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European Democracy Support Annual Review 2021
European Democracy Support Annual Review 2021
By Richard Youngs, Ken Godfrey, Ruth-Marie Henckes, Erin Jones, Elisa Lledó and Kinga Brudzinska, Carnegie Europe, January 24, 2022
Introduction
This study offers a first annual review of European democracy-support policies. While there are now many widely consulted indices and rankings of democracy, there is no equivalent that measures efforts to support democratic norms internationally. This review aims to correct this imbalance and is intended to begin a series of yearly overviews of European democracy-support policies.
It offers information on the efforts of the European Union (EU) and European states to foster democracy internationally, and it also dissects the limitations to such efforts. Complementing the several indices of democracy, the review aims to foster more informed reflection on policies designed to support democratic norms.
The review disaggregates the different strands of policy that are relevant to international democracy. It begins by summarizing the general global context during 2021 and how this conditioned the relative priority that the EU and European governments attached to democracy support.
It then details European funding for democracy projects around the world, instances in which the EU imposed sanctions or other restrictive measures in relation to concerns over democracy and human rights, and the place of democracy support within security interventions. Across the different categories, the review looks at European democracy-support efforts globally and within Europe.
The review identifies key developments in 2021. The EU and several of its member states launched new funding arrangements to support democracy projects around the world. There were modest increases in the amount of money devoted to democracy and human rights by some governments but decreases by others. The EU stepped up its use of democracy and human-rights sanctions while still refraining from exerting strongly critical pressure in relation to many notable cases of democratic regression and serious human-rights crises.
It also began to deploy a wider range of democracy-support efforts within its own borders. The wider international context was both boon and bane. In particular, the new U.S. administration gave a fillip to European democracy support while the COVID-19 pandemic was a complicating factor. The year saw some strengthened EU-level commitments to supporting and defending democracy, but also signs of democracy and human rights slipping down the order of European geopolitical priorities.
The review covers the actions of EU institutions, collective EU-level interventions, and member-state policies as well as those non-EU European states active in democracy support. There is no objectively correct definition of what does and does not count as democracy support, and this uncertainty is reflected in the analysis. The review looks at the quantitative and qualitative elements of European strategies and reflects on both of these in its concluding assessment.
Overarching Developments
The international and political context brought new constraints as well as potential opportunities for democracy support in 2021.
COVID-19
International politics were dominated by the coronavirus and resulting COVID-19 pandemic throughout 2021 in terms of efforts to contain the virus and the diplomacy of vaccine rollouts. The pandemic pushed questions related to democracy support down the EU’s agenda. Governments sought coordination on these issues above and beyond any specific attachment to a democracy agenda.
Governments around the world abridged democratic rights in order to fight the pandemic and then used such restrictions to buttress their own power; autocracies became more autocratic, democracies became less democratic. Yet as the year progressed, the EU also made commitments to integrate governance issues within its external actions related to the pandemic.
Council conclusions in February 2021 promised that the EU would support a “human rights-based recovery” from COVID-19 around the world.1 Restrictions imposed to mitigate the effects of the pandemic galvanized many democracy movements throughout the year.
The New U.S. Administration
The change of U.S. president seemed to open up new opportunities for global democracy support. Joe Biden promised to resurrect the United States’ commitment to democracy after the erratic positions of Donald Trump’s administration on this agenda. European governments welcomed this change and committed to working with the Biden administration on global democracy.
As the new president increased U.S. commitments, this also put more pressure on European governments to demonstrate their own commitments to defending democratic norms. In December, the Biden administration organized a Summit for Democracy, with the participation of over one hundred countries. All EU member states but one—Hungary—were invited and committed to doing more to support democracy domestically and internationally.
While there was a new energy to the transatlantic discussion on democracy cooperation, European actors were also somewhat wary of U.S. efforts proving too heavy-handed and cutting across their approaches to democracy support.
U.S.-China Rivalry
The U.S.-China rivalry rose dramatically in significance during the year as the primary shaper of EU geopolitical positioning. To some extent, this drove European governments toward a more assertive focus on defending democracy. The strategic overtones of the democracy agenda became much sharper in 2021, and a striking development was the reemergence of widespread talk of alliances between democratic states. This was not only related to China, but competition with the country was a major factor behind their genesis.
As this review details, the EU launched several initiatives during the year that in some measure, directly or indirectly, ostensibly linked the defense of democratic norms to strategies related to Chinese actions and power. Still, this dynamic was not absolute and something of a counterbalance persisted. Many governments in the EU sought to avoid being pulled too far into the democracies-versus-autocracies frame.
The EU has sought to cooperate more with China on climate change, in particular. Moreover, the union is likely to require help from autocratic allies as well as other democracies to the extent that China’s rise becomes the main strategic concern. The U.S.-China rivalry gave a boost to democracy support but also bred concern lest this be tied too tightly to U.S. strategic interests.
Strategic Autonomy
During the year, EU foreign policy debates revolved heavily around the concept of strategic autonomy. This emerged clearly as the core notion set to define and guide EU foreign and security policy under the leadership that took office in Brussels in late 2019. President Ursula von der Leyen championed strategic autonomy as integral to her “geopolitical” European Commission while High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell gave countless interviews and speeches and wrote numerous articles on it.
The push for strategic autonomy strengthened in the wake of the Western withdrawal from Afghanistan (see below) and as a response to the creation of a security pact between Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom.
The relationship between the quest for strategic autonomy and democracy support was not straightforward or clear. Leaders and statements sometimes spoke in general terms about strategic autonomy helping defend “European values,” but the concept was aimed mainly at building joint military capabilities and protecting domestic production. The prominence given to strategic autonomy during the year at the very least sat uneasily with nominal commitments to democracy support and offset other aspects of EU policy crafted around a heightened focus on global democracy.
Afghanistan
Events in Afghanistan left a broad imprint on international relations and the global democracy-support agenda. The Taliban’s victory and the hasty withdrawal of international troops represented a defeat for twenty years of efforts to build democratic institutions. Even if building democracy was not the main Western aim in Afghanistan, this outcome left wider doubts about the future of such interventions. Biden’s decision to withdraw despite European concerns lessens the prospect of EU states following the United States into such ventures again.2
Many in Europe had already long come to terms with the limits to what external intervention could achieve for democracy—if Afghanistan put a nail in the coffin of liberal interventionism, it also cemented a direction that EU foreign policy had already taken for some years.
The events in Afghanistan also shifted the focus of international concerns to security and migration. From August, the international community was increasingly concerned with refugee flows from the country and the possible reemergence of international terrorist operations from there.
This not only represented a defeat for democracy support in Afghanistan, but also meant that EU states began cooperating more with autocratic regimes in Iran, Central Asia, and elsewhere to contain the new wave of refugees.
If the indulgence by the United States and European countries of corrupt and only partially democratic elites in Afghanistan following the invasion in 2001 contributed to the Taliban’s regaining support among the population,3 their even tighter focus on migration and security concerns after the Taliban returned to power risked simply repeating this cycle.
New Strategies
During 2021, the EU moved forward on significant new initiatives in internal and external democracy support. In addition, several governments published strategies in this area as well.
EU External Initiatives
The year 2021 was de facto the first operational year of the EU Action Plan on Democracy and Human Rights 2020–2024. The plan promises “a new geopolitical agenda on human rights and democracy” with EU responses to new challenges posed by the erosion of democracy, climate change, and the digital transition.4 The EU institutions and delegations agreed strategies necessary for implementing this, including Civil Society Roadmaps, thematic and country Multiannual Indicative Programs (MIPs), and Human Rights and Democracy Country Strategies.
The MIPs identified the priority areas of EU cooperation with partner countries, setting the contours of funding until 2027. The MIP for human rights and democracy closely mirrors the priorities in the action plan and links policy objectives with financing.5 The fact that the MIPs were only adopted by late 2021, however, means that the start of disbursement of funds under the 2021–2027 EU budget was delayed. Around a third of EU delegations have prioritized democracy and human rights within their respective country funding strategies.
At the end of the year, the EU launched the Team Europe Democracy initiative—a commitment to build a strong response to defend democracy around the world. It aims to bring together fragmented EU and member-state democracy-support actions into a coherent whole, ensuring that actions are better targeted, more strategic, and more visible. The European Commission and a handful of member states were the prime movers behind this effort to replicate their joint approach to COVID-19 emergency aid. While this could be considered a rebranding of existing joint programming, the choice of democracy as a theme for this new collective approach indicates a certain prioritization of this issue, especially as funding was made available quickly outside standard budget procedures. Team Europe Democracy includes financing for research to contribute to increased knowledge and effectiveness along with assistance to EU delegations to enhance their democracy support together with member states. The development of the Team Europe Democracy initiative will be key for EU efforts in the coming years.
EU official statements and communications in 2021 included increased mentions of democracy support. Around a third of communication materials referenced EU commitments to democracy, although it was their main focus in a small number of cases. European Commission Vice President for Values and Transparency Věra Jourová and Commissioner for International Partnerships Jutta Urpilainen mentioned democracy in over a third of their statements, while Borrell mentioned it in around a quarter of his. These represented slight increases compared to 2020 (see Table 1).
However, democracy rarely formed the spine of these communications and was frequently mentioned among other issues in introductory or concluding text (see Table 2). The exception was Borrell’s official statements, which had democracy as a core focus in just under a fifth of cases in 2020 and in 2021.
The EU introduced several new regional strategies that promised upgraded democracy support. The new Indo-Pacific strategy promises enhanced engagement in the region “based on promoting democracy, the rule of law, human rights” and “mainstreaming” these principles in all EU action there, through sanctions, dialogues, trade preferences, and other tools—although without offering details on resources or strategies for these themes.6 The new Partnership Agreement between the EU and members of the Organization of African, Caribbean, and Pacific States—adopted in April following nearly three years of negotiations—has democracy, human rights, and good governance as one of its priority areas.
It includes the possibility of taking “appropriate measures without consultation” in response to serious violations of democratic norms, although it appears to require lengthier consultations before aid cuts are implemented.7
Commitments to strengthening democracy are less prominent in the EU’s Integrated Strategy in the Sahel, which has a heavy focus on security cooperation, stability and peace, fighting terrorism, and economic growth. While the Sahel strategy emphasizes the importance of political cooperation and governance issues, the latter relate mostly to matters such as security-sector reform, anticorruption, the rule of law, and public-service provision. Reference to democracy support is limited to a commitment to election observation missions in this region.8
In May, EU Council conclusions promised stronger support for democracy in the Horn of Africa as a geostrategic priority to safeguard European security interests in the region.9
The EU agreed a Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood: A New Agenda for the Mediterranean that includes a degree of focus on democratic governance. This states that support to governance and the rule of law in Arab partner countries will involve an upgraded focus on the independence and accountability of the judiciary, anticorruption, election observation and assistance, democratic internet governance, and privacy and data protection as well as support to civil society and gender equality.10 At the Eastern Partnership summit in December, the EU reiterated commitments to increase support for democracy for the countries concerned.11
There were also important new developments at the thematic level. The third EU Gender Action Plan (GAP III) began operating in 2021 and will run to 2025. This promises an upgrade in support for women’s political empowerment and participation compared to GAP II, which focused mainly on capacity building for women politicians rather than targeting the root causes of women’s underrepresentation, such as legislative hurdles and patriarchal political parties.12
The approach to support for connectivity and regional infrastructure took a more political turn. The EU introduced its Global Gateway infrastructure program, billed as a democratic alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative that will advance “a values-based approach, offering transparency and good governance” to partners and work to support democratic norms, with a particular focus on tackling forced labor.13 It commits to mobilizing €300 billion in 2021–2027 for infrastructure with good democratic standards—although it is not clear where this money will come from as only €18 billion of EU aid grants is promised. It is also not entirely clear how Global Gateway investment credits and guarantees will serve democracy. The EU suggests that financing will depend on states meeting democratic standards, but the details of such conditionality have not been spelt out.
The EU continued with its regular human-rights dialogues. These were held with thirty-two partners: Afghanistan, the African Union, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, EU candidate countries, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Moldova, Morocco, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Palestinian Authority, the Philippines, Qatar, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, the United Arab Emirates, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
The EU also started a new dialogue with Saudi Arabia, co-chaired by the EU special representative for human rights. The dialogues with Iran, Israel, and Russia remained frozen throughout 2021, while Belarus and China suspended theirs in 2021 after the last ones took place in 2019. The EU, along with several European countries individually, has supported the International Accountability Platform for Belarus, whose mission is to collect and preserve evidence of serious human-rights violations committed in the country.
