chisinau works to counter Russian interference in its affairs and to guard against a post-election crisis over Russian gas supplies to the country.

Moldova’s location between Ukraine and Romania has made both Kyiv and Moscow keen to secure the support of the formally neutral nation in their fight. Over the past two years, leaders in Chisinau have accused Moscow of disrupting energy supplies, funding political protests and attempting a coup. They fear that Russia will continue encouraging unrest, including within the dissident regions, Transnistria and Gagauzia, in order to undermine President Maia Sandu, who has oriented the country’s foreign policy in a more Western direction, deeming Russia its principal adversary.

Public appeals in February and March from leaders of Transnistria and Gagauzia for Russia’s support in the face of what they view as mistreatment by Moldovan authorities have deepened Chisinau’s worries about Russian meddling ahead of the October vote and parliamentary polls in early 2025.

While there is little doubt that Moscow has long fanned the flames of discontent in Transnistria and Gagauzia, the gripes of residents and anxieties of authorities in both these regions are not purely a function of Russian interference. As Chisinau’s steps toward energy independence and Russia’s war in Ukraine have diminished Moscow’s economic clout in Moldova, Chisinau has taken a harder line against those it accuses of embracing separatism or toeing the Kremlin’s line.

In doing so, it has fuelled grievances in the two dissident regions and given Russia ammunition it can use to propagate discord. It also risks spurning the best opportunity in decades to seek a rapprochement with Transnistria, while doing too little to manage a difficult relationship with Gagauzia.

Keeping these tensions in check will depend in part on managing three interconnected challenges. The most imminent concerns attempted Russian interference in the run-up to the votes scheduled for October. Sandu’s government has worked with Western allies to build up Moldovan resilience to disinformation, cyberattacks and other forms of subterfuge. In dealing with this set of risks, however, Chisinau will need to tread cautiously to avoid aggravating the country’s polarisation, particularly around the matter of its new foreign policy orientation.

If anti-meddling efforts cross the line into an arguably anti-democratic or unconstitutional crackdown on Moldovans sympathetic to Moscow, it will only provide Russia with an opportunity to exploit these differences and complicate the country’s EU accession negotiations.

The second dilemma facing the government is how to head off a looming crisis tied to the expiration of a transit agreement for Russian gas flowing through Ukraine to a power plant in Transnistria. The pipeline transit contract between Russia and Ukraine is critical to Moldova’s electricity supply. Despite the friction likely to dog the run-up to 20 October, the government should engage as soon as possible in talks with the broadest spectrum of interested parties, including EU, Ukrainian, Russian and Transnistrian leaders.

Moldova’s push to lessen its dependence on Russian energy supplies has made progress. But it is not yet free from reliance on power purchases from Transnistria’s gas-fired plant, and its efforts to date cannot compensate for the potential impact of a sudden halt to Russian gas flows to the breakaway region, which could lead numerous people to flee into Moldova proper, with destabilising effects.

Finally, throughout and beyond what promises to be a turbulent period, Moldovan officials cannot lose sight of a third and arguably most critical challenge: the need to address the deeper chill in its relations with Transnistria and Gagauzia. Chisinau should urgently renew efforts to minimise tensions that underlie so many of its immediate problems. It should reinvigorate contacts with de facto leaders in Transnistria aimed at eventually convening talks on its reintegration.

The challenge is steeper in Gagauzia, given that its governor (the political ally of an exiled businessman sanctioned by the U.S. and EU for election interference on Russia’s behalf) is regarded as an illegitimate Russian puppet by Sandu’s government, but even here there may be room to cultivate counterparties with whom Moldova believes it can do business. In both places, the first order of business is to avoid ratcheting up tensions in order to create space for internal diplomacy to work. Moldova’s Western partners should urge it along this path.

II. Moldova and Russia: Moving Apart

More than three decades after declaring its independence, Moldova has loosened its legacy ties to Russia and is working assiduously to form closer bonds with Western powers.1

A. Walking a Difficult Line

As a small state living in the shadow of a big power, Moldova has spent much of the three-plus decades of its post-Cold War independence walking a delicate line with Russia – which views the post-Soviet countries in its shared neighbourhood with Europe as within its historical sphere of influence. Shortly after Moldova declared independence in 1991, Russian forces helped Transnistria break away from it in a brief war of succession in 1992.2 After Moscow brokered a ceasefire in the conflict, Moldova declared itself a neutral state in its 1994 constitution.

Over the years, its commercial relations with the West have steadily grown, becoming increasingly important in what was once an economy closely tied to Russia’s.3 But until recently, it remained highly dependent on Russian gas to meet its energy needs. Caught between legacy cultural, political and economic ties to Russia and burgeoning relations with the West, Moldova has seen the Kremlin’s influence over its foreign policy wax and wane in recent years.

President Sandu gained office in 2020, and her Party of Action and Solidarity won a parliamentary majority in 2021, on a platform favouring closer ties with the EU, but it was unclear how quickly that change would come. Like her predecessors, Sandu met with Russian envoys in the months after her election and maintained cordial relations with Moscow.4

Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, together with a series of energy crises (discussed below), catalysed Chisinau’s pivot to the West. Today, Sandu’s government has embraced the pursuit of EU membership and pointedly painted Moscow as its primary adversary – both unprecedented moves in Moldova’s short history.5 The country’s new national security strategy, unveiled by Sandu in October 2023, stated that “the Russian Federation and its proxies in the Republic of Moldova represent the most dangerous and persistent source of threat” to the country.6

Sandu said the decision to identify Russia as her country’s main threat was made following discussions with U.S., UK and EU officials, who have steered her government regarding how to gird itself against outside pressure.

