By Tara Varma and Sophie Roehse, Brookings, October 24, 2024
In this 2024 “super election year,” a common concern across Europe and the United States has been the growing popularity and electoral successes of far-right movements and narratives. Though right-wing parties exhibit clear distinctions in different countries, they echo each other strongly in their nationalist orientation, their softness on Russia—and skepticism toward support for Ukraine—and their harsh anti-immigration stance.
In the European Union (EU), one election after another has demonstrated the centrality of irregular migration and border security in public discussions and forced mainstream parties to take more restrictive approaches to calm fear and anxiety fueled by xenophobic, far-right rhetoric. The conflation between regular and irregular migration has also severely distorted the debate.
The results of the European Parliament election, France’s snap election, three German state elections, and the Austrian election all showed a strong rightward drift and signaled voters’ distrust in their national governments, confirming the notable shift in tone on migration in Europe toward a more securitized, hardline approach, even among mainstream parties. A look at the numbers indeed reveals a challenging situation as the European Union faces its highest number of asylum applications since 2016, which is straining resources for processing, accommodation, service provision, and thus integration.
In the aftermath of Europe’s so-called “refugee crisis” or “migrant crisis,” which began in 2015, EU member states tried and failed repeatedly to rethink and renew the union’s common policy, until a breakthrough this summer concluded the new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. In the interim years, however, national governments made separate plans, implementing ad hoc measures to fortify their borders, restricting access to their asylum systems, and negotiating deals with non-EU states to limit movement.
This patchwork of policies did little to deter an increasing number of displaced persons worldwide from heading toward Europe in search of safety. It did, however, create divisions within and between member states, thus impeding progress on effective EU-wide responses. This political incoherence, together with fluctuating irregular arrivals, has since been exploited by populist parties, who propagate the sense that governments have lost control over their sovereignty and can no longer protect their populations.
To provide a better understanding of the complex situation Europe finds itself in today, this explainer aims to clarify the EU’s role in migration and asylum policy, why the issue became so controversial, how to understand recent developments in the migration space, and what opportunities the new pact offers.
How does migration and asylum policy in Europe work?
The free movement of goods, services, capital, and persons has been a fundamental pillar of the European idea, as enshrined in the 1957 Treaty of Rome that founded the political and economic community that today constitutes the European Union. Within the EU, national borders became almost fully invisible with the creation of the Schengen Area in 1995, which today includes 25 EU member states and four non-EU countries, collectively home to more than 450 million people.
When it comes to regular migration, the law stipulates that the EU has the authority to establish the conditions for entry and legal residence in member states, “including for family-reunification purposes, applicable to nationals of non-EU countries. Member States retain the right to set quotas for admitting individuals from non-EU countries seeking employment.” The fight against irregular immigration requires the EU to implement “an effective returns policy, in a manner consistent with fundamental rights.”
The EU’s Common European Asylum System (CEAS) was established in 1999 to enhance coordination across member states and streamline systems for processing asylum claims and supporting refugees granted protection. More specifically, the “Dublin Regulation” governs relations among member states and manifests that the country of an individual’s first arrival in the EU is responsible for asylum processing and refugee reception. For years, the Schengen regulation of free movement has made the Dublin system difficult to administer, as it unintentionally permitted asylum seekers to self-select destination countries—often based on linguistic abilities, families, perceived hospitality, and benefits.
It has also placed disproportionate obligations on EU border countries at the forefront of irregular movements to Europe, particularly in the Mediterranean (Greece, Italy, and Spain) and the Balkans (Hungary, Croatia, and Bulgaria). Finally, a lack of enforcement to relocate applicants in instances of violation has sustained pressure on more “popular” destination countries and undermined authorities’ credibility.
Before this year’s overhaul of common EU policy, as reflected in the agreement on the new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum—more on that below—member states at the national level and EU leadership implemented incremental measures to deter irregular arrivals. While some actions temporarily led to decreases in arrivals in certain member states, however, they failed to address the underlying drivers of displacement.