National Foreign-Policy Initiatives
Several European governments published new democracy strategies or wider foreign-policy reviews that gave democracy a prominent place. In the early part of the year, Germany made progress on plans for implementing the democracy strand of the German Marshall Plan for Africa. In July, then chancellor Angela Merkel and President Joe Biden signed the Washington Declaration, promising their countries will coordinate against democratic backsliding around the world.14
The new coalition government that took office in December has promised to raise the profile of democracy support and to be tougher on autocrats within and outside Europe. It has stressed that democracy support will be an “indispensable” part of German foreign policy and promised “systems-competition with authoritarian-ruled states and strategic solidarity with our democratic partners.”15
The government has also said it will develop a democracy-support policy by 2023.16 The coalition agreement also commits the government to increasing resources and staff for human rights policy, a more feminist foreign policy, boosting support for political foundations’ work on human rights and democracy, and increasing funds for the European Endowment for Democracy. Still, the government is set to be even more cautious than its predecessor on the military aspects of foreign policy, including the provision of equipment to defend democracy where it is threatened as in a case like Ukraine.
The United Kingdom published an integrated review of foreign, security, and defense policy that gave a prominent place to support for “open societies,” anticorruption commitments, and a new election observation facility—even if it was as notable for its upgrades to traditional defense capabilities as well as cybersecurity.17
On the back of this, the Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office began drawing up more specific sub-strategies, including through an Open Societies and Human Rights directorate that has been charged with adding political impetus to these issues. The United Kingdom and the United States signed a new Atlantic Charter, whose eight principles commit them to defending democratic values, domestically and internationally.
The United Kingdom prepared and pushed for a G7 Open Societies strand of new work, and it invited Australia, India, South Africa, and South Korea to the G7 summit to build up the kernel of a D11 grouping of democracies. Foreign Secretary Liz Truss has talked of the United Kingdom supporting a “network of liberty” and the need for democracies to push back assertively against authoritarianism.18
In its first year of post-Brexit foreign policy, the United Kingdom seemed to accentuate its commitment to global democracy as a higher-profile pillar of its strategic identity. However, many of its efforts to build new alliances brought it closer to some repressive regimes. The merger between the foreign and development ministries took some time to solidify, and by the end of the year it remained unclear what effect it would have on democracy commitments.
One unresolved debate was whether the UK’s “open societies” framing signaled a broader understanding of democracy than other donors or justified cooperation with economically “open” authoritarian regimes like Singapore. The Pandora Papers shone a negative light on financial governance in some overseas UK territories,19 although the government insisted it was pushing hard for transparency measures there.20
France’s government passed a new act on inclusive development and combating global inequalities, which reaffirmed the transversal role of democratic governance and the rule of law in its development agenda.21 It introduced a new Anti-Corruption Strategy in Cooperation Action for 2021–2030 promising more action from its Anti-Corruption Agency in the international arena.22
France chaired the 2021 edition of the Summit for Information and Democracy, and it sponsored the creation of an International Observatory on Information and Democracy, which aims to evaluate the information and communication space and its impact on democracy.23 The country’s commitment to supporting gender equality worldwide was shown in June, with the organization of the Generation Equality Forum in Paris.24 France also launched a new Fund for Democracy in Africa and its new Indo-Pacific strategy included a formal commitment to supporting democratic values.
Spain’s government produced a Foreign Action Strategy for 2021–2024 whose opening chapter is dedicated to human rights, democracy, security, feminism, and diversity.25 It backed the strategy with moves on specific themes, including a Strategy on Technology and Global Order, a Feminist Foreign Policy Strategy, and the creation of a Task Force for Democracy in Latin America.
By announcing an explicit commitment to implementing a feminist foreign policy, Spain joined countries that have placed gender equality and empowerment of women and girls at the center of their foreign policy. The strategy includes five priority lines of action: women, peace, and security; violence against women and girls; human rights; the participation of women at the decisionmaking level; and economic justice and empowerment.
Italy’s government, formed in February, appeared to push the country in a direction more supportive of democracy, and it leaned away from relationships with China and Russia.26 In July, Prime Minister Mario Draghi criticized China and all other authoritarian countries for their violations of human rights with striking boldness.27 The parliament passed a resolution condemning China for its human rights violations in Xinjiang.28
Democracy and human rights were stated priorities in Italy’s new Partnership with Africa and programs on gender rights and peace-building were launched under this.29 Still, the coalition government has struggled to cohere the radically different views on democracy support among its diverse groups.
In the Netherlands, a new interim government took office after the March elections and Foreign Minister Ben Knapen issued a statement in September on new foreign policy priorities, which include democracy support.30 In Ireland, a Statement of Strategy 2021–2023 mentioned democracy as a key value, while the Global Ireland: Ireland’s Global Footprint to 2025 document promised an ambitious renewal and expansion of the country’s international presence including around democracy support.31
The United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council adopted an Irish-led Resolution on Civil Society Space.32 In the Czech Republic, the coalition agreement reached in November to form a new government stressed democracy support and stronger partnerships with democratic countries around the world.
Slovakia approved its first Concept for the Promotion of Human Rights and Democracy in the World in May and appointed its first ambassador for human rights in July.33 This focuses thematically on supporting civil society and the establishment of rule-of-law institutions, protecting freedom of media and religion, and promoting gender equality, and regionally on the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership states. In October, the country organized its first international high-level conference on the promotion of human rights and democracy in the world.34
Lithuania continued its efforts in 2021 to support the Belarusian opposition and provided a safe haven for opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, who left Belarus in August 2020. It was also notable for its China policy—being outspoken against human rights abuses in the country, dropping out of China’s 17+1 initiative with Central and Eastern European countries, and announcing it was considering opening a representative office in Taiwan.
China responded with punitive restrictions against Lithuanian trade.35 The Foreign Ministry organized a high-level Future of Democracy forum in Vilnius in November.36 In May, Latvia adopted a Development Cooperation Policy Plan for 2021–2023 that includes democracy as a priority area.37 The document points to developments in Belarus as a trigger for an upgraded commitment to democracy.38
Estonia set up a Centre for International Development and adopted a Programme of Development Co-operation and Humanitarian Aid 2021–2024.39 Support for democracy was listed among the latter’s priorities.40 Estonia also increased its commitments to supporting digital and e-government capabilities globally,41 and it became a member of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.42 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs updated development co-operation strategies for Moldova and Ukraine for 2021–2024 with supporting democratic development and strengthening good governance top priorities.43
Poland’s government adopted in January a Multiannual Programme for Development Cooperation for 2021–2030: Solidarity for Development that includes a formal commitment to democracy and human rights.44
Bulgaria adopted in January its new Mid-term Programme for Development Assistance and Humanitarian Aid 2020–2024.45 Promoting democratic processes based on the values of democracy, the rule of law, transparency, and the efficiency of institutions are central to it but they are not at the top of development aid priorities, ranking lower than education and healthcare.46
Good governance and building inclusive societies have emerged as priorities under Romania’s Annual Plan for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid.47 In May, the country’s two-year Presidency of the Community of Democracies was extended until September 2022 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.48
EU Internal Initiatives
The EU institutions moved forward with a wide range of new internal policies that form part of the European Commission’s “new push for European democracy.” The main strategic document underpinning this push is the European Democracy Action Plan (EDAP) adopted in December 2020, which is particularly focused on the digital challenges to democracy. The EDAP reinforces commitments to linking democracy support within the EU with its foreign-policy toolbox, particularly regarding online interference in elections and tackling disinformation.
In 2021, the European Commission moved forward with several actions outlined in the EDAP and a new Media and Audiovisual Action Plan that deal with media freedom and the safety of journalists. In September, it adopted nonbinding recommendations on the protection, safety, and empowerment of journalists.49 These mirror those of the Council of Europe, which are considered best practice by many journalists’ associations.50
They set out actions for member states to ensure that journalists enjoy safer working conditions and that state authorities do more to counter intimidation online and offline. The European Commission drew up a European Media Freedom Act to be proposed in 2022. This will have a specific focus on the independence and pluralism of media, and it will relate mainly to the situation inside the EU but is likely to have an external component.
Under the EDAP, the EU institutions have promised a legislative initiative on strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs): legal actions often used to silence journalists and human-rights defenders. The process of agreeing this began in 2021, with a public consultation run by the Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers.
A coalition of over one hundred civil society organizations (CSOs) pushed the EU institutions to adopt an ambitious directive, which gained traction with a European Parliament own-initiative report adopted in October.51 Taken together, these initiatives dealing with the sustainability of the media sector, media independence, and the work of journalists represent a concerted effort to address challenges to the role played by media in European democracies.
The year 2021 also saw progress on EU initiatives for safeguarding democratic norms online. These will have an impact on the digital policies of other countries around the world as they seek to tackle the problems social media and artificial intelligence pose to democratic governance. Several of these policies regulate large online platforms such as Facebook and Google with the aim of mitigating their harmful impacts on democracy.
In October, the whistleblower Frances Haugan provided evidence of Facebook’s damaging effects on fundamental freedoms, electoral integrity, and democracy, leading to more calls for regulation.52 In addition, the EU and the United States created a joint Trade and Technology Council to defend democracy against digital threats domestically and globally among other things.
Proposed by the European Commission in December 2020, the Digital Services Act (DSA) will regulate content moderation—the removal of illegal content such as terrorist content or hate speech—and also impose transparency requirements on advertising and recommender systems. In addition, the DSA puts in place a framework for risk assessment as a means of identifying and countering violations of fundamental rights and threats to democracy produced by online platforms. France in particular pushed for these and other tougher EU regulatory measures against big tech companies. Many in the EU saw these measures as key to tackling the harmful impact of social media companies on democracy in recent years. In December, the European Parliament insisted on strengthening the proposals for the transparency obligations placed on tech companies. The DSA will need to be adopted by the European Parliament and Council of the EU in 2022 in order to enter into force.
Following consultations conducted over the year, the European Commission issued in November a proposal for a Regulation of Online Political Advertisement. This seeks to impose additional obligations on online service providers to provide transparency and to set clear rules for the use of personal data in online political advertising. The basis of the regulation is an EU-wide definition of political advertising. What such a definition might be is clear in relation to political parties and candidates, but it is less clear when it comes to other actors like CSOs and private companies. The transparency requirements proposed include information on the identity of the sponsor of an advert, the amount spent per advert, the relevant election or legislative process, the data source, and the criteria for ad targeting. The regulation would limit political advertising but falls short of civil society demands for a full or partial ban on political microtargeting.53
In April, the European Commission unveiled a proposal for a new Artificial Intelligence Act, which is currently under discussion in the Council of the EU and the European Parliament. The proposal uses risk-based criteria to determine what kind of artificial intelligence can be developed in the EU and exported for purposes such as surveillance and policing outside it. The act is likely to influence global standards around a risk-based approach to artificial intelligence, with democratic norms ostensibly being central in this regard.
In May, Vice President for Values and Transparency Věra Jourová issued guidance to strengthen the EU’s Code of Practice on Disinformation, a self-regulation tool that sets out rules for large social-media platforms to curb disinformation and foreign or malign interference in elections.54 The revised Code of Practice will focus on demonetizing disinformation, ensuring the integrity of services, empowering users to understand and flag disinformation, increasing the coverage of fact-checking, providing access to data to researchers, and monitoring platforms’ performance. The European Commission started revising the Code of Practice in September, attracting sixteen new signatories by late November, and it is expected to publish the updated version in the first half of 2022.55
The second annual EU Rule of Law Report contained a stronger focus on civic-space restrictions than the 2020 report and included a section on the impact of COVID-19 on the rule of law in member states. However, on other fronts the report could be considered weaker, with many negative trends in member states entirely omitted due to the overly narrow definition of the rule of law used by the European Commission.
The report does not include country-specific recommendations. In her State of the Union Speech in September, von der Leyen committed to having country-specific recommendations in the 2022 report, which would have much more practical impact.56 Public consultations opened in December for the third reporting cycle.57
In May, the Conference on the Future of Europe began after a delay of one year, with an online consultation platform for citizens and civil society. The conference is working to a compressed timetable, with the goal of finishing its task by mid-2022. Citizen panels and three large plenaries were organized over the course of the year.
Many hundreds of decentralized deliberative exercises have also been organized by civil society and member states and registered on the multilingual platform for policy input. The conference is widely seen as the most participative exercise the EU has held. The question for 2022 will be whether these various inputs find their way into meaningful conclusions and follow-up actions.58
In December, all member states except Hungary, along with non-EU European democracies, participated in the U.S.-led Summit for Democracy. They have all promised commitments to strengthen and support democracy at home and abroad, with details of these plans due to be submitted in early 2022.
While the Biden administration announced a $424 million Presidential Initiative for Democratic Renewal, by the end of 2021 European states had not firmly committed extra funds specifically for the summit’s follow-up (although Belgium announced just under €4 million of general democracy aid at the summit).59 After not receiving an invitation, Hungary vetoed the EU’s formal participation in the summit. Most European governments engaged positively with Biden’s initiative, although with some doubts over what practical impact it was likely to have.
Democracy Aid
There was broad continuity in European aid for democracy and human rights in 2021. Funding for external democracy projects continued on a relatively constant course, with some donors making modest increases, while the EU opened a new program for spending on democracy projects in member states. Still, the funds allocated for democracy aid remain relatively low compared to those for other policy areas such as climate action or security.