Public opinion is moving, too. The traditional Moldovan divide between those who support integration with the EU and those who look to Russia as their patron of choice remains, but the adherents of the latter camp are fewer today, and the differences between the two are starker than ever. The number of Moldovans who say relations with Russia are good has fallen from 53 per cent in 2019 to 27 per cent in 2024.7 Migrants looking for employment opportunities elsewhere increasingly head westward, with many Moldovans seeking Romanian passports to be able to work in the EU.

B. Toward Energy Self-reliance

Arguably the most consequential way in which Moldova has changed its relationship with Russia is in the energy sphere, where Chisinau has actively sought to wean itself off Russian gas supplies. Two energy crises, in the fall of 2021 and then 2022, drove the government’s expensive move to put in place the infrastructure needed to gain access to costlier alternative sources of gas and electricity supplies. First, in October 2021, the failure to reach a new contract with the giant Russian export monopoly, Gazprom, left gas supply in jeopardy for several weeks with winter approaching.8

Amid aborted talks on a new agreement, Gazprom demanded that Moldova pay claimed arrears of over $700 million threatening to cut off supply.9 To avert a crisis, on 29 October, Moldova and Gazprom reached an agreement on a new five-year contract, with Chisinau committing to a higher price and promising to resolve the debt issue.10

The second crisis came after Russia’s February 2022 all-out invasion of Ukraine. In October 2022, Russia cut gas supply to Moldova by a third, blaming Ukraine for issues relating to the transit of gas across its territory.11 (The pipeline that supplies Moldova runs from Russia west through Ukraine and has continued to operate, the war notwithstanding.) The 2022 cuts also affected Transnistria, leading it to stop exports of electricity to Moldova from its gas-fired power plant.

At the same time, Russian strikes on energy infrastructure in Ukraine halted Ukrainian electricity exports accounting for some 20 per cent of Moldova’s supply, causing blackouts and plunging the country into an energy crisis.12 Chisinau was able to manage the crisis through a deal with Transnistria, reserve withdrawals and spot market purchases partly supported by Western allies. But both crises led to soaring energy prices and inflation.

Seeking a way out of its vulnerable situation, Moldova stopped buying gas from Gazprom in December 2022, including by tapping into the Trans-Balkan pipeline running north from Türkiye to Ukraine through Romania.13Based on its own audit, Moldova also disclaimed the debt assessed by Gazprom.14 The switch would not have been possible without sustained substantial support from Western partners and international financial institutions.15 Until 2023, Moldova had no dedicated energy ministry, and seven people in government were handling these matters; there are now 60 people in the ministry, which was established with U.S. support.16 “The Russians lost their last instrument to switch off the lights”, a senior Moldovan official boasted.17

C. Russia’s Shifting Tactics

Moscow’s response to Chisinau’s Westward drift has evolved. At the start of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it appears to have thought that control of southern Ukraine all the way to Transnistria would give it the military leverage to dictate its desires to Moldova.18 Moscow still aims to outlast Ukraine in order to force Kyiv into striking a deal that would – if possible – include its preferences regarding Moldova’s future orientation and Transnistria.19 For the time being, however, with the front lines far from the Moldovan border, that goal is on the back burner, as Moscow looks to other tactics.

While Moscow has traditionally enjoyed greater economic and political leverage over Chisinau than it does today, it has also developed other means of keeping Moldova off balance. Going back to Soviet days, it looked to Transnistria as a bulwark of influence in the region, and it has more recently cultivated Gagauzia as well. By seeking to reinforce the country’s internal divisions, it aims to keep Chisinau on the back foot. It may also be creating a check on how far the country can be integrated into the West, believing that neither the EU nor NATO will accept a divided Moldova.

Scare tactics are another tool. Kremlin propaganda has stirred both fear and division by spuriously accusing the Moldovan authorities of threatening the country’s Russian speakers – many of whom live in the two dissident regions; it is the sort of claim that could be a pretext for intervention down the road.20 In another muscle-flexing signal, in 2023, Russia removed from its foreign policy doctrine mention of resolving the Transnistrian conflict on the basis of respect for Moldova’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.21

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and fellow officials repeatedly draw threatening parallels between Chisinau and Kyiv, implying that military action is not out of the question.22 Additionally, a number of largely unexplained events seem like they may have been intended to reinforce the sense that Russian power can still reach into Moldova – including the explosion of a grounded helicopter on 17 March and a drone attack on 5 April – both at military bases in Transnistria – and other explosions in April and May.23

Still another set of tools involve efforts to influence the country’s politics through the manipulation of political actors and spreading of disinformation, as discussed further below.24 But whatever impact these tactics are having, they have not moved Chisinau off its path. An emboldened Moldova has continued to tack West, and as it does, it has also begun to tighten the reins on the two dissident regions – to less than ideal effect.