Most notable have been a series of EU deals with third countries in Europe’s neighborhood to improve border management and halt irregular departures toward the EU, in exchange for the provision of financial support. A 2016 agreement with Turkey became a model for future EU deals with North African and Middle Eastern countries, including Lebanon, Egypt, Mauritania, and Tunisia. Italy, on its own, concluded a memorandum of understanding with Libya in 2017, which pledged millions of euros in assistance to enhance the maritime surveillance capacities of the Libyan Coast Guard. In exchange, Libyan authorities would prevent people from departing the Northern African country and intercept irregular migrants at sea to return and detain them in Libya.
Yet these “migration partnerships” have been severely criticized by humanitarian groups and lawmakers alike, who express concerns about how the policy legitimizes and increases Europe’s dependency on autocratic regimes, disregards human rights, and threatens migrants’ physical safety. A recent investigative report by The Washington Post and Lighthouse Reports further revealed that local authorities, aided by EU funding and equipment, have violated human rights and asylum law. Several research studies have further criticized the migration deals’ lack of effectiveness.
Why is migration so controversial?
When over 1.2 million people entered the EU in 2015 to claim asylum under international law, most of whom were Syrian refugees fleeing civil war, the CEAS and the Dublin Regulation quickly proved dysfunctional and ineffective in absorbing the shock to European processing and integration systems. The situation sparked tensions among frontline countries—which were challenged by the arrival of 1,216,860 and 1,166,815 asylum seekers at their borders in 2015 and 2016, respectively—and countries further inward, which in many cases resisted migrant transfers to share responsibility and restricted access to their asylum systems under fear of adverse domestic consequences. Municipalities in major destination countries were overwhelmed by the speed and scale of arrivals and faced difficulties mustering enough resources for housing, financial support, and integration of newcomers in their local communities.
Despite agreements by the European Council to relocate up to 160,000 asylum seekers from frontline countries Italy and Greece to other member states to reduce pressures on the Italian and Greek asylum systems, fewer than 12,000 relocations were realized by the end of 2016. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, for instance, refused orders from Brussels to take in 1,294 asylum seekers and instead organized a national referendum on whether the EU should have the authority to “mandate the obligatory resettlement of non-Hungarian citizens into Hungary,” which he used to validate his harsh domestic anti-immigrant approach.
Stoking fears of a Muslim “invasion” and claiming his country was the “last Christian-conservative bastion of the Western world,” Orbán’s approach also included the construction of fences at Hungary’s southern borders, changing asylum laws to speed up processing and reduce protections, and introducing “transit zones” at Hungary’s border with Serbia, which have been condemned as “container prisons” surrounded by barbed wires.
In stark contrast, German Chancellor Angela Merkel valiantly declared “Wir schaffen das!” (“We can do it!”) and decided to keep her country’s borders open, leading to the arrival of around 1.2 million asylum seekers in Germany between 2015 and 2016. The real pressure on municipalities and the sense of chaos and disorder, however, benefitted the far-right populist Alternative for Germany (AfD), which entered the federal parliament for the first time in 2017 and became the largest opposition party.
Over the years, asylum seekers have become convenient scapegoats for disillusioned and frustrated Europeans who have seen their societies change and economies tumble because of successive external shocks, from climate change and a global health crisis to rapid technological change and a disruption of Europe’s decades-old security order. In this time of great uncertainty, a rights-based vision of migration and asylum has become a perceived political vulnerability, replaced with a security approach stressing law and order.
In a 2021 effort led by Marine Le Pen, the head of France’s National Rally party, 16 right-wing parties from across Europe—including the governing parties of Hungary, Italy, and Poland at the time—declared their opposition to a “European Superstate” allegedly being created by “radical forces” within the EU. They objected to a perceived “cultural, religious transformation and ultimately nationless construction of Europe” and instead pressed for “respect for the culture and history of European states” and “respect for Europe’s Judeo-Christian heritage.”
Uniting diverse national political actors, their communique demonstrates the focus on national identity and Christian values that the far right has portrayed as being under threat because of the EU’s migration policy. Hence, the EU finds itself caught between a rock and a hard place: its policy is weaponized by right-wing populists as too weak, and it is denounced by nongovernmental organizations and observers as not respecting its own values.
How does the new Pact on Migration and Asylum address prior shortcomings?