A striking deficiency is that donors still generally struggle to identify how much they actually spend on democracy and human rights. Figures are not easily available, democracy aid is mixed in confusing ways with other funding (such as for public administration reform or peace-building), and aid categories are not directly comparable across countries. Even those policymakers responsible for democracy aid are almost always unable to say how much their country was spending on this objective. This compares unfavorably with other areas of external funding.
By the end of 2021, the most recent official spending figures available were for 2019: in this year, of EU member states, only Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden gave more than €100 million for democracy aid, alongside the European Commission, Norway, and the UK—all these donors were individually a long way behind the U.S. allocation for democracy.
External EU Funding
As 2021 was the first year under the EU’s 2021–2027 budget (or Multiannual Financial Framework), several changes to its democracy funding came into operation. The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), which for many years was the dedicated budget line for such funding, ceased to exist as a separate instrument. Rather, funding for human rights and democracy is now available as one of four thematic programs under a new catchall Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI).
This thematic program was allocated €1.5 billion for 2021–2027, compared to €1.3 billion to the EIDHR for 2014–2020, and retained the flexible modalities of the EIDHR, such as not requiring funding approval from the local government and being able to support unregistered entities.
In addition to the human rights and democracy program, a new CSO thematic program was allocated €1.5 billion for 2021–2027, compared to €1.4 billion to the CSO-Local Authorities instrument for 2014–2020. Only part of the CSO program will address projects related to human rights and democracy. The EIDHR provision on not requiring government approval has been extended to all CSO support under the new thematic programs.
These thematic allocations are dwarfed by the geographical allocations that make up nearly 80 percent of the NDICI total. Around 15 percent of these, or €9 billion, are slated for democracy-relevant programs. The budget also includes a fund for emerging challenges, €200 million of which will go to democracy and human rights, while additional democracy support may also be possible from a reserve for rapid-response actions. Diplomats report that having a single instrument enables them to ensure that democracy is now integrated into the mainstream geographic aid programs.
In September, the EU announced a package of €119.5 million dedicated to supporting democracy and defending human rights worldwide from the funds allocated to the 2021 fiscal year. Of this, €100.8 million would go from the NDICI to local-level support for CSOs, democracy activists, and human-rights defenders across 116 countries; €5 million to the Team Europe Democracy initiative to support data collection, analysis, and enhancing coordination between member states on human rights and democracy; €4.8 million to the UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights; €4 million to the Human Rights Crises Facility to support CSOs in conflict zones and more unpredictable, difficult political situations around the globe; and €4.9 million to the Global Campus of Human Rights for the 2021–2022 academic year.60
A new European Peace Facility (EPF) was agreed at the end of 2020 and became operational in 2021, with a €5 billion allocation from member states rather from the EU budget. Its main rationale is to encourage stabilization and peace mediation, and its most notable innovation is a remit to fund military cooperation and equip security forces in third countries—a potentially significant change to the extent that the EU had previously been fastidious in not funding security actors but only training them. High Representative Josep Borrell clarified that the EPF’s focus is to provide military capacities to African allies for security and stability.61
The EU insisted this new remit represents a boost to democracy-building as it now funds security projects helping to establish more stable foundations for democracy. Still, the EPF has taken a large slice of EU funds for very direct security support, much of which sits uneasily with democracy-support commitments—security forces that receive EU advice and training are often used by regimes to curtail pro-democracy protests. So far, the EPF has provided funding to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Mali, Moldova, Mozambique, and Ukraine as well as to the African Union to support operations in Somalia.62
As the European Commission moved forward with programming for all these funds, priorities and trends took shape in 2021. It aimed to increase the mainstreaming of democracy support into geographic and sectoral programs. It devised a new global initiative on the enabling environment for civil society. More funds were allocated to local actors and away from large CSOs, with 80 percent of EU civil society funds now managed by delegations so as to match local priorities.
The European Commission increased direct funding to grassroots groups and significantly increased sub-granting to reach smaller community-based groups. The EU cannot directly support protest movements but it has increased its efforts to encourage established CSOs to engage with these. In recent years, the European Commission has offered more Framework Partnership Agreements that act like operating grants in order to provide more predictable long-term funds beyond project support.
The European Commission also devised more flexible ways to support CSOs in very repressive environments, through small local and sometimes digital actors. The European External Action Service created a new unit on digital technology to boost support for digital activists. The European Commission now aims to get funds to individuals more than before, in a form of support less tied to CSOs pressing for harmonization with EU laws and standards.
Another development was that the updated Civil Society Roadmaps allowed for more extensive local CSO involvement and influence over priorities—although this did not meet CSOs’ expectations in many countries. The European Commission also moved beyond traditional consultations with CSOs to undertake more forums at the local level to give space for grassroots groups. A declared priority was to reach out even more to informal civic movements.63
In response to COVID-19, the EU cut the number of Election Observation Missions (EOMs). The EU only sent one full mission, to Ghana, in the first half of the year and then one to Zambia in August. It canceled a planned mission to Ethiopia for political reasons in addition to the pandemic. The number of missions increased toward the end of the year with EOMs to Gambia, Honduras, Iraq, Kosovo, and Venezuela.
Different levels of expert teams were dispatched to local or national elections in several countries including the Central African Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Liberia. The EOM to Venezuela was especially significant and led to the EU releasing a report that was critical of the electoral process while acknowledging that opposition candidates had been allowed to run.64
The EU released democracy aid to respond to emerging opportunity or crises in some cases. It dedicated around €30 million to Belarusian civil society and promised €3 billion of general aid support if the regime agreed to reforms. In December, the European Commission announced a further €30 million for Belarusian youth, independent media, small and medium-sized enterprises in exile, and cultural actors.65
The EU launched a new aid initiative to help Sudan’s fledgling and shaky democratic transition. New EU projects worth €155 million were approved for Cuba, with four of seventy-eight projects with the Cuban authorities and the rest to CSOs in and outside the country. After a reformist and EU-oriented government took office in Moldova in August, the EU released a package of reform-related assistance in October.
After the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict reignited, a new EU for Dialogue initiative was set up, offering €15 million to projects on conflicts, with a democracy component, in the Eastern Partnership states. Also in October, the EU released €600 million of macro-financial assistance to Ukraine following progress on the rule of law under the country’s International Monetary Fund program.66
Offsetting these increases and improvements to democracy aid were some clear limitations to EU funding. In some notable instances of possible opportunity or popular mobilization, donors did not release significant democracy funding. The EU and many of its member states equivocated about backing pro-democracy activists in Algeria and Hong Kong.
In the Sahel, most new funds went to regimes to build up states’ institutional and security capacities, trying to create jobs and local health and education facilities to prevent people sympathizing with radical groups, while democracy assistance was a small and dwindling part of these aid programs.67
In Libya, the EU supported a new unity government but did not release significant funding to help build a democratic political system around it; notwithstanding a contribution to strengthening election infrastructure in the country, the main focus of funding remained on stemming migration as tensions within the new government triggered a new wave of migrants. In Syria, the last remaining aid efforts to underpin opposition-held governance structures wound down.
National Government Funding
Several EU member states increased their democracy aid in 2021. Sweden began its Drive for Democracy in 2019 and advanced this further in 2021. Its development agency, Sida, announced that its regional development cooperation strategy with sub-Saharan Africa would include an additional €48 million for strengthening democratic movements that have faced increased risk as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.68 Sweden launched a new Middle East and North Africa regional strategy that increases democracy support, especially in the Palestinian territories.
Under the country’s declared feminist foreign policy, funding to women’s rights groups was one of the major sectors of support. In April, Sida began work on a new party-support program.69
The Swedish International Centre for Local Democracy stepped up its work to promote collaboration between Swedish and Russian municipalities, including through initiatives that help to increase the participation of civil society in municipal decisionmaking processes.70 In Syria, Sida supported independent media, the dissemination of knowledge about nonviolence, and training for lawyers and journalists on women’s rights, among other initiatives.71
Sweden introduced new development cooperation strategies for Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, and Guatemala, alongside a strategy for Latin America that increased resources for democracy, the rule of law, and human rights.72 It also added €96 million to its Asia development cooperation strategy for democracy and human rights.73
No other state offered an as well-structured or highly prioritized set of democracy-support initiatives as Sweden, although in many cases governments increased their funding levels. Germany remained the largest European government donor in democracy support. Its aid increased modestly and the number of countries where it operated political aid programs increased, although it is unclear precisely how much funding went to democracy. The development ministry published a new strategy to guide its work over the next decade.
This launched a new approach that reduced the number of core recipients from eighty-five to sixty countries, with thirty-three of these set to have governance and democracy as a “key” component of their aid programs, including through new “reform” and “transformation” partnerships more tailored toward political reform.74 The new government’s coalition agreement promises that more development aid will be oriented toward democracy and human rights.75
Poland’s development aid slightly increased from €0.7 billion in 2020 to €0.8 billion in 2021.76 Democracy support is mainly provided through Solidarity Fund PL, which has offices in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.77 Its budget increased from €3.2 million in 2020 to €5.9 million in 2021, and it gained new competencies in overseeing election-monitoring missions.78 Poland increased its Solidarity With Belarus aid package from €11.2 million in 2020 to €13.6 million in 2021.79 Estonia increased its development aid, including its democracy support, although with relatively limited amounts of funding.80
Most commonly, European donors increased their aid in 2021, which they insisted increased the resources made available for democracy projects, although without specific or identifiable amounts being allocated to democracy assistance it was impossible to quantify the measure of their commitments. France increased its ODA by 49 percent between 2020 and 2021, and it stated it would increase its democracy aid, especially to media support, democratic participation and civil society, human rights, and gender equality.
It also allocated €50 million to its new Democracy Fund for Africa to be spent over five years.81 Spain increased its ODA, mainly for spending related to the COVID-19 pandemic and without clear allocations for democracy. Italy increased the annual budget of its Agency for Development by €600 million from 2020 to €6.4 billion. Democracy was listed as a priority but without any preset allocation to it; most proximately, €125 million was allocated for peace and stabilization. 82
Several countries did not specify an overall increase in democracy aid but launched new initiatives in this field. Denmark launched the Amplify Change fund for civic movements and the Tech4Democracy Program. Austria contributed to UNDP programs on strengthening electoral processes and democratic participation in Ethiopia and Uganda, along with new programs on elections in Mozambique, local democracy in Georgia, investigative journalism in the Balkans, and women’s rights in Kosovo.
Finland’s government published its “Report on Development Policy,” which identified democracy support as a top priority of development policy; a budget line of €3 million supported Demo Finland and a newly created Rule of Law Centre.83
Other European donors decreased their democracy funding. Within the United Kingdom’s overall aid cut from 0.7 percent to 0.5 percent of GDP, funding for democracy and the rule of law has been cut back (by an amount that was still unknown at the end of the year). Some long-funded programs wound up in the context of already deep, ongoing funding cuts to nonstate bodies involved in democracy assistance.84
The United Kingdom led the creation of the Global Media Defense Fund, which had an active role in the Media Freedom Coalition, and prioritized support for independent media in its aid.85 Other thematic areas suffered cuts, although the country remained one of the largest European democracy aid funders.
The Czech Republic cut its democracy aid as its Transformation Cooperation Program shrank, although it increased its support to civil society and independent media in Belarus.86 Slovakia’s democracy support remained at roughly the same level as in previous years even as its overall aid increased slightly, though the Sharing Slovak Expertise initiative shifted some of its aid to COVID-19 priorities and away from democracy.87
Latvia’s Development Cooperation Policy Plan for 2021–2023 included a decrease in aid from 2021 into 2022 and 2023.88 This was the eighth calendar year of support by the European Endowment for Democracy (EED) to democracy actors in Europe’s neighborhood and beyond. The EED spent just over €30 million on democracy support. Over 40 percent of this went to independent media, with many grants providing core funding that enables outlets to continue to operate in challenging environments.
The EED enhanced coordination efforts relating to Belarus, acting as a basket fund to support the International Accountability Platform for Belarus. Beyond grant-making, the endowment contributed to knowledge-sharing and policy debates through many events during the year, including partnership events such as Democracy Day and Difference Day, and a series of closed-door events that brought together activists with stakeholders from EU institutions and member states.
During the second half of the year, in the run-up to the Summit for Democracy, the EED together with fourteen other democracy-support organizations on both sides of the Atlantic developed and published the Five Messages for the Summit for Democracy document.
Funding Within the EU
In 2021, the first calls for proposals were published and awarded under the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values program (CERV). This new program was adopted under the 2021–2027 EU budget, with a total budget of €1.55 billion. It merged the former Rights, Equality and Citizenship program and the Europe for Citizens program that disbursed €435.3 million and €195.5 million respectively under the 2014–2020 EU budget—meaning the new program represents a significant increase.
CERV has an expanded scope with democracy and the rule of law added as focus areas, making it the first clear funding mechanism for protecting and promoting democracy and the rule of law inside the EU.
In April, the European Commission published a call for proposals for four-year Framework Partnership Agreements to support European networks, CSOs active at the EU level, and European think tanks on a variety of themes including “promoting and protecting Union values” and “promoting citizen engagement.” These agreements existed under the previous EU budget, but now they address the areas covered by the EDAP, including democratic elections, disinformation, and the rule of law.