III. Escalating Tensions with Transnistria and Gagauzia

Newly emboldened by stronger ties to both the West and to Ukraine, Moldovan officials have sought to strengthen political and economic controls on breakaway Transnistria and autonomous Gagauzia – creating a mix of anxiety and grievance. Although Russia’s war in Ukraine has sped up the reorientation of trade ties in each region away from Russia, and diminished Moscow’s sway in other ways that could offer an opportunity for rapprochement with Chisinau, the political elites in both regions have appealed to Moscow for help in response to what they have described as bullying by Moldova’s government.

A Transnistria Gets Squeezed

Since Russia helped Transnistria break away from Moldova three decades ago, the region’s economy has thrived off its unusual status at an informal crossroads of East and West. This status has allowed Transnistria to receive free gas from Moscow and Russian pension payments; engage in trade and smuggling across its 400km border with Ukraine; and enjoy access to EU markets through Moldova.25 Its residents, if they wish, can hold Russian passports and vote in Russian elections. The conglomerate that dominates its economy, Sheriff, financed a football club that beat Real Madrid in 2021 in the Champion’s League.26

The region flies its own flag, prints its own money and runs its own security, economic and social policies for a population of over 360,000. Its shops supply Russian goods and sport signs in Cyrillic. A checkpoint just over 50km from Chisinau that marks the line between Transnistria and the rest of the country has all the trappings of a border. It is patrolled by Russian peacekeepers – part of a mission with local and Moldovan forces that has operated in the region since the war of secession ended in 1992.

But the war next door has cut off Transnistria’s eastward trade ties. Ukraine closed its border with Transnistria, fearing Russia would seek to open another front – perhaps aided by the 1,300 Russian troops who are still based in the enclave, mostly local recruits guarding Soviet-era weapons and ammunition stockpiles.27 Boxed in by the border closure, exports to Russia also shrunk, contracting 7 per cent in 2022 and 39 per cent further in 2023 – though the country remains the second-biggest market for goods from Transnistria.28 This change in circumstances has made Transnistria more dependent on trade links via Moldova. “Instead of importing goods through Ukraine according to our own rules, we clear goods through Moldova according to their rules, and it is twice as expensive”, an expert close to the de facto Transnistrian leadership told Crisis Group.29

Transnistria has also been affected by Ukraine’s improved relations with Moldova. The countries increasingly see eye to eye on Transnistria. In the past, it was a source of friction: the illicit economic links connecting the breakaway region with Ukraine had enriched a group of businesspeople and politicians in Ukraine who had no desire to change that status quo.30 But in the aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion, concerns about the 1,300-strong Russian troop contingent in Transnistria, the arms depot and the corresponding prospect of a new front in the Russo-Ukrainian war trumped those considerations.31 Kyiv has come to believe it should play a supporting role in Moldova’s efforts to resolve its internal dispute. It has made clear that its main partner in this effort will be the government in Chisinau.32

Although Tiraspol remains closer to Moscow than Chisinau, Russia’s star has faded somewhat in Transnistria, too. An indicator appeared in 2023 when the region agreed to allow transit of Ukrainian goods through its territory even as Russia tried to impede Kyiv’s grain exports with missile strikes.33 The former head of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission to Moldova offered a terse opinion as to Russia’s standing in the region: “no access, no influence”.34

Business chiefs such as Viktor Gushan, owner of the sprawling Sheriff conglomerate, appear to be increasingly hedging their bets, worried that taking too uncompromising a position with Chisinau or too staunch a pro-Russian stance will endanger their future business interests.35 They remain dependent on cheap Russian gas but also on continued access to trade with the EU.36 “The people thinking about their future know that EU integration could bring them benefits and they also see that Russia can do little for them now”, a senior Ukrainian diplomat said.37

Simultaneously, the war next door appears to have intensified the feelings of estrangement from Russia gradually spreading among the population in the breakaway region. At a Romanian-language school in Tiraspol, teachers said they have more and more children whose parents speak only Russian but who want their children to be able to study and work in Chisinau – “on that side”, as one put it.38 Applications for Moldovan passports by the region’s residents (who sometimes travel on Romanian, Russian or Ukrainian passports) surged following Russia’s 2022 invasion, representing 97.55 per cent of the population by January 2024.39 In March, Transnistria recorded its lowest turnout in a Russian presidential election in the past eighteen years.40 But if Transnistria has shown signs of changing, it is not doing so fast enough for Chisinau.

Feeling increasingly emboldened in this new landscape, Moldovan officials have sought to tighten political and economic controls on the region through the incremental enactment of a variety of laws and policies. In March 2023, the Moldovan parliament outlawed political demands for Transnistria’s separation from greater Moldova, making them punishable by imprisonment in a move that Transnistria’s leaders branded an act of aggression.41 Despite Moldovan assurances that they remain free to travel throughout Moldova, Transnistria’s high-ranking de facto officials fear they could be arrested and no longer dare leave the region.42

The legislation (which was introduced at the behest of Moldova’s security services) has attracted outspoken criticism from the OSCE, which had been the main international mediator in Moldova’s internal conflict prior to the fizzling of talks amid the war in Ukraine, as well as from Western diplomats in Chisinau – who cited its vague language and the potential for selective enforcement.43