A sound European policy that attempts to better manage the drivers of irregular migration in countries of origin and centers on the collaboration of all EU member states is needed to handle rising global displacement trends. The passage of the new Pact on Migration and Asylum in May 2024 offers a chance to transform the EU’s current governing framework if implemented effectively by the time the new legislation takes force in 2026. It represents the first major agreement on migration and asylum policy in over a decade, intended to accelerate procedures and enhance cooperation and solidarity between member states.
Framed by the European Commission as a “fair and firm” approach, the new legislation consists of 10 major reform proposals that cement Europe’s policy shift to fortify borders, enhance scrutiny in asylum processing, double down on deporting rejected applicants, and partner with non-EU states of origin and transit to limit irregular arrivals. A key aspect is a new accelerated procedure for asylum applicants from countries with a low recognition rate, whose probability of getting their asylum application request granted is low.
The mechanism will take a maximum of 12 weeks (about three months) and permits fast-track processing at EU external borders, during which migrants, including families and children, will stay in collective detention-like facilities. Further, the pact aims to correct the failures of the Dublin Regulation through a new solidarity system, which obliges all member states to share responsibility, either by receiving up to 30,000 asylum applicants per year, paying a fee of 20,000 euros per asylum applicant to assist hosting countries or contributing other resources.
Critics have pointed out, however, that the focus on securitizing EU borders as opposed to addressing humanitarian implications is unlikely to reduce arrival numbers and increases the risks of human rights violations. The European Union must satisfy its obligations under international law to ensure fast-track processing facilities satisfy human rights standards and that all asylum claims are evaluated fairly, as required by the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. These principles should apply equally to EU-funded migration management projects in Europe’s neighborhood.
As the European Union enters a new governing cycle—following the European Parliament election in June and with a new college of commissioners later this fall—it has an opportunity to prioritize a new common migration and asylum policy and take functional steps to achieve a more balanced and orderly system among member states, which provides for the dignity, safety, and rights of those seeking international protection. The number of displaced people globally has increased consistently over the past 12 years and is expected to have exceeded 120 million persons in 2024.
However, it is imperative to remember that 75% of displaced persons remain in low- and middle-income countries in the “Global South,” which often struggle with political, economic, and social insecurity themselves. As war continues in Ukraine, conflicts escalate in the Middle East, political instability grows across sub-Saharan Africa, and the secondary effects of climate change jeopardize people’s lives and livelihoods, the EU will be forced to grapple with irregular migration for the foreseeable future.
The nationalities of first-time asylum applicants in the European Union in recent years demonstrate the global nature of migration today. In 2023, for instance, Syrians (183,250), Afghans (100,985), Turks (89,985), Venezuelans (67,085), and Colombians (62,015) represented the five largest nationalities among first-time asylum applicants in the EU. Certainly, contemporary migration flows to Europe are mixed and not all persons applying for asylum fall into the protected categories of the Geneva Convention.
It is also true, however, that many EU countries are changing demographically as birth rates fall across developed economies and are experiencing severe shortages of workers across professional and blue-collar sectors, threatening future social and economic vitality and stability. Immigration, therefore, offers an enormous benefit for Europe to counteract downward demographic and economic trends. Beyond the pact, leaders should dedicate greater efforts to expand legal pathways at the national level for people not considered refugees under international law, but who desperately seek greater economic opportunity and are eager to contribute meaningfully to host societies.
Recent political developments in the European migration space
The yearslong EU effort to agree to a set of clear, cohesive policies as represented by the new Pact on Migration and Asylum, however, appears to be undercut by a recent shift in tone on migration across the bloc. National, xenophobic rhetoric is no longer contained to the fringes of the political spectrum across the European Union. Anti-immigrant sentiment today features dominantly in public debates, after years of far-right populists amplifying cultural anxieties and accusing governments of having lost control of their sovereign borders.
Right-wing leaders, from Hungary’s “illiberal democrat” Viktor Orbán to Italy’s Giorgia Meloni, whose Brothers of Italy party has its roots in a 20th-century fascist movement, have increasingly shaped the direction at the EU level toward a more restrictive approach focused on border security and a defense of European culture and values.