Over the course of the year, further calls on, among other things, promoting equality, combating gender violence, supporting strategic litigation, and upholding democratic values were published. In the summer, the European Commission contracted a consultancy to conduct a mapping of civil society in each EU member state to inform its programming, with a view to funding larger organizations that can regrant funds to smaller civic initiatives—however, CSOs complained about what they judged to be limited consultation with civil society.
The European Commission also launched a new set of projects through the Directorate General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology focused on the broad area of media support in the EU. This included calls for projects on media councils, support for media freedom and investigative journalism, media plurality, and a media-monitoring system. At the same time, the Directorate General for Research and Innovation launched a new cluster of research opportunities linked to democracy under the Horizon Europe program.
Horizon Europe includes more funding for democracy than in previous years. Calls focused on the future of liberal democracy, democracy in the EU’s neighborhood, the economic models of modern democracies, post-pandemic politics and governance, and the intersection of feminism and democracy.
Norway continues to provide support to CSOs in fifteen EU countries through the Norway Grants program, with most of its funding for civil society, good governance, and human rights flowing through the EEA Grants fund run in partnership with Iceland and Liechtenstein. In the last year of the 2014–2021 cycle of programming, the EEA donors failed to reach an agreement with Hungary on selecting an operator to manage funding for civil society in the country, as they insisted this be a fully independent body.
Sanctions and Democratic Conditionality
The EU has generally preferred to avoid strongly punitive approaches to democracy support, and it has applied democratic conditionality mainly under its enlargement policies. While this long-existing feature continued in 2021, the year also saw the EU adopt sanctions and reduce aid in connection to human rights and democracy. Possible sanctions were debated in all EU leaders’ meetings, although the need for unanimity acted as a brake on their use and legal doubts rumbled on about whether listings (those individuals subject to restrictive measures) were human-rights compatible.
During the year, there was continuous work to sharpen the operational details of sanctions in areas like preventing evasion and clarifying criteria to remove sanctions. There was also some debate on the sanction regime’s next phase and possible extension.
Sanctions
In December 2020, the EU agreed on the new Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime. As 2021 unfolded, it invoked this to apply several rounds of sanctions on individuals and entities deemed guilty of major human-rights abuses. Notably, the regime enabled the EU to impose sanctions on Chinese officials for the first time since the Tiananmen Square killings in 1989, on Russian officials implicated in the poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, and on officials responsible for especially egregious abuses in Eritrea, Iran, and North Korea; and to respond to political stalemate in Lebanon.
Introduced in 2020, the United Kingdom’s human-rights sanctions regime became a regular part of its foreign policy in 2021.89 The country also established its global anticorruption sanctions regime in April and began to apply it, taking it beyond the scope of EU sanctions.90 Norway adjusted its sanction provisions to align itself with the EU’s shift toward targeting particular individuals or entities.
Some countries were the subject of especially intense debates about restrictive measures that led to the EU imposing sanctions. But in several of these cases, it kept sanctions to a modest scale and offset them with efforts at political engagement.
Belarus
After initial measures in late 2020, the EU incrementally ratcheted up its response to the situation in Belarus with five rounds of sanctions over the course of 2021 to cover 183 individuals and twenty-six entities. In the fourth round in June, it went beyond individuals and entities to impose sanctions covering the financial services and oil and potash sectors, along with restrictions on exports of digital surveillance equipment—the first time the EU imposed sectoral sanctions on Belarus.
(In December, Lithuania was discovered to have broken the sanctions by importing potash from the country.)91 EU and UK sanctions went beyond U.S. measures related to financial products and sovereign debt; the United States caught up at the end of the year. Measures in response to the hijacking of a Ryanair flight with journalist Roman Protasevich on board included a ban on the access of Belarusian airlines to airports and airspace within the EU.
The fifth round of measures came in response to President Alexander Lukashenko’s strategy of helping refugees across Belarus’s border into the EU, mainly Lithuania and Poland.92 More measures in November targeted the state airline Belavia for its role in carrying refugees from the Middle East to Minsk. As this crisis worsened, Germany’s then chancellor Angela Merkel reopened contact with Lukashenko to negotiate humanitarian relief for the refugees.93
The European Commission made €700 million available for this. Some member states wanted to hold back on the new sanctions as Belavia then stopped the refugee flights. Eastern European and Baltic states as well as Belarusian opposition figures criticized this pause and Merkel’s dialogue with Lukashenko. Belarus’s government ceased ferrying refugees to the border, suggesting that sanctions had some impact—although not on democracy in the country.
Russia
In June, the EU extended its sanctions against Russia related to the annexation of Crimea for another six months, and in October it added to its listings eight Russians deemed to be undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity.94 After targeting four individuals involved in the Navalny poisoning case, the EU took no further action in relation to this issue. Russia expelled three EU officials for attending protests against Navalny’s imprisonment; Sweden, Poland, and Germany retaliated by expelling a Russian diplomat each.95 Germany suspended its Petersburg Dialogue with Russia after the latter designated several German CSOs as “undesirable foreign organizations.”
Still, after the sanctions on a small number of officials, in June France and Germany pushed to offer Russia a new process of leaders’ summits. While other member states blocked this, EU policy moved back to selective engagement with Russia. Although the Crimea-related sanctions remained in place, no comparable general measures were considered in relation to the Russian regime’s infringement of democratic rights. At the end of the year, the EU debated adding to its sanctions after Russia’s military buildup on Ukraine’s borders. It also imposed sanctions on operatives of the Russian mercenary group, Wagner, in relation to their actions in Africa.
Venezuela
When the EU placed sanctions on nineteen Venezuelan officials in February, the country’s government expelled the union’s ambassador. The EU then signaled that it would be willing to lift sanctions in return for incremental steps from the regime toward a de-escalation of the fraught situation in the country. It also stopped holding Juan Guaidó to be the country’s legitimate president, putting itself at odds with the Lima Group of countries from the region.
The EU’s focus was increasingly on trying to mediate between the regime and the opposition to break the stalemate,96 which kept the scope of sanctions within limited bounds. Norway led a third attempt at dialogue that began in August, with the Netherlands as one of the monitoring states, together with Russia, but this made little progress.
Myanmar
The EU imposed three rounds of sanctions on Myanmar. These were designed to avoid punishing the population and instead targeted ministers, deputy ministers, and the attorney general as well as economic entities in the timber and gems sectors. The EU also withheld financial aid from the government, although it continued humanitarian assistance, providing €20.5 million of emergency relief.97 At the end of October, the European Parliament called for wider sectoral sanctions as Myanmar’s junta continued to intensify repression against the population, but member states declined to take this step.98
Lebanon
In July, the EU adopted a framework that would enable it to apply sanctions against Lebanon’s elite for blocking the formation of a new unity government.99 However, France then co-hosted a donors conference that raised €314.5 million more in aid for Lebanon.100 The EU and its member states pumped money into the country to prevent a complete collapse of the economy while also trying to hold back tranches of support pending reforms, mainly economic ones rather than deep political ones.
After a government was formed, France pushed to retain engagement and economic support, while the EU restarted support for ministries with technical assistance, making available €291 million in grant financing with some conditionality.101
Limited or No EU Measures
While the EU imposed an increasing number of sanctions in 2021, there were notable cases of democratic crisis and repression where it took no or extremely limited action. It did not impose sanctions in relation to China’s increasingly harsh clampdown on pro-democracy movements in Hong Kong.
In contrast, the United Kingdom imposed restrictive measures and offered citizenship to many democracy activists in the territory. It also followed the United States in announcing a diplomatic boycott of the 2022 Winter Olympics in China over various human rights concerns, while the EU did not do so. The EU did not impose sanctions in response to the Cuban regime’s brutal repression of protesters who took to the streets over the summer, with France and Spain in particular opposing the European Parliament’s call for the EU to use its human-rights sanctions regime.
The EU condemned the move by Tunisia’s president in July to close the parliament, but it did not impose sanctions. The EU, France, and other member states mainly called for dialogue between all parties to find ways to respect the country’s democratic constitution.102 The EU maintained sanctions from 2020 on Turkey relating to drilling for gas in the waters around Cyprus, but it did not take measures related to the country’s ever-more pronounced authoritarian turn.103 EU relations with Algeria continued in a relatively positive vein, without measures being taken as the regime put down democratic protests with virulence.
France’s President Emmanuel Macron made critical remarks about the country’s authoritarian politics, leading Algeria to recall its ambassador. Debate sharpened in the EU late in the year over possible measures as Serb leaders threatened to pull out of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s multi-ethnic state institutions, but ultimately no moves were taken. Germany pushed for EU measures while Borrell was against this. The United Kingdom did impose sanctions, together with the United States, related to corruption in the country.
In Africa, there were several instances where the EU declined to act in critical fashion. Most conspicuously, it did not impose sanctions on Ethiopia’s government in response to its military actions and rights abuses in the Tigray region.104 The EU began negotiations with Burundi’s government to lift sanctions in place since 2016. While it renewed measures on four individuals in October, it declined to move forward with restrictive measures under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement.
After a coup in Guinea in September, the United States suspended aid and the Economic Community of West African States imposed sanctions on the country’s military leaders, while the EU continued providing aid and only imposed an arms embargo.
France’s government was cautious, having been close to the ousted authoritarian president Alpha Condé.105 Following the coup in Sudan in October, Borrell suggested that the EU could impose measures if the situation was not immediately reversed, yet this did not happen—in contrast to the World Bank, which halted its funding, and the African Union, which suspended Sudan from participation in union activities.106
Following the coup in Mali in May, the EU adopted in December a framework for sanctions, but it did not list any individuals for restrictive measures and security cooperation continued (see below).107
While the EU did not impose sanctions specifically related to many internet shutdowns across the world, its sanctions regimes in Belarus, Iran, Myanmar, and North Korea did cover some issues relating to digital restrictions. An upgraded EU export-control regulation entered into force in September, with new criteria relating to digital surveillance equipment, suggesting that firmer action might be taken in the future.
At the Summit for Democracy in December, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Norway—along with Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom—signed on to a broader multilateral code of conduct that will attach human-rights criteria to export licenses for sensitive technologies.108 At the end of the year the commission stepped back from proposing a ban on products made with forced labor, rather suggesting that companies take responsibility for carrying out due diligence on the use of forced labor in their supply chains.109
Aid Reductions and Conditionality
In addition to sanctions, the EU moved in several cases to suspend or reduce aid on grounds related to democracy and human rights. If for some years much attention was on internal debates over the new sanctions regime, policymakers focused increasingly on aid conditionality in 2021. This change occurred because of events in countries like Ethiopia and Myanmar that made it difficult to continue large aid flows, and also because of the new, restructured Multiannual Financial Framework and its new processes for external funding. In addition, COVID-19’s economic impact put pressure on aid budgets and made governments more sensitive to the need to justify aid flows.
In early 2021, the EU suspended €88 million of budget support to Ethiopia’s government due to its military actions against opponents in the Tigray region and the limitation of access for humanitarian relief workers. It cut pre-accession aid to Turkey on democracy and human-rights grounds, which it has done each year since 2018.
The EU held back training assistance for Libya’s coast guard and other security forces after criticism that these funds were fueling human-rights abuses, and it called for detention centers in the country to be closed after the UN criticized it for being complicit in rights abuses carried out in them.
The EU also intimated that it would hold back macro-financial assistance to Georgia on rule-of-law grounds and in response to the government’s apparent complicity in attacks on a gay pride march. The government preempted this by announcing it would not request these funds and would take funds instead from the Asian Development Bank that did not come with democratic conditions.110
Policy on Afghanistan reflected a complex mix of dynamics. The country was among the top ten recipients of EU aid each year during the 2010s, but the EU and its member states held back aid after the Taliban seized power. However, the EU quadrupled its humanitarian aid with five benchmarks attached: that the Taliban cooperate on terrorism, allow people to leave, let humanitarian aid in freely, respect human rights, and form an inclusive government. The EU defined these benchmarks as aims rather than preconditions for cooperation with the Taliban.111
It engaged with the Taliban to cooperate on security and refugee issues although it did not formally recognize the new government. The EU pursued “humanitarian plus” aid beyond strictly emergency support despite the clearly autocratic nature of the new regime.112 After cutting its aid in 2020 from $70 million to $18 million, the United Kingdom increased it again. The EU mooted a new €1 billion for Iran and Pakistan to manage refugee flows from Afghanistan, despite these countries’ marked democratic backsliding. At the end of October, it decided to reopen its diplomatic representation in Afghanistan.113
Overall, the EU was relatively sparing in its use of aid cuts as a mean of leverage on democracy issues. Member states and EU institutions sought to retain the flexibility to vary such responses with strategic aims in mind rather than be obliged to reduce funding in accordance with democracy criteria. Despite a hardline new government with a more authoritarian style taking office in Iran, the EU stepped up its efforts at rapprochement and renewal of the nuclear accord.