Moldova also began to deny entry to the small number of Transnistrian residents who lack a Moldovan passport, even if they were travelling on passports issued by Russia, Ukraine or Romania. In December 2023, Moldova sent Aleksandr Navaric, a former de facto Transnistrian official with a Russian passport, to Armenia (as there are no direct flights to Russia) when he tried to return home.44 The next January, the authorities did the same to Anna Mamei, a judge from Tiraspol with Russian citizenship.45

Tiraspol has noted that such moves have been “accompanied by threats” against Transnistrian officials.46 In March, Ukraine followed Moldova’s lead, placing Tiraspol’s de facto foreign minister, Vitaly Ignatiev, who holds both Ukrainian and Russian citizenship, on a wanted list over accusations of “cooperating with an aggressor state [Russia]”, further restricting his movements.47

In the commercial realm, over the course of 2023, Chisinau also began enforcing tighter customs checks on goods in transit to Transnistria and stripped some Transnistrian exporters of tax relief that they had previously enjoyed. Moldovan authorities also hindered the import by Tiraspol of Russian medical supplies and drugs, saying they are not certified in Moldova.48 Chisinau banned three Transnistrian companies from sending Russia goods it said could have military uses, forcing them to cut production and slash jobs.49

Moldovan authorities also demanded that some Transnistrian firms, including one of the region’s largest employers, the Moldovan Metallurgical Plant, pay environmental fees into the Moldovan budget for the first time.50 It was a thinly veiled warning to the company, which can export to and import from the EU only if national authorities issue it an environmental permit.51

At the start of 2024, tensions between Moldova and Transnistria escalated over the issue of taxes. On 1 January, Chisinau quashed the longstanding exemption of Transnistrian businesses from paying duties on exports, ending a 25-year-old arrangement that had enabled the breakaway region’s firms to instead pay lower tax rates to Transnistria’s de facto authorities.52 Under Moldova’s trade pact with the EU, signed in 2014, Transnistrian firms also benefit from tariff-free exports to the bloc.

“We cannot tolerate two different regimes: Moldova companies respect the rules whereas Transnistrian companies don’t”, a senior Moldovan official said. “We want to make [Transnistrians] understand that this is the only possible way in the future if we are to join the EU and they want to continue to have access to the EU single market”.53Transnistrian officials counter that the move amounts to an economic blockade.54 They claim it will cost the region $100 million, or some 10 per cent of its GDP.55

While those figures may be exaggerated, the economic squeeze drove the region to take retaliatory steps. In January, Transnistria imposed a tax on Moldovan farmers with land located on the Transnistrian bank of the Dniester River, which divides the breakaway region from the rest of Moldova, and hiked utility bills for Moldovan institutions operating in the breakaway region, such as schools teaching in Romanian.56

Next came an appeal for diplomatic assistance from Moscow. On 28 February, Transnistria’s de facto leader convened an extraordinary session of local deputies – the first in eighteen years – which asked Russia to take steps to protect the region from what the deputies called increasing Moldovan pressure.57 In the run-up to their pleas, rumours had swirled in Moldova and beyond that Moscow would attempt to annex the region, after a former Transnistrian official forecasted as much on social media.

58 But neither Transnistria nor Gagauzia (which approached Moscow at roughly the same time) went so far as to ask for Russia’s political or military intervention, calling only for diplomatic support. A Russian lawmaker bluntly said it would have made no “practical sense” for Transnistria to ask for anything more, since Moscow could not supply the region by land or air.59 “It turned out to be much ado about nothing”, a Moldovan official said.60

Still, the public appeal to Moscow showed how much the breakaway region’s relations with Chisinau have deteriorated over its recent policies, and the trend shows no sign of abating. “Chisinau stopped negotiating and started demanding”, a source familiar with negotiations between the two sides said.61 “There is less and less acceptance in Moldova that it is necessary to compromise with Transnistria”, another said.62

Moldovan officials say privately they will continue to push Transnistria to comply with rules that apply to the rest of the country, and which would make life more expensive for firms and consumers there.63 While Moldovan officials assert that these measures are needed to create a level playing field for Moldovan businesses, and/or to smooth the path toward EU accession and/or to prepare the ground for eventual reintegration, they are perceived in Transnistria as heavy-handed if not punitive.64

Transnistria’s loss of leverage in its relations with Chisinau and Russia’s diminished sway – two trends which Moldovan officials are quick to crow over – have understandably spurred authorities to seek ways to chip away at the region’s de facto self-rule and lingering allegiance to Russia. It is the first time they can do so without fear of reprisals from Moscow such as trade bans or energy cutoffs. But by opting for sticks without offering carrots or dialogue, Moldovan authorities risk creating a backlash and calcifying resistance to closer alignment with Chisinau.

B. New Tensions with Gagauzia

Unlike on the road to Transnistria, there are no checkpoints en route from Chisinau to Gagauzia’s main city, Comrat. The region’s spoken language is overwhelmingly Russian. Signs are also in Gagauz, an official language of a mainly ethnically Turkic, Orthodox Christian minority for whom the rural region with a population of 150,000 is home.65 But few speak Romanian, the state language of Moldova, and that has limited the region’s integration with the rest of the country.