Recent electoral outcomes across the EU revealing strong support for far-right parties have sent shockwaves across the continent. Following June’s European Parliament election, parties to the right of the European People’s Party—the center-right Christian Democrats—now hold over one-quarter of seats in the EU’s lower legislature (187 out of 720). The vote produced a snap election in France, from which a center-left coalition barely emerged ahead of the far right.
In Germany, the extremist AfD emerged from the European vote as the second strongest party, ahead of all three governing coalition parties. In three recent regional elections in eastern Germany, the AfD and the Alliance Sahra Wagenknecht—a new party on the extreme left founded in January 2024 that has also adopted a harsh anti-immigration stance—fanned the flames of fear and xenophobia and soared to a combined 42%-49%, both landing among the top three strongest parties in each state.
Finally, Austria’s September election saw the far-right Freedom Party become as the strongest new parliamentary grouping, whose campaign included promises of “remigration” as part of a larger theme to create a “Fortress Austria.”
In response to these volatile political trends, member states—including many led by centrist governments—are once again turning to reactive, unilateral measures to contain the far right by way of a more restrictive stance on migration and asylum.
Most notably, Germany’s center-left government has drastically shifted its tone on combating irregular migration and enhancing domestic security after two fatal knife assaults occurred in Germany this summer, whose perpetrators turned out to be foreign nationals. In a stark break with Merkel’s hopeful and humanitarian spirit, the government expanded temporary controls to include all German borders—defying the Schengen regulation—imposed stricter rules on benefits and protected status for asylum seekers, and even began deportations of convicted Afghans to Afghanistan. Not only are these actions inconsistent with the principle of EU solidarity and grounds for heightened tensions with Germany’s neighbors, but the German police union has deemed the border checks largely ineffective, particularly as people claiming asylum can still enter.
Emboldened by the German turn on the issue, Orbán most recently threatened to send buses of migrants to Brussels—copying his conservative MAGA friends in the United States. The new French government, led by Prime Minister Michel Barnier, has also vowed to crack down on irregular entries and strengthen controls at France’s borders. In Poland, Prime Minister and former President of the European Council Donald Tusk announced a temporary suspension of the right to seek asylum for irregular migrants entering through the Polish-Belarusian border, claiming that Russia and Belarus were “weaponizing” migrants in attempts to destabilize the EU. The policy could violate the right to non-refoulement—which protects individuals from being returned to a country under international human rights law—and set a perilous precedent for other member states trying to restrict irregular entries.
In a novel move, Meloni concluded a new “partnership” with Albania—a non-EU country—under which Italy will send up to 36,000 asylum applicants per year to process their claims externally. Though the policy only applies to adult male individuals intercepted in international waters prior to arrival at Italian shores, several attempted transfers of migrants to Albanian processing centers have already been invalidated by an Italian court. Together with six other EU countries, Meloni has also tried to advance normalization with the Assad regime in Syria, in part to reconsider the possibility of returning Syrian refugees to the war-torn country.
At the October 2024 European Council summit, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, European Council President Charles Michel, and leaders of EU member states gathered to discuss a full agenda of topics in which migration featured prominently. In a letter setting the tone for the summit, von der Leyen stressed to European leaders the centrality of expanding third-country partnerships like those concluded with Turkey and countries in North Africa and the Middle East, to improve processes of return and counter the “weaponization” of migrants by Russia, Belarus, and others attempting to instigate political instability in Europe. During the meetings, the agreement between Italy and Albania was lauded as a model for the EU to emulate, confirming the shift toward externalization that has gained traction in Europe.
Notably absent from the summit communique was any mention of the new common EU Pact on Migration and Asylum or strategies for its timely and comprehensive implementation. The recent uncoordinated measures by EU members and their preoccupation with “weaponization,” third-country deals, and “return hubs” at the EU level are unlikely to provide the sense of reassurance, cohesion, and opportunity that people expect of their national and European leaders.
AUTHORS
Tara Varma: Visiting Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe
Sophie Roehse: Senior Research Assistant - Center on the United States and Europe
Disclaimer
The opinion expressed in this aper is that of the author and does not necessarily reflect that of the CEMAS Board.