Germany used harder rhetoric on Chinese and Russian authoritarianism but tended to say this justified more engagement through trade.114 Tranches of EU aid were held back for Ukraine but not the likes of Egypt, Iran, or Uganda with more limited aid and far worse human-rights records. As with sanctions, EU decisions on aid cuts lacked precision or any detailed attempt to match proportionality of measures with expected outcomes.
The EU and its member states also increased aid to many nondemocratic states. The EU offered new aid under recently signed cooperation agreements to Central Asian states, Cuba, and Vietnam. After regime-controlled elections in Uganda, it did not suspend aid; rather, it was President Yoweri Museveni who halted funding from the Democratic Governance Facility—a fund dating from 2011 and financed by Austria, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the European Commission.115 The EU increased aid as repression intensified in DR Congo, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe. It also increased funding for Egypt, Rwanda, and other countries with authoritarian regimes for cooperation on COVID-19 vaccines.116 Within weeks of a military coup in Chad, the European Investment Bank announced a €340 million investment in green projects in the country, alongside Guinea and Mali. Negotiations with Azerbaijan for a new contractual agreement for political and economic cooperation did not conclude successfully, in part due to the regime’s repression of civil society, yet the EU released new aid to the country for a range of sectoral issues.117
The EU continued to fund the Palestinian Authority after President Mahmoud Abbas canceled elections in May. Many in the EU shared his fear that Hamas would win the elections. Hamas’s anger at being deprived the chance to compete in elections was one reason why the group then launched a wave of missile strikes on Israel, which in turn caused Israel to respond with far greater firepower against the Gaza Strip. The EU was not able to agree on a common position on this conflagration, with Hungary in particular blocking criticism of Israel. The EU did push for the Palestinian Authority to set a new date for elections but it did not reduce aid or trade cooperation when this failed to materialize.
The EU did not attach significant democratic conditionality to trade agreements. The European Parliament acted largely against member states’ preferences when it effectively froze ratification of the EU’s Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with China signed at the end of 2020, acting after China imposed restrictive measures against some its members in retaliation for the EU sanctions on Chinese officials.
This was an important case of the new sanctions regime spilling over into economic relations. Mostly, however, the EU continued or even increased trade with authoritarian regimes. European governments declined to take any measures against China that would interrupt trade and investment in response to the Chinese actions against Lithuania outlined above, with the EU saying only that it may consider raising the issue in the World Trade Organization. The EU pushed ahead with trade talks with Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand—all backsliding countries.
Talks with India on a free-trade agreement resumed in May as the country was downgraded to nondemocracy in several international rankings.118 The United Kingdom’s foreign minister stated that it would sign trade agreements with countries suffering poor human-rights records.119 It did so with Turkey, pushed similar talks forward with Singapore, and finalized a new investment agreement with the United Arab Emirates.
The democracy clause included in EU trade agreements was not used, nor did the EU use conditionality provisions in its Generalized System of Preference (GSP) trade regime. GSP democracy and human-rights conditionality has been used only four times over nearly twenty years, most recently with regard to Cambodia in 2020.
The EU did not consider any new cases for the removal of trade preferences in 2021, though a new complaints mechanism came into force, which may lead to increased pressure for such action in the future.120 The European Parliament called for the EU to remove GSP+ from Sri Lanka as its government failed to abide by human-rights obligations, but member-state leaders declined to take this step.121
At end of the year, the European Commission was finalizing long-discussed proposals for an “anti-coercion” trade-defense sanctions regime to be used when countries adopt restrictions against EU trade and investment or attempt economic coercion. China’s actions against Lithuania were an added prompt to these proposals, even if member states eschewed any concrete measures against China for these actions in 2021. These new sanctions are not strictly related to democracy and may take some focus away from, or even cut across, human-rights sanctions, although their eventual targets may well be mainly nondemocratic powers.
There was an overall increase in European arms sales to nondemocratic regimes. Twenty-six European companies were among the world’s one hundred largest arms suppliers, and European suppliers accounted for 21 percent of total arms sales in 2021, with the United Kingdom the third-largest supplier behind the United States and China.122 While the United States cut arms sales to Saudi Arabia, European supplies to the country increased.
The United Kingdom restarted arms sales to the Saudi regime despite a court decision that ruled against these on the grounds that the use of these arms in the Yemen conflict flouted basic humanitarian norms.123 France and Greece deepened security cooperation with Saudi Arabia in an effort to push back against Turkey’s regional assertiveness. In December, Macron toured the Gulf states, where he signed new arms deals, and he became the first Western leader to meet with Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman since the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.
When Italy restricted arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates over their involvement in Yemen, the United Arab Emirates ordered Italian troops and aircraft to leave the Al Minhad Air Base, causing Italy to remove some of its restrictions.124 New French weapon sales to Egypt in May raised particular concerns since it was later proved that they had been used in civil society repression.125
In 2021, EU humanitarian aid increased by 60 percent to €1.4 billion from €900 million in 2020.126 These funds went mainly to addressing crises in countries with authoritarian regimes. Humanitarian assistance increased in particular to Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, as noted above. In countries where it imposed sanctions or conditionality, such as Syria and Venezuela, the EU also usually increased its humanitarian relief.
It allocated €130 million of humanitarian aid to Syria and to support Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon. While the EU retained a strictly nonpolitical approach to such emergency relief, so significant an increase in humanitarian aid has clearly had political implications: the EU channeled most of this aid to UN bodies that set priorities in cooperation with the autocratic governments hosting them.
Internal Measures
The relationship between the EU institutions and many member states on the one hand and Hungary and Poland on the other steadily deteriorated in 2021. Article 7 proceedings against both countries remain stuck in the EU Council but there was a perceptible hardening of member-state positions with regard to these two governments’ persistent breaches of democratic values. While the ultimate sanction of suspending voting rights for Hungary and Poland remains off the table, the issue of conditionality moved up the agenda through a new rule-of-law mechanism in the 2021–2027 EU budget.
In November, the European Commission sent letters listing instances where the two governments’ rule-of-law infringements undermined EU financial interests.127 The letters are widely seen as the first step in the use of the conditionality mechanism on the rule of law. Still, during discussions in the EU Council in October, the European Commission made clear that it would not activate the mechanism until the European Court of Justice rules on its legality in early 2022, despite significant pressure from the European Parliament. The Netherlands has taken the strongest stance on the need to enforce the conditionality mechanism while Germany has argued for some kind of compromise with Hungary and Poland. The European Commission did not send funds from the Recovery and Resilience Facility to either country in 2021, possibly preparing to enforce rule-of-law conditionality in relation to the EU budget.
After Hungary’s government passed an anti-LGBTQ law, fourteen member-state leaders denounced this move at a summit in June 2021. The Netherlands’ Prime Minister Mark Rutte went as far as to say that Hungary “has no place in the EU anymore.”128 Hungary’s governing party Fidesz was finally removed from the European People’s Party (EPP) family in March. Over the years, the EPP had shielded Hungary’s government from punitive EU measures. While Fidesz was suspended from the party family in the spring of 2019, its MEPs had continued to enjoy the rights and privileges of EPP membership within the European Parliament. That Fidesz was finally pushed to leave the EPP was a significant step in allowing for a pan-European and cross-party alliance in favor of stronger measures against Hungary’s government.
Poland’s government lost a series of cases at the European Court of Justice regarding its continuous breaches of the rule of law through controversial judicial reforms in recent years. In October, the court ruled that Poland’s government should pay €1 million per day for failing to abolish a disciplinary chamber for judges—the highest daily fine in EU history. The commission also launched legal action against the Polish government after the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, the legality of which is questioned by Brussels, ruled in October that the Polish Constitution has primacy over EU law, challenging the European legal order. Following the European Council in October, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated that Poland would need to abolish the disciplinary chamber, end or reform the disciplinary regime for judges, and start reinstating judges who had been sacked in order to receive EU pandemic recovery funds—a clear invocation of democratic conditionality. This pressure prompted Poland’s government to agree to revamp the disciplinary chamber, although it is not yet clear whether this would allow for the chamber to function with genuine independence.
While the legal developments in the European Court of Justice are important in the ongoing standoff between Hungary and Poland on one side and the EU institutions on the other, political developments also weigh heavily on the decision to invoke democratic conditionality. Many member states balked at the prospect of these two governments taking significant shares of the recovery fund when they were so directly flouting core EU values.
The coalition treaty of Germany’s new government indicates a hardening of the country’s position and increases the likelihood that rule-of-law conditionality for EU funds will be formally invoked in 2022. If the EU and its member states declined to take critical action against Hungary and Poland for many years, in 2021 they took tentative steps toward a firmer stance.
Security and Peace-Building Interventions
While the use of military deployments has always been highly sensitive within the democracy-support community, European governments have sometimes seen hard power as beneficial to democracy. In 2021, however, there were no deployments of European troops specifically to defend democracy.
European governments moved further away from seeing military assets as having any relevance to democracy support. Events in Afghanistan exacerbated this trend that was already evident from the mid-2010s. In countries where the EU or its member states had security missions, the relationship between these and support for democratic norms was uneasy.
Although several violent conflicts worsened in 2021, EU states eschewed major military engagements. The EU did not employ any of its battle groups during the year. Yet there was much internal discussion about the need to strengthen military capacities and to engage more directly in conflict situations. Borrell was especially keen to give EU foreign policy this more action-oriented focus.129
The EU prepared a Strategic Compass during the year with the aim of cohering and sharpening security and defense strategies. This is due to become operational in 2022 and is set to include democracy support as one of its formal aims.130 The first draft of the Strategic Compass in November proposed the creation of 5,000-strong Rapid Hybrid Response Teams.
In 2021, there were seventeen ongoing Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations, of which eleven were civilian and six military. The civilian missions were in the Central African Republic, Georgia, Iraq, Kosovo, Libya, Mali, Niger, the Palestinian territories (specifically in the cities of Ramallah and Rafah), Somalia, and Ukraine.
They involved around 2,000 staff and an annual cost of €281 million. The EU began a new counterterrorism training mission in Mozambique following terrorist attacks there. It also moved to create a new mission in Libya focusing on security-sector support, with human-rights training attached to this.131 Formally, under the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability mechanism, civilian CSDP missions promote stability and build resilience through strengthening the rule of law in fragile environments.132
In practice, however, the most recent missions have focused on tightly defined security aims and had little direct relevance to democracy support—indeed, they often seemed to undermine it. The French-led European Intervention Initiative, which is separate from the EU, remained inactive.
In the Sahel, France reduced its military presence and focused on a narrower set of counterterrorism efforts. The EU’s CSDP missions in the region focused on security and counterterrorism training and capacity-building; they did not provide a vehicle for any meaningful amount of democracy support. This presence involved some difficult accommodations with authoritarian dynamics.
When military hardliners took control of Mali’s supposedly transitional post-coup government in May, the EU prepared the ground for possible sanctions (see above), diverted some aid from the security sector to other uses, suspended its counterterrorism training mission (EUTM), and pushed the transitional government toward new elections. However, it soon restarted EUTM activities, and some French and European counterterrorism cooperation continued with local security forces as jihadist attacks increased.133
France’s decision to reduce its military presence in Mali in the final months of 2021 reflected its frustration with the regime’s threat to renege on an agreed electoral timetable. Still, counterterrorism operations continued. As France wound down its Opération Barkhane in the region, its focus switched to the more narrowly focused Takuba Task Force, the European operation to advise and assist Mali’s armed forces.
134 Operational since April, by the end of the year the task force had around 600 troops, half of them French with eight other EU states contributing the rest.135 The decision to run the task force outside the CSDP in part reflected France’s desire to keep the focus tightly on counterterrorism cooperation with state authorities in the region while drawing down its own troops.
When Chad’s long-time autocratic ruler Idriss Deby was assassinated in April, France helped his son take power in an archetypal undemocratic putsch so as to be able to continue security cooperation.136 As most of Germany’s troops deployed abroad are in the Sahel region, it raised concerns over the counterinsurgency approach that seemed increasingly to sideline governance factors. However, while some EU states pressed for more mediation and efforts to broker deals between local armed groups and authorities, France and others insisted on keeping the focus on defeating armed groups militarily.
The downgrading of political reform rebounded against European interests: at the end of the year, the EU was forced to review its training missions across the region, and even suspend training in the Central African Republic, after it was revealed that these had been helping the same authoritarian government forces who were now working with Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group.137
In Syria, the EU showed no interest in replacing the last 900 U.S. troops working with the Syrian Defense Forces on post–Islamic State stabilization in the northeast of the country after those troops left. As the regime put a heavy squeeze on the remaining semiautonomous rebel areas, European states were left with little room to operate and moved toward modest engagement with it and a focus almost exclusively on retaining access for humanitarian aid, channeled mainly via UN agencies that work through and at the behest of the regime.
In Afghanistan, European troops had not been in direct combat roles for some years prior to the Taliban takeover, and they were engaged mainly in counterinsurgency training, with only a tangential relationship to democracy-building. As the political crisis deepened and the government weakened, European governments did not offer military support to protect what remained of democracy against Taliban advances.