The region has its own governor, known as the Bashkan, and its own parliament. It nominates the local head of police and prosecutor for approval by Moldova.66 But the autonomous southern region’s status has been a chronic source of tensions, with Gagauzia frequently accusing Chisinau of failing to respect its autonomous rights.67

Moldova’s crumbling relations with Moscow and the question of EU accession have provoked a backlash in Gagauzia, where the population is largely opposed to President Sandu’s new foreign policy orientation. A dip in exports to Moscow for farmers, soaring inflation and energy prices under her government has only bred more resentment in the impoverished region, despite economic realities that diminish Russia’s importance there.

EU member Romania, Turkey and Ukraine are all bigger markets for Gagauz exports than Russia, and the EU is much more heavily invested in the region than Moscow.68Gagauzia is also one of the country’s most heavily subsidised regions, with 70 per cent of its budget coming from the national Moldovan treasury.69 Still, all the candidates running for regional governor in the spring of 2023 were pro-Russian and against closer European integration.

The Kremlin appears to have seized on these dynamics as an opportunity to destabilise Moldova. Tensions between Gagauzia and the Moldovan government have escalated quickly the election of Evghenia Guțul as governor in May 2023. Guțul is a protégé of Ilan Shor, an exiled pro-Russian businessman and politician whom the EU and the U.S. have sanctioned as a Russian agent.70 Shor was convicted in 2023 for his role in stealing $1 billion from the Moldovan banking system; the sentence, however, was issued in absentia because he had fled to his native Israel in 2019 to evade charges.71 Moldovan authorities say he organised a series of anti-government protests in 2022 and 2023 with financing from and under the direction of the Kremlin.72

Guțul had no background in politics before being catapulted to power from relative obscurity after working as a secretary for the local branch of Shor’s party. Her campaign, during which she promised to build an airport and amusement park in the tiny region, was backed by video endorsements from Russian celebrities.73 The campaign officially declared spending seven times more than her main rival.74 President Sandu has refused to recognise Guțul’s election or include her in the country’s government, as seemingly required by Moldova’s constitution, saying she was voted in on the ticket of Shor’s party and is “a member of a criminal group”.75 Upon the government’s request, Moldova’s Constitutional Court in June 2023 banned Shor’s party.76

As it did in Transnistria’s case, the Moldovan government has sought to introduce measures that – had they stuck – would have caused Gagauzia economic pain. In October 2023, the Moldovan parliament demanded that the autonomous region reimburse local entrepreneurs for tax breaks from the local budget, rather than from the national budget, as had been the practice until then.77 Sandu’s ruling party said the aim was to reduce the financial burden on the Moldovan state, but some deputies said the goal was to punish Gagauzia for “anti-European sentiments”.78

The decision prompted deputies in the regional legislature, the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia, to withdraw from an inter-parliamentary contact group with their Moldovan counterparts, one of the few regular channels of dialogue between Chisinau and the region since 2015.79 The tax reimbursement measure was ultimately overruled by Moldova’s Сonstitutional Сourt in March.80 Meanwhile, the Gagauz authorities have also opposed the Moldovan government’s judicial reform plan and demanded enhanced status for the Russian language in the region.81

Against this backdrop, Gagauzia did its own outreach to the Kremlin.82 In early March, just days after Transnistria’s public appeal to Moscow, Gagauzia’s head Guțul met Russian President Vladimir Putin during a week-long visit to Moscow, where she accused the Moldovan authorities of usurping the autonomous region’s powers.83 Gagauzia’s decision to follow in Transnistria’s path and ask Moscow for aid has earned a firm rebuke from Moldova. After Guțul made another trip to Russia in early April, Moldovan state prosecutors charged her with illegally financing a political party; if convicted she could be jailed and stripped of the right to hold office.84 The United States – lending its weight to the Sandu government’s efforts to sideline Guțul – sanctioned her on 12 June.85

Guțul’s travels reportedly earned her pledges of support from Russia – though some of her claimed successes appear more real than others. The Gagauz leader was widely quoted in the Russian media as saying the Kremlin had promised preferential access to the Russian market for Gagauzian goods, which are mostly agricultural exports. She also said she would secure discounted natural gas deliveries, but that appears impossible as it would breach Moldovan law and infrastructure is lacking for the region to receive direct supplies.86

But the most striking result of Guțul’s visit was Moscow’s commitment that the state-owned Russian bank, Promsvyazbank, would pay all pensioners and public-sector employees in the region who apply a monthly payment equivalent to $100 (in a country where the average pension is $220).87 Under the plan, some 25,000 residents would be eligible for the payments via a so-called Mir payment card issued by the bank. Since the Mir payment system is under Western sanctions, Gagauzia’s eligible residents are left to withdraw money using the card in Transnistria or by making electronic purchases on Russian websites.88

The October referendum on charting a course toward joining the EU now threatens to deepen Chisinau’s tensions with Gagauzia.89 In the run-up to the vote, Guțul has joined forces with other Moldovan parties opposing President Sandu’s drive to secure EU membership. Together, they have formed a new electoral bloc.90 Many voters in Gagauzia, who account for roughly 5 per cent of the nation’s vote, are likely to abstain or cast their ballots against EU accession – enough to have an impact but only in a very tight count.