They did not replace the departing U.S. troops even though they were united in strongly opposing the United States’ withdrawal;138 instead they withdrew their own remaining forces. European troops deployed only to get European citizens out of the country and not for any broader remit. In 2021, the European security presence moved from a modest capacity-building function to humiliating retreat.
Rather than undertaking military deployments, the EU intensified its focus on mediation. The new mediation strategy it launched at the end of 2020 became operational.139 The European External Action Service upgraded its Mediation Support team.140 The place of democracy support in EU mediation efforts remained uncertain and differed across countries. In some cases they sat uneasily together: the EU moved to foreground mediation efforts in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan as its democracy support lost traction in these countries.
In Georgia, in contrast, the EU mediated in April an accord during the country’s political crisis that promised to unblock political reforms; however, the government later withdrew from this agreement and its democracy commitments. The EU did not engage in the standoff between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh that began in late 2020 and restarted in May 2021, although European Council President Charles Michel hosted a meeting with the countries’ leaders in December.
Conclusion: Themes in 2021 Democracy Support
On several levels, the EU’s political commitment to defending and fostering democracy internationally strengthened in 2021. Counterbalancing this, its external actions pulled in contrary directions as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and various regional security concerns. Yet the upgraded democracy commitments were not negligible. What is more, the strategic or COVID-19 dynamics that undercut democracy support in some instances also provided a fillip to new democracy funds and diplomacy elsewhere. While COVID-19 was the year’s top policy priority, it did not drown out democracy considerations, as some had initially predicted.
Democracy Aid
A familiar, even ubiquitous, refrain over the last several years has been that past models of democracy support need to be ditched and no longer hold any prospect of success, that the EU has failed to move with the geopolitics of the times, and in particular that it needs to move beyond a reflexive effort to export its own templates and notions of democracy to a world that simply does not want these.
Policy developments in 2021 show that EU democracy support has already moved into a new phase. European democracy aid has become more focused on protecting core rights under attack, and the EU has moved to mold its aid policy around local demands for support. It adheres to a lowered and more realistic ambition of keeping some space and capacity for democratic agency alive, as opposed to replicating wholesale institutional models or sequencing all-embracing patterns of democratization focused overwhelmingly on elections.
The EU has not gone far enough in this direction, but significant changes are apparent in the way that it supports democracy. EU funds mostly tried to keep a faint democratic-civic pulse alive in several countries despite inauspicious times. In the future, the EU will need to build on efforts to better pair its support for civil society and citizen demands with the institutional support for democratic governance it provides to governments.
Sanctions and Conditionality
This was the year when the EU rolled out a new human-rights sanctions regime and talked tougher on aid conditionality. The EU faced key challenges in reacting to promising reforms of recent years unravelling—in Armenia, Ethiopia, Myanmar, and Tunisia—and discerning what critical leverage could be exerted in such cases. Its increased use of sanctions was striking but it was also rather ad hoc and scattershot, and not apparently linked to detailed assessments of where this might have impact.
While the impact of sanctions depends on very specific contextual factors and structural features of regimes to which they are applied, the EU’s decisions on sanctions did not seem to take into consideration such complexities.
Alongside sanctions, the EU also used forms of democratic conditionality, in particular reducing aid in response to democratic backsliding and increasing funds in the wake of positive democratic progress. Aid cuts were more frequent but also narrower in their aims. In many cases, the EU sought forms of aid variation short of cuts, such as changing end recipients or providing less unconditional budget support. Trends during 2021 suggest that the EU is becoming more targeted and specific in its rationale for aid cuts—for example, pressing for very specific institutional changes relating to anticorruption, cessation of violence, and observer access. These conditions seemed to be designed to unblock aid while cuts signaled a more punitive disengagement.
Democracy as Geopolitics?
The year saw attempts to inject more geopolitical overview into funding on the ground, although progress in this was still modest. There was also debate about whether the EU should be more global in its democracy policy or focus on its neighborhood as the United States tilts more to the Pacific.
While the Afghanistan debacle re-awoke familiar calls for a new EU intervention force, the political will to contemplate ambitious interventions in the name of difficult democracy-building aims, as opposed to security or migration containment, diminished during 2021. The familiar “democracy cannot be imposed by military means” critique looks increasingly hollow given the absence of any such intent in EU actions.
In relation to such strategic linkages, a recurring concern for effective European democracy support around the world remains lack of policy coherence. Efforts to support democracy frequently push up against other key priorities like trade, energy security, migration, and stability, with democracy and human rights usually ending up playing second fiddle.
This can be seen, among other things, with the export of military technology to dictatorships, the significant amount of aid to authoritarian regimes, trade deals with regimes with poor human-rights records, and the uneven application of sanctions. European actors made only limited progress in 2021 in reducing these key inconsistencies. This is something they can ill-afford in an era of heightened international and geopolitical competition.
Internal Momentum
The momentum of new EU policy commitments appeared more dynamic in relation to the internal than external sphere. Some of the lessons from international democracy support began to find resonance in EU internal funding and conditionality measures, although this remained tentative. The European Democracy Action Plan is a notable upgrade in efforts to defend European democracy and the closest the EU has come to having a democracy strategy as such.
Still, it relates mainly to a range of digital issues, the area where the EU was most ambitious in 2021. A tension clearly emerged between those prioritizing freedom of speech against those wishing to use the EDAP for more far-reaching regulatory limits against online debate.
The breadth of its proposed digital policies is significant and puts the EU in a strong position to help shape digital issues at the international level. Still, the impact of these policies will depend heavily on U.S. efforts to rein in tech giants, the aggressiveness of China’s government abroad, and the ability of the EU to successfully use those policies to help people around the world gain more digital access and build digital infrastructure alternatives to Chinese offers.
Launchpad?
It is possible that a foundation was laid in 2021. The EU created or signed up to several new commitments like the Team Europe Democracy framework, and member states made commitments at the Summit for Democracy, while the EU also set in place the funding to support its new Democracy and Human Rights Action Plan. These could prove to be the foundations of stronger and more effective democracy support in future years.
It might also be the case that these foundational moves fail to lead to tangible policy upgrades in the years ahead, or that only a small number of member states see value in contributing to the next-phase democracy agenda. If this happens, European commitments to improve democratic support made in 2021 might turn out to represent a false dawn.
About the Authors
Richard Youngs (lead) is a senior fellow in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program, based at Carnegie Europe, and a professor at the University of Warwick.
Ken Godfrey is the executive director of the European Partnership for Democracy.
Erin Jones is a research analyst in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program at Carnegie Europe.
Ruth-Marie Henckes is an advocacy and communications coordinator at the European Partnership for Democracy.
Elisa Lledo is a senior program manager in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance program at Carnegie Europe.
Kinga Brudzinska is the head of the Center for Global Europe at GLOBSEC, a think tank based in Slovakia.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Simon Eslinger for his analytical contribution to this publication.
About the European Partnership for Democracy
The European Partnership for Democracy (EPD) is a not-for-profit organisation with a global remit to support democracy. The EPD network brings together 18 organisations specialising in the different parts of a democratic system and supports democracy in over 140 countries around the world. See www.epd.eu.
This article is part of the European Democracy Hub initiative run by Carnegie Europe and the European Partnership for Democracy.
This document was produced with the financial assistance of the European Union. The views expressed herein are the sole responsibility of the authors and can in no way be taken to reflect the official opinion of the European Union.
Notes
1 Council of the EU, “COVID-19: Council Adopts Conclusions on Human Rights-Based Recovery,” press release, February 22, 2021, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/02/22/covid-19-council-adopts-conclusions-on-human-rights-based-recovery/.
2 Sam Fleming, Henry Foy, and Victor Mallet, “Afghanistan Pullout Deepens EU Concern Over Lack of Military Power,” Financial Times, September 2, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/dd7434b5-ae82-4f96-95bd-88874744b2f6.
3 Oz Hassan, “Reassessing the European Strategy in Afghanistan,” Carnegie Europe, November 17, 2021, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/11/17/reassessing-european-strategy-in-afghanistan-pub-85776.
4 European Commission, “Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024,” March 25, 2020, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52020JC0005&rid=3.
5 European Commission, “Multi-Annual Indicative Programming for the NDICI-Global Europe Thematic Programme on Human Rights and Democracy 2021-2027,” n.d., https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/system/files/mip-2021-c2021-9620-human-rights-democracy-annex_en.pdf.
6 European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, “Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council,” September 16, 2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/jointcommunication_2021_24_1_en.pdf.
7 European Commission, “Post-Cotonou Negotiations on New EU/Africa-Caribbean-Pacific Partnership Agreement Concluded,” press release, April 15, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_1552. See also Article 101 of the new Partnership Agreement, replacing Article 96 of the old Cotonou-Agreement.
8 Council of the EU, “The European Union’s Integrated Strategy in the Sahel—Council Conclusions,” April 16, 2021, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7723-2021-INIT/en/pdf.
9 Council of the EU, “Horn of Africa: EU to Deepen Strategic Relationship With the Region,” May 10, 2021, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/05/10/horn-of-africa-eu-to-deepen-strategic-relationship-with-the-region/.
10 European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, “Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions—Renewed partnership With the Southern Neighbourhood: A New Agenda for the Mediterranean,” February 9, 2021, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Joint%20Communication%20to%20the%20European%20Parliament%2C%20the%20Council%2C%20the%20European%20Economic%20and%20Social%20Committee%20and%20the%20Committee%20of%20the%20Regions%20-%20Renewed%20Partnership%20with%20the%20Southern%20Neighbourhood%20-%20a%20new%20Agenda%20for%20the%20Mediterranean.pdf.
11 Council of the European Union, “Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit as agreed on 15 December 2021 in Brussels,” December 15, 2021, https://www.consilium.europa.eu//media/53526/20211215-eap-joint-declaration-en.pdf?utm_source=POLITICO.EU&utm_campaign=59a2cc5d97-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2021_12_16_04_43&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_10959edeb5-59a2cc5d97-190698572.
12 Saskia Brechenmacher, Ruth-Marie Henckes, and Elisa Lledo, “Bolstering Women’s Political Power: Lessons From the EU’s Gender Action Plan II,” Carnegie Europe, December 7, 2021, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/12/07/bolstering-women-s-political-power-lessons-from-eu-s-gender-action-plan-ii-pub-85921.
13 Brian Wu, “EU Challenges China’s Belt and Road Initiative With Global Infrastructure Program,” SupChina, September 16, 2021, https://supchina.com/2021/09/16/eu-challenges-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-with-global-infrastructure-program/.
14 Joseph R. Biden Jr. and Angela Merkel, “Washington Declaration,” White House, press release, July 15, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/07/15/washington-declaration/.
15 “Koalitionsvertrag zwischen SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen und FDP,” Politico, n.d., https://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/24/Koalitionsvertrag-2021-2025.pdf.
16 Amadeu Antonio Stiftung, “Demokratie schützen—jetzt!,” n.d., https://www.amadeu-antonio-stiftung.de/demokratie-schuetzen-jetzt/
17 Government of the United Kingdom Cabinet Office, “Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy,” March 16, 2021, last updated July 2, 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy.
18 “British Foreign Minister Liz Truss Gives Speech at Tory Party Conference,” YouTube video, posted by The Independent, October 3, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=epP88p4t59Y.
19 Chatham House, “How the UK Enables the Kleptocrats of Eurasia and Weakens Its Own Rule of Law,” virtual event, December 8, 2021, https://www.chathamhouse.org/events/all/research-event/how-uk-enables-kleptocrats-eurasia-and-weakens-its-own-rule-law?utm_source=Chatham%20House&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=12862767_REP%20-%20content%20update%20de-fr%20kleptocracy%20videos%20-%2010.12.2021&dm_i=1S3M,7NOZ3,NUT8LF,V74VZ,1.
20 Sam Eastwood and Daniel Leveson, “Beneficial Ownership Transparency: UK Overseas Territories Commit to Publicly Accessible Registers,” Mayer Brown, January 29, 2021, https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/perspectives-events/publications/2021/01/beneficial-ownership-transparency-uk-overseas-territories-commit-to-publicly-accessible-registers.
21 Government of France, “Loi n° 2021-1031 du 4 août 2021 de programmation relative au développement solidaire et à la lutte contre les inégalités mondiales (1),” Legifrance, 2021, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000043898536.
22 Agence Française de Développment, “France’s Anti-corruption Strategy in Its Cooperation Action 2021-2030,” June 2021, https://www.afd.fr/en/ressources/frances-anti-corruption-strategy-its-cooperation-action-2021-2030.
23 Forum on Information and Democracy, “New York Summit Sees Launch of the International Observatory on Information and Democracy,” September 24, 2021, https://informationdemocracy.org/2021/09/24/new-york-summit-sees-launch-of-the-international-observatory-on-information-and-democracy/.
24 Generation Equality Forum, “Generation Equality Forum: Paris,” https://forum.generationequality.org/generation-equality-forum-paris.