In any event, the planned vote has already heightened the region’s perception of its differences with the rest of Moldova, although these are hardly new. After Moldova signed its trade pact with the EU in 2014, a referendum staged in Gagauzia – which the government in Chisinau declared illegal – saw more than 98 per cent vote in support of joining the Russian-led trade bloc of former Soviet states, the Eurasian Customs Union, rather than the EU.91

IV. Looming Challenges

Beyond the need to manage fraught relations with Transnistria and Gagauzia, the coming period will bring Chisinau two challenges of particular consequence for Moldova’s stability: first, navigating forthcoming polls amid Russian meddling and, secondly, getting through negotiations over the future of Russian gas supplies to Transnistria and its critical power plant ahead of an end-of-year deadline.

A. Three Big Votes

Moldova’s 20 October presidential election comes at an uncertain moment for the country. The incumbent, President Sandu, has improved her odds of winning a second term by twinning the presidential poll with the referendum on joining the EU.92 While polls suggest she faces a serious challenge as support for her party falters, in large part due to Moldova’s economic malaise, they also show strong support for EU membership.93 Moldovan law had banned combining national elections with a referendum.94 But Sandu’s party voted to scrap that restriction, while the president argued that the referendum – which, if successful, would result in amending the country’s constitution to declare integration into Europe a strategic goal – was needed to ensure that Moldova keeps pursuing the course of accession no matter who holds office in the future.

The EU referendum is not an unalloyed boon for Sandu. It has galvanised opponents of joining the bloc, heralding a rough ride ahead of the polls and possibly until parliamentary elections due in early 2025. Sandu’s opponents have called for a boycott of the plebiscite.95 One of them is a former president, Socialist Party leader Igor Dodon, who forged close ties with Moscow during his years in office. On 8 July, he said he would stand down from running for president and threw his support behind former Prosecutor-General Alexandru Stoianoglo, in a bid to consolidate opposition to Sandu.96

Despite Moscow’s sway having receded, a significant minority of voters across the country remain loyal to Russia and sceptical of the government’s headlong rush toward the West.97 These sentiments are clear in Moldovans’ deeply polarised views on the war in Ukraine. One poll in August 2023 found that just over a third of Moldovans said they believed Ukraine to be in the right in the conflict next door, while in another the next July, 59 per cent said they disagreed that outside powers should supply more arms to Ukraine.98

Some residents have hosted Ukrainian refugees but refused to blame Russia for the war, causing tensions.99 This divergence of opinion can even be found in the Moldovan military. One media investigation purportedly revealed that the former chief of the general staff shared sensitive military information with Russian intelligence services in 2022. This former officer appeared to echo Russia’s narrative that it is fighting fascism in Ukraine.100

It is in this context that Russia has stepped up its meddling. Moldovan authorities have warned that Russian disinformation campaigns will aim to discourage the public from voting in the referendum in a bid to undermine its credibility.101 Russian outlets are already backing Shor and his new anti-European political project, which is attempting to consolidate the votes of those opposed to EU accession, while fake news and videos that appear to be of Russian origin have spread online.102 Alert to the risk of Russian mischief, the U.S., Britain and Canada have accused Russia of plotting to interfere in the October votes, issuing a sharply worded joint statement in June that warned Russia was “spreading lies” and planning to incite protests in Moldova should its “election meddling” fail.103

Just how far election interference might go is unclear. In 2023, Kyiv’s intelligence services said they had intercepted a Moscow plan to stage a coup and oust Sandu, but Russia is not expected to try anything so dramatic ahead of the planned October votes or the 2025 parliamentary polls. It is, however, expected to continue trying to tilt the playing field using payoffs and disinformation.104 These efforts also draw on a general mistrust of politicians in one of Europe’s poorest countries, where politics has been seen for three decades as a corrupt game and where the government is still struggling to deliver on many of its promises.

B. Looming Energy Crises

Moldova has been successful in weaning itself off Russian energy supplies in all but one important respect: it still purchases some four fifths of its electricity from a Russian gas-fired power plant based in Transnistria. Gas from Russia piped through Ukraine feeds the Moldavskaya plant, the country’s biggest, which is owned by the Russian company Inter RAO. The EU, U.S. and international financial institutions are helping finance new electricity lines to Romania that will offer Moldova an alternative source of power, but the construction takes time.105

In the interim, the Moldovan nation will remain dependent on Transnistria, and indirectly reliant upon Russia, while Transnistria’s economic stability will hinge on subsidised Russian gas and revenues from Moldova’s power bills.106 Leaders in both Chisinau and Tiraspol worry how they will keep the lights on after the transit contract for the gas supplied by Gazprom and piped across Ukraine expires on 31 December.