25 Government of Spain, “Council of Ministers Agrees to Submit Foreign Action Strategy 2021-24 to Parliament,” press release, January 26, 2021, http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/en/SalaDePrensa/NotasdePrensa/Paginas/2021_NOTAS_P/20210126_NOTA009.aspx.
26 Teresa Coratella and Arturo Varvelli, “Rome’s Moment: Draghi, Multilateralism, and Italy’s New Strategy,” European Council on Foreign Relations, May 20, 2021, https://ecfr.eu/publication/romes-moment-draghi-multilateralism-and-italys-new-strategy/.
27 Euractiv.com with AFP, “Draghi Takes Distance From Russia and China, Anchors Italy to the West,” Euractiv, June 18, 2021, https://www.euractiv.com/section/china/news/draghi-takes-distance-from-russia-and-china-anchors-italy-to-the-west.
28 Paolo Formentini, “Risoluzione conclusiva 8-00120,” Commission III (Foreign Affairs), May 26, 2021, https://aic.camera.it/aic/scheda.html?numero=8/00120&ramo=C&leg=18.
29 Fabrizio Lobasso, “Italy and Africa: ‘Value Oriented Diplomacy’ in Action,” Instituto Affari Internazionali, April 23, 2021, https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/italy-and-africa-value-oriented-diplomacy-action.
30 Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Netherlands, “Foreign Affairs: Commitment to Security, Stability and Sustainability,” news release, September 21, 2021, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/ministerie-van-buitenlandse-zaken/nieuws/2021/09/21/buitenlandse-zaken-inzet-op-veiligheid-stabiliteit-en-duurzaamheid.
31 Department of Foreign Affairs for Ireland, “Statement of Strategy 2021-2023,” https://www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/aboutus/Statement-of-Strategy-2021-2023.pdf; Government of Ireland, “Global Ireland: Ireland’s Global Footprint to 2025,” https://www.ireland.ie/media/ireland/stories/globaldiaspora/Global-Ireland-in-English.pdf.
32 Department of Foreign Affairs for Ireland, “UN Human Rights Council Unanimously Adopts Irish-Led Resolution on Civil Society Space,” press release, July 12, 2021, https://www.gov.ie/en/press-release/f18d2-un-human-rights-council-unanimously-adopts-irish-led-resolution-on-civil-society-space/.
33 The basis for these activities has been provided by the Manifesto of the Government of the Slovak Republic 2021-2024 and the Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic 2021. More in: Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs for the Slovak Republic, “Foreign Policy: Current Human Rights Topics,” last updated December 7, 2021, https://www.mzv.sk/web/en/foreign_policy/human_rights/current_human_rights_topics.
34 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Affairs for the Slovak Republic, “The First International High-Level Conference on the Promotion of Human Rights and Democracy in the World at the Foreign Ministry in Bratislava—By Protecting Human Rights in the World, We Also Protect Our Rights,” October 28, 2021, https://www.mzv.sk/web/en/news/detail/-/asset_publisher/oLViwP07vPxv/content/prva-medzinarodna-konferencia-na-vysokej-urovni-o-podpore-ludskych-prav-a-demokracie-vo-svete-na-pode-rezortu-diplomacie-v-bratislave-ochranou-ludskyc/10182?p_p_auth=Acui6Uuq&_101_INSTANCE_oLViwP07vPxv_redirect=%2Fweb%2Fen.
35 Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Republic of Lithuania, “Taiwan to Open Its Representative Office in Lithuania,” July 20, 2021, https://www.urm.lt/default/en/news/taiwan-to-open-its-representative-office-in-lithuania.
36 Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Republic of Lithuania, “Lithuania Is Organising a High Level Forum on Resisting Authoritarianism—Future of Democracy,” last updated November 8, 2021, https://www.urm.lt/default/en/news/lithuania-is-organising-a-high-level-forum-on-resisting-authoritarianism-future-of-democracy; “Future of Democracy: Vilnius 2021,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Republic of Lithuania, https://www.futureofdemocracyforum.com.
37 The Development Cooperation Policy Plan sets out specific measures for practical implementation of Latvia’s Development Cooperation Policy Guidelines for 2021–2027. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, “The Latvian Cabinet of Ministers Approves the Development Cooperation Policy Plan for 2021-2023,” May 18, 2021, https://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/article/latvian-cabinet-ministers-approves-development-cooperation-policy-plan-2021-2023.; and here Guidelines: Republic of Latvia, “On the Development Cooperation Policy Plan 2021-2023. year,” Cabinet of Ministers, May 18, 2021, https://likumi.lv/ta/id/322455-par-attistibas-sadarbibas-politikas-pamatnostadnem-20212027-gadam.; and Plan: Republic of Latvia, “On the Development Cooperation Policy Plan 2021-2023 year,” Cabinet of Ministers, May 18, 2021, https://likumi.lv/ta/id/323339-par-attistibas-sadarbibas-politikas-planu-20212023-gadam.
38 Concord, “AidWatch 2021—A Geopolitical Commission: Building Partnerships or Playing Politics?,” 2021, https://aidwatch.concordeurope.org/2021-report/.
39 Government of Estonia, “Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid Program 2021-2024,” n.d., https://vm.ee/sites/default/files/content-editors/development-cooperation/arengukoostoo_ja_humanitaarabi_programm_2021-2024.pdf (for now, only in Estonian).
40 Ministry of Finance of Estonia, “State Budget Strategy 2021-2024,” n.d., https://www.rahandusministeerium.ee/system/files_force/document_files/state-budget-strategy-2021-2024-estonia.docx?download=1.
41 Government of Estonia, “Estonian Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid,” 2021, https://vm.ee/sites/default/files/content-editors/development-cooperation/arengukoostoo_infolehed_uldine_0.pdf.
42 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, “Estonia Joins International IDEA as the 34th Member State,” news article, December 1, 2021, https://www.idea.int/news-media/news/estonia-joins-international-idea-34th-member-state; Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Republic of Estonia, “Foreign Minister Liimets Discussed Cooperation Possibilities With the Secretary General of IDEA,” October 14, 2021, https://vm.ee/en/news/foreign-minister-liimets-discussed-cooperation-possibilities-secretary-general-idea.
43 Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Republic of Estonia, “Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid,” last updated December 6, 2021, https://vm.ee/et/tegevused-eesmargid/arengukoostoo-ja-humanitaarabi.
44 Government of Poland, “The Multiannual Programme for Development Cooperation for 2021-2030. Solidarity for Development,” 2021, https://www.gov.pl/web/polishaid/the-multiannual-programme-for-development-cooperation-for-2021-2030-solidarity-for-development.
45 Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Republic of Bulgaria, “Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid,” n.d., https://www.mfa.bg/bg/3088.
46 Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Republic of Bulgaria, “Priorities of the Bulgarian Development Policy,” n.d., https://www.mfa.bg/bg/3846.
47 Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Romania, “Annual Plan for International Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance,” July 2021, https://www.mae.ro/node/54871.
48 Community of Democracies, “Romania’s Presidency of the Community of Democracies to Continue,” n.d., https://community-democracies.org/romanias-presidency-of-the-community-of-democracies-to-continue/.
49 European Commission, “Recommendation on the Protection, Safety and Empowerment of Journalists,” September 16, 2021, https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/recommendation-protection-safety-and-empowerment-journalists.
50 Council of Europe, “Safety of Journalists,” Council of Europe Portal, n.d., https://www.coe.int/en/web/freedom-expression/safety-of-journalists.
51 Coalition Against SLAPPs in Europe (CASE), “The Need for an EU Anti-SLAPP Directive,” n.d., https://www.the-case.eu/campaign-list/the-need-for-an-eu-anti-slapp-directive; European Parliament, “Report on Strengthening Democracy and Media Freedom and Pluralism in the EU: The Undue Use of Actions Under Civil and Criminal Law to Silence Journalists, NGOs and Civil Society,” October 27, 2021, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2021-0292_EN.html.
52 “The Facebook Files: A Wall Street Journal Investigation,” Wall Street Journal, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-facebook-files-11631713039.
53 European Partnership for Democracy, “Reaction to Online Political Ads Regulation Proposal,” November 25, 2021, https://epd.eu/2021/11/25/online-political-ads-regulation-reaction/.
54 European Commission, “Commission Presents Guidance to Strengthen the Code of Practice on Disinformation,” press release, May 26, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_2585.
55 European Commission, “Code of Practice on Disinformation,” last updated December 2, 2021, https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/code-practice-disinformation.
56 State of the Union speech, September 2021.
57 European Commission, “2022 Rule of Law Report,” n.d., https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/rule-law/rule-law-mechanism/2022-rule-law-report_en.
58 European Union, “What is the Conference on the Future of Europe?,” n.d., https://futureu.europa.eu/pages/about.
59 See International IDEA portal on the summit follow-up, https://www.idea.int/news-media/news/international-idea-tracks-summit-democracy-commitments-and-launches-resources-portal.
60 European Commission, “EU Announces Additional 119.5 Million Euro Support to Democracy and Human Rights for 2021,” September 20, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_4708.
61 Marijn Hoijtink and Hanna L. Muehlenhoff, “The European Peace Facility and the Legitimation of European Arms Exports,” E-International Relations, 1 June 2021, https://www.e-ir.info/2021/06/01/gunning-for-peace-the-european-peace-facility-and-the-legitimation-of-european-arms-exports/
62 Council of the EU, “European Peace Facility: Council Adopts Assistance Measures for Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and the Republic of Mali,” press release, December 2, 2021, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/12/02/european-peace-facility-council-adopts-assistance-measures-for-georgia-the-republic-of-moldova-ukraine-and-the-republic-of-mali/.
63 European Commission, “Global Europe: EU Launches a Global EUR 1.5 Billion Programme to Support Civil Society Organisations,” press release, December 14, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_6792.
64 European Union Election Observation Mission in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, “Preliminary Statement: A Return to the Electoral Arena By Most Political Forces With Improved Electoral Conditions Though Structural Shortcomings Remain,” November 23, 2021, https://www.eods.eu/library/prelimnary_declaration_moe_ue_venezuela_2021_en.pdf.
65 European Commission, “EU Further Steps Up Its Support to the People of Belarus,” news article, December 13, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/news/eu-further-steps-its-support-people-belarus-2021-12-13_en.
66 Andrew Rettman, “EU to Call Out Russian Aggression at Kyiv Summit,” EU Observer, September 17, 2021, https://euobserver.com/world/152944.
67 International Crisis Group, “A Course Correction for the Sahel Stabilisation Strategy,” February 1, 2021, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/299-course-correction-sahel-stabilisation-strategy; Katherine Pye, “The Sahel: Europe’s Forever War?,” Centre for European Reform, March 2021, https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/policy-brief/2021/sahel-europes-forever-war.
68 Donor Tracker, “Sweden Increases Support for Strengthening Democracies in Southern Africa, Adding US$6 Million to Regional Strategy Framework,” February 25, 2021, https://donortracker.org/policy-updates/sweden-increases-support-strengthening-democracies-southern-africa-adding-us6.
69 Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Sweden, “Sida Is Commissioned to Contribute to a New Strategy for Democracy Support Through Swedish Party-Affiliated Organizations,” April 15, 2021, https://www.regeringen.se/pressmeddelanden/2021/04/sida-far-uppdrag-att-bidra-till-ny-strategi-om-demokratistod-genom-svenska-partianknutna-organisationer/.
70 Sida, “Sida’s Work in Russia,” n.d., https://www.sida.se/en/sidas-international-work/russia.
71 Sida, “Sida’s Work in Syria,” n.d., https://www.sida.se/en/sidas-international-work/syria.
72 Donor Tracker, “Sweden Adopts New Development Cooperation Strategy for Latin America, Including Specific Strategies for Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala,” May 6, 2021, https://donortracker.org/policy-updates/sweden-adopts-new-development-cooperation-strategy-latin-america-including-specific.
73 Donor Tracker, “Sweden Adds US$11 Million in Additional Funding for Democracy, Human Rights to 2016-2021 Development Strategy for Asia, Oceania,” January 18, 2021, https://donortracker.org/policy-updates/sweden-adds-us11-million-additional-funding-democracy-human-rights-2016-2021.
74 German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, “BMZ 2030 Reform Strategy,” n.d., https://www.bmz.de/resource/blob/29026/a73123a6094263264e921881d6b76f90/Materialie520_BMZ%202030%20reform%20strategy.
75 “Koalitionsvertrag zwischen SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen und FDP,” Politico.
76 Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Poland, “Development Cooperation Plan in 2020,” 2019, https://www.gov.pl/attachment/79204aa6-12c5-485d-99b3-.51a0f2e105ae#:~:text=tak%C5%BCe%20priorytety%20tematyczne.-,W%202020%20r.,obszar%C3%B3w%20wiejskich%20oraz%20ochron%C4%99%20%C5%9Brodowiska; Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Poland, “Development Cooperation Plan in 2021,” March 19, 2021, https://www.gov.pl/attachment/332a3387-9ad2-4d3b-9a1f-97f5655a28f0.