Failure to find a way to keep Russian gas flowing could trigger an energy crisis on a scale worse than that seen in 2022 (see Section II), sending prices soaring and causing blackouts in Moldova, while also ravaging Transnistria’s economy.107 Both the Moldovan government and the de facto Transnistrian administration appear eager to strike a deal to continue the current arrangement – although hardline officials in Chisinau have suggested that cutting supplies could help force Transnistria to reintegrate into Moldova on the capital’s terms.108

On paper, forging any deal that involves Moscow and Kyiv would seem forbiddingly difficult, but the prospects are not altogether bleak. Russia’s interest in fostering greater influence in Moldova means it wants to keep gas flowing to Transnistria, since gas is one of its last and most effective sources of leverage in the country. Kyiv, meanwhile, has shown it is sympathetic to Moldova’s concerns. In May, Moldova’s energy minister said Moldova and Ukraine had reached an informal agreement to keep natural gas flowing to Transnistria, suggesting that Russian gas could instead be pumped via Türkiye.109

European buyers and EU officials are also exploring a broader agreement that would allow gas to keep flowing via Ukraine’s main pipeline, though the contours of such a deal remain fuzzy. Without this agreement, the volumes of gas needed by Transnistria are too small to keep this supply route open. Options for a deal that would involve larger gas flows are complicated by the fact that Ukraine and Russia will not talk to each other.

Although Kyiv has said it would not renew its contract with Gazprom, in March it noted it would be ready to accept continuing flows across its territory if European countries so request.110 But all of the schemes being floated by European officials and gas companies, including those aiming to replace Russian with Azerbaijani gas, would be challenging to carry out – not least because of the political impetus from Brussels to stop buying Russian gas.111

V. Looking Forward

Ahead of Moldova’s 20 October vote, national authorities and their Western backers are keenly aware of the dangers posed by Russian meddling. While the levers of influence that Moscow can bring to bear are weakened – especially while its forces are tied up in eastern Ukraine – it still has arrows in its quiver, including methods that have proven disruptive in the past. It also still holds sway over a significant minority in the country. It will thus be able to exploit the internal fissures that are one of Moldova’s greatest vulnerabilities. But there are steps Moldova can take to protect its election and perhaps improve its prospects for EU membership.

A. Engaging Transnistria and Gagauzia

The geopolitical and commercial shifts wrought by Russia’s attack on Ukraine have opened a rare opportunity for Moldova to draw closer to dissident regions that might, if given the chance, see themselves as beneficiaries of a warmer relationship with the West. But, whether justified or not, Chisinau’s new, more forceful approach to Transnistria and Gagauzia risks squandering this opening and persuading the two that their interests depend on preserving the lifeline to Moscow.

Part of the challenge is overcoming political inertia. Moldova’s ruling party no doubt sees restarting a long-frozen reintegration dialogue with Transnistria as a burden it does not need right now. For starters, tensions with the region rank low on the list of voter concerns, with only 1.9 per cent of Moldovans seeing it as a priority in 2023.112

Furthermore, the hurdles to be addressed are overwhelming for a nation already struggling to keep its economy afloat, tackle corruption and begin the reforms required for accession to the EU. Among the knotty issues requiring attention would be absorbing the numerous retired citizens living in Transnistria, as well as dealing with its longstanding de facto institutions and figuring out what to do about Russia’s garrison and arms depot.113

With the impending polls on their minds, Moldova’s Western-leaning politicians no doubt also fear reintegration would permanently shift electoral politics to their detriment, with hundreds of thousands of additional Transnistrian votes potentially going to political forces that favour closer ties with Moscow and oppose European integration. “The domestic political environment is not amenable to [talk of] the reintegration of Transnistria”, a former Moldova official told a conference in Chisinau. “Just imagine putting it on the political agenda: who would dare politically to assume these costs?”114

Even so, missing the opportunity to engage in dialogue with Transnistria and to start addressing these challenges could entail greater hurdles later, not least because ill-will that builds up in the interim will need to be overcome. Internal divides could also complicate Moldova’s path to EU membership. Leaving Moldova’s rift with the breakaway region unhealed would give pause to many EU member states, who take the final decision on any candidate country’s accession.

Although EU foreign affairs chief Josep Borrell signalled in June 2023 that Moldova could follow the model of still-divided EU member Cyprus – join the bloc first, then try to resolve its division later – many European and EU officials are inclined to disagree, in large part due to Russia’s influence in shaping Moldova’s fault lines.115 The EU “would like them to come in as full countries with their territorial disputes fully resolved”, one EU official dealing with enlargement said. “Otherwise, we will import problems and (others) will always have leverage and interfere in the EU”.116

Some clarification on this point by European leaders would be helpful. Borrell’s comments regarding the case of Cyprus appeared geared toward ensuring that Transnistria, and by extension Russia, would not be able to derail Moldova’s EU aspirations. But it appears to have given Moldova’s government yet another reason to turn its back on a potential settlement. Indeed, Chisinau had begun preparing for negotiations with Transnistria in early 2023, expecting the EU to say settlement talks with Transnistria “go hand in hand with European integration”, in the words of a Moldovan diplomat.117 But in the wake of Borrell’s remarks, Chisinau mothballed these plans.118

Chisinau should take up the effort again and see it through. The first step should be to ensure that channels for dialogue between Chisinau and Tiraspol stay open. Russia’s war in Ukraine has corroded the decades-long, internationally mediated peace process between Moldova and Transnistria. The group involved in the so-called 5+2 format – which besides the two principal parties included Russia, Ukraine, the EU, the U.S. and the OSCE – last met in 2019; Ukraine says it has since become moribund.119 While these talks did little to move the two sides toward a political settlement, they did broker solutions to practical disagreements.