77 Foundation of International Solidarity, “Democratisation,” 2021, https://solidarityfund.pl/en/co-robimy/demokratyzacja/.
78 Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Poland, “Development Cooperation Plan in 2020,” 2019, https://www.gov.pl/attachment/79204aa6-12c5-485d-99b3-.51a0f2e105ae#:~:text=tak%C5%BCe%20priorytety%20tematyczne.-,W%202020%20r.,obszar%C3%B3w%20wiejskich%20oraz%20ochron%C4%99%20%C5%9Brodowiska; Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Poland, “Development Cooperation Plan in 2021,” March 19, 2021, https://www.gov.pl/attachment/332a3387-9ad2-4d3b-9a1f-97f5655a28f0.
79 Adam Easton, “Belarus Protests: Why Poland Is Backing the Opposition,” BBC, September 10, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54090389; Government of Poland, “‘Solidarity with Belarus’ —NAWA Scholarships for Students, Scientists and Teachers,” November 6, 2020, https://www.gov.pl/web/polishaid/solidarity-with-belarus---nawa-scholarships-for-students-scientists-and-teachers; Foreign Affairs Committee No. 56, “Record of the Meeting,” July 21, 2021, https://studiabas.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm9.nsf/biuletyn.xsp?documentId=0C7042814118FF0DC1258725003F803E; List of Supported Projects in 2021 (No Money Indicated): https://solidarityfund.pl/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Zalacznik-z-wynikami-do-ogloszenia-na-strone.pdf.
80 Concord, “Concord AidWatch 2020—Knock-on Effects: An Urgent Call to Leave No One Behind,” 2020 https://concordeurope.org/?smd_process_download=1&download_id=19732, 31.
81 DonorTracker, “France,” n.d., https://donortracker.org/country/france?gclid=CjwKCAjw-sqKBhBjEiwAVaQ9ax3N9wUQxKW-7mGYhQ38ukOOdZLwc_Ctgkp8Atimle6gjNhnqLa4AhoChL4QAvD_BwE.
82 Italian Agency for Development Cooperation, “Reviewed Budget 2021,” September 9, 2021, https://aics.portaleamministrazionetrasparente.it/archivio29_bilanci_0_923_731_1.html.
83 Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Finland, “Report on Development Policy Across Parliamentary Terms—We Can Build a Better World Together,” May 28, 2021, https://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/-/report-on-development-policy-across-parliamentary-terms-we-can-build-a-better-world-together.
84 Foreign Policy Centre and Westminster Foundation for Democracy, “Global Britain for an Open World?,” October 19, 2021, https://fpc.org.uk/publications/global-britain-for-an-open-world/, 10 & 69.
85 UNESCO, “Global Media Defence Fund,” UNESCO, 2021, https://en.unesco.org/global-media-defence-fund.
86 Government of the Czech Republic, “Czech Development Cooperation Plan 2021 With Indicative Outlook 2022-2023,” https://www.mzv.cz/file/4060417/_2021_Development_Cooperation_Plan.pdf.
87 OECD, “Development Co-operation Profiles: Slovak Republic,” 2021, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/2dcf1367-en/1/3/2/40/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/2dcf1367-en&_csp_=177392f5df53d89c9678d0628e39a2c2&itemIGO=oecd&itemContentType=book.
88 Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Republic of Latvia, “The Latvian Cabinet of Ministers Approves the Development Cooperation Policy Plan for 2021-2023,” May 18, 2021, https://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/article/latvian-cabinet-ministers-approves-development-cooperation-policy-plan-2021-2023; Government of Latvia, “Guidelines for Development Cooperation Policy 2021-2027 Year,” Cabinet of Ministers, April 14, 2021, https://likumi.lv/ta/id/322455-par-attistibas-sadarbibas-politikas-pamatnostadnem-20212027-gadam; Government of Latvia, “On the Development Cooperation Policy Plan 2021-2023,” Cabinet of Ministers, May 18, 2021, https://likumi.lv/ta/id/323339-par-attistibas-sadarbibas-politikas-planu-20212023-gadam.
89 Government of the United Kingdom, “Global Human Rights Sanctions: Information Note for NGOs and Civil Society,” July 6, 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-human-rights-sanctions-information-note-for-non-government-organisations-and-others-interested-in-human-rights/global-human-rights-sanctions-information-note-for-ngos-and-civil-society#:~:text=The%20GHR%20sanctions%20regime%20allows,human%20rights%20violations%20or%20abuses.
90 Government of the United Kingdom, “Global Anti-corruption Sanctions: Information Note for Non-government Organisations,” April 26, 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-anti-corruption-sanctions-information-note-for-non-government-organisations/global-anti-corruption-sanctions-information-note-for-non-government-organisations.
91 Milda Seputyte, “Lithuanian Minister Hands in Resignation Over Belarus Sanctions,” Bloomberg, December 10, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-10/lithuanian-minister-hands-in-resignation-over-belarus-sanctions.
92 Andrew Rettman, “Lukashenko’s Refugee-Abuse to See New EU Sanctions,” EU Observer, September 8, 2021, https://euobserver.com/world/152839.
93 Euronews with AFP, “Lukashenko and Merkel Agree to EU Talks Over Belarus Migrant Crisis,” Euronews, November 17, 2021, https://www.euronews.com/2021/11/17/lukashenko-and-merkel-agree-to-eu-talks-over-belarus-migrant-crisis.
94 Ukrinform, “EU Prolongs Sanctions Against Russia By Six Months,” Ukrinform, July 12, 2021, https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-polytics/3279046-eu-prolongs-sanctions-against-russia-by-six-months.html.
95 Reuters in Brussels, “Germany, Poland, and Sweden Expel Russian Diplomats,” Guardian, February 8, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/08/germany-poland-sweden-expel-russia-diplomats-eu-retaliation.
96 Enrique Gómez Ramírez, “New Political Dialogue and 2021 Elections in Venezuela,” European Parliamentary Research Service, November 2021, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2021/698793/EPRS_ATA(2021)698793_EN.pdf.
97 Council of the EU, “Myanmar/Burma: Third Round of EU Sanctions Over the Military Coup and Subsequent Repression,” June 21, 2021, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/06/21/myanmar-burma-third-round-of-eu-sanctions-over-the-military-coup-and-subsequent-repression/.
98 International Federation for Human Rights, “Myanmar: The European Parliament Calls for Further Sanctions Against the Military,” FIDH, October 7, 2021, https://www.fidh.org/en/international-advocacy/european-union/myanmar-the-european-parliament-calls-for-further-sanctions-against.
99 Council of the EU, “Lebanon: EU Adopts a Framework for Targeted Sanctions,” press release, July 30, 2021, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/07/30/lebanon-eu-adopts-a-framework-for-targeted-sanctions/.
100 News Wires, “International Donor Conference Raises $370 Million in Aid for Lebanon,” France24, August 4, 2021, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210804-french-president-macron-pledges-100-million-euros-worth-of-emergency-aid-for-lebanon.
101 Ibid.
102 Council of the EU, “Tunisia: Declaration By the High Representative on Behalf of the European Union,” press release, July 27, 2021, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/07/27/tunisia-declaration-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-eu/.
103 Sarah Repucci and Amy Slipowitz, “Freedom in the World 2021: Turkey,” Freedom House, 2021, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/FIW2021_World_02252021_FINAL-web-upload.pdf.
104 Hans von der Burchard, “EU’s Borrell Criticizes Countries Over Reaction to Ethiopia Conflict,” Politico, December 13, 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/josep-borrell-criticizes-eu-for-reaction-to-ethiopia-killings/.
105 Pierre Godon, “Guinea: France Condemns the Coup Attempt and Calls for the Release of President Alpha Condé,” France Televisions, May 9, 2021, https://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/afrique/guinee/guinee-des-putschistes-affirment-avoir-capture-le-president-alpha-conde-la-situation-est-confuse-a-conakry_4760967.html; Benjamin Maiangwa, “Guinea Coup Highlights the Weaknesses of West Africa’s Regional Body,” Conversation, September 11, 2021, https://theconversation.com/guinea-coup-highlights-the-weaknesses-of-west-africas-regional-body-167650.
106 World Bank, “World Bank Group Paused All Disbursements to Sudan on Monday,” October 27, 2021, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/statement/2021/10/27/world-bank-group-paused-all-disbursements-to-sudan-on-monday; “African Union Suspends Sudan After Military Coup,” Deutsche Welle, October 27, 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/african-union-suspends-sudan-after-military-coup/a-59638408; and “African Union Suspends Sudan Over Coup,” Al Jazeera, October 27, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/27/african-union-suspends-sudan-over-coup.
107 Council of the EU, “Mali: EU Sets Up Autonomous Framework for Sanctions Against Those Obstructing the Political Transition,” press release, December 13, 2021, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/12/13/mali-eu-sets-up-autonomous-framework-for-sanctions-against-those-obstructing-the-political-transition/.
108 White House, “Joint Statement on the Export Controls and Human Rights Initiative,” statement, December 10, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/12/10/joint-statement-on-the-export-controls-and-human-rights-initiative/.
109 Mehreen Khan, “EU Urges Caution on Any Ban on Imports Made With Forced Labour,” Financial Times, December 23, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/748a837b-ac51-4f2e-9a5d-3af780ec8444.
110 Shota Kincha, “Georgian Government Rejects EU Aid,” OC Media, August 31, 2021, https://oc-media.org/georgian-government-rejects-eu-aid/.
111 Tomas Niklasson in: Crisis Group, “2021 Watch List Policy Dialogue—Day 1: Afghanistan; the Horn of Africa,” virtual event, November 24, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ylHiZJDsexU.
112 Tomas Niklasson in: Crisis Group, “2021 Watch List Policy Dialogue—Day 1: Afghanistan; the Horn of Africa,” virtual event, November 24, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ylHiZJDsexU.
113 Henry Foy, “EU Plans to Reopen Afghanistan Diplomatic Mission Within a Month,” Financial Times, October 24, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/0f29bc21-e486-451d-932e-75c4dd1e6850.
114 Steven Erlanger, “The New Government Promises to Be Tougher on China and Russia,” New York Times, December 8, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/08/world/europe/germany-russia-china.html.
115 Rodney Muhumuza, “Uganda’s President Orders Suspension of European-Backed Fund,” Associated Press, February 3, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/europe-yoweri-museveni-east-africa-africa-uganda-e5cae1baff832c8653ceaa56fda09602.
116 European Commission, “EUR 1 Billion Team Europe Initiative on Manufacturing and Access to Vaccines, Medicines and Health Technologies in Africa,” press release, May 21, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_2594?utm_source=POLITICO.EU&utm_campaign=532cee9246-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2021_11_22_04_14&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_10959edeb5-532cee9246-190698572.
117 EU Neighbours East, “Factsheet: EU and Azerbaijan,” European Union, November 14, 2021, https://euneighbourseast.eu/news-and-stories/publications/eu-azerbaijan-relations-factsheet/.
118 Soutik Biswas, “‘Electoral Autocracy’: The Downgrading of India’s Democracy,” BBC, March 16, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-56393944.
119 Arj Singh, “Exclusive: Raab Says UK Wants Trade Deals With Nations That Violate Human Rights,” Huffington Post, March 16, 2021, https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/raab-trade-deals-human-rights_uk_6050d75bc5b605256ebeaca6.
120 European Commission, “Report From the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: on the Implementation and Enforcement of EU Trade Agreements,” October 27, 2021, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2021/october/tradoc_159888.pdf.
121 Human Rights Watch, “Sri Lanka: Rights Abuses Jeopardize EU Trade Benefits,” Human Rights Watch, September 22, 2021, https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/09/22/sri-lanka-rights-abuses-jeopardize-eu-trade-benefits.
122 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “Business as Usual? Arms Sales of SIPRI Top 100 Arms Companies Continue to Grow Amid Pandemic,” December 6, 2021,https://sipri.org/media/press-release/2021/business-usual-arms-sales-sipri-top-100-arms-companies-continue-grow-amid-pandemic
123 Gemma Davies, “Can a New Legal Case Stop UK Arms Sales to Yemen?,” ODI, March 26, 2021, https://odi.org/en/insights/can-a-new-legal-case-stop-uk-arms-sales-to-yemen/.
124 Angelo Amante, “Italy Eases Curbs on Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia and UAE,” Reuters, July 6, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-arms-saudi-emirates/italy-eases-curbs-on-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-and-uae-idUSKCN2EC25L.
125 Marie Verdier, “Sale of Rafale to Egypt: The Ministry of the Armed Forces Defends a ‘Strategic Partnership,’” La Croix, May 4, 2021, https://www.la-croix.com/Monde/Vente-Rafale-lEgypte-ministere-armees-defend-partenariat-strategique-2021-05-04-1201154096; Amnesty International France, “Egypt: French Weapons at the Heart of Repression,” Amnesty International, October 16, 2018, https://www.amnesty.fr/controle-des-armes/actualites/france-egypte-aux-armes-policiers-egyptiens.
126 European Commission, “EU Boosts Humanitarian Aid Budget for