These included the mutual recognition of diplomas and licence plates; the right of Romanian-language schools in Transnistria to teach; and resolution of disputes over access to farmland.120 These talks also helped prevent more serious clashes, although in practice the risk of military conflict between Moldova and Transnistria has been low since the war of secession three decades ago.

With the collapse of traditional avenues for dialogue, sporadic direct talks between Transnistria’s de facto leaders and the Moldovan government have become all the more important. The only real channels for such talks until now have been impromptu meetings between Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean and de facto Transnistrian leader Vadim Krasnoselsky, at which they discuss pressing practical economic and security matters, such as Moldova’s electricity purchases. Turning ad hoc contacts into a more regular dialogue track could provide an avenue for rebuilding trust.121 Chisinau should broaden this track, using it to engage Tiraspol on new policies affecting residents and businesses in Transnistria, and Tiraspol should seize the opportunity.122

Dialogue is also needed to ease tensions in Gagauzia. Moldova’s authorities are unlikely to change tack as regards their refusal to engage with the governor, Guțul, but this impediment need not stymie all interaction. Indeed, the government has opted to preserve relations with mayors, businesspeople and students in the region – and even to disburse state funds while bypassing the governor.123 Chisinau should reinforce these contacts and look for new ones: for example, the Moldovan parliament should seek to restart its joint working group with Gagauz deputies, which was suspended following the tax changes introduced by Chisinau that have since been overturned.124 Over the long run, both sides will need to take a step back and look into negotiating a more comprehensive plan that would address the region’s chronic concerns over what it sees as Chisinau’s infringements on the rights set out in its autonomy status.125

B. Protecting the Vote

Mounting tensions ahead of the forthcoming votes underscore that efforts by Moldova and its Western backers to shield it from Russian interference remain a work in progress. While the security services work to defuse covert threats, the country’s long-term initiatives to tackle corruption and reform the justice system – now given encouragement through the EU accession process – are a surer but slow-moving way to help its institutions fend off outside meddling.

Nascent efforts to counter Russian disinformation are also important. A two-year EU mission launched in April 2023 to bolster the security sector and counter foreign interference has been critical to plugging the gaps in Moldova’s state capacity as its own fledgling Centre for Strategic Communication and Combating Disinformation begins work.126 Moldova’s Western partners should press big social media firms to do more to tackle fake, damaging content on their platforms ahead of the votes, including hiring more staff with the language skills to vet posts.

No less essential is long-term investment by Moldova’s partners in civil society fact-checking and media awareness groups. In Moldova’s small media market, independent outlets are struggling and in need of support; Moldova’s Western backers should help foster trustworthy local Russian-language news. Notwithstanding the temptation to ban outlets suspected by authorities of disseminating falsehoods, the Moldovan government should be cautious about measures that impinge on free speech. Missteps risk playing into Moscow’s hands by fostering grievances.127

C. Averting an Energy Crisis

The most likely path to avoid a shutoff of Russian gas flows to Transnistria and its knock-on effects on Moldova’s electricity supply is to start work now to broker a solution among the various parties. Some Moldovan officials seem inclined to wait to see the outcome of discussions that involve the other, bigger European actors still purchasing Russian gas pumped via Ukraine. But none of these players are dependent to quite the same degree and they may well not find a way to extend transits.

Any agreement to avert a crisis is bound to be a complex one; for this reason, Moldovan officials, along with their Ukrainian and European partners, must double down on seeking a discrete solution. While they all have some reason to want to work this out, a good outcome cannot be taken for granted.

Over the longer haul, Moldova and its supporters should bolster efforts to connect Moldova with the EU grid and break its lingering dependence on Russian gas supplies. To do so, it will need to boost domestic capacity, including through energy saving measures; and strengthen Romania’s ability to export electricity to the country. But these plans will simply displace the problem if they do not also include Transnistria. Halting electricity purchases from the breakaway region’s power plant would cause serious economic harm to the region, and possibly rekindle tensions that have flickered on and off since the 1990s.

VI. Conclusion

Moldova’s government faces a delicate moment, trying to lay out a new road toward the West in a country where divisions remain over that orientation and while Russia seeks to retain its influence by magnifying the splits. As it charts its path, Chisinau faces three major near-term challenges – protecting the integrity of a series of important votes; stopping a possible disruption of its energy supplies; and reversing the deterioration of its relations with Gagauzia and Transnistria.

The war in Ukraine is both a catalyst and an impediment to navigating these challenges, but the rapid changes it has wrought in the country also offer a rare opportunity. Even as Chisinau works with Western partners to parry Russian interference, and engages with all relevant actors to safeguard its future power supplies, it should seek a rapprochement with its two problem regions – through the expansion of ad hoc leader-level dialogue in Transnistria and the broadening of lower-level engagements in Gagauzia. With politicians in Chisinau and the two regions believing the Ukraine conflict’s outcome will be decisive for their internal tug of war, a swift resolution may not be in sight.

Nevertheless, perhaps the best long-term investment Chisinau can make in the country’s stability is to avoid fanning the flames of defiance in the two regions. That, in turn, would give the Moldovan government a chance to strengthen the economic and cultural ties that could, with encouragement, bind the regions more tightly to Chisinau than to Moscow.

For footnotes and info graphs, visit: https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/2024-08/b097-moldova-divided.pdf

Chisinau/Kyiv/London/Brussels, 21 August 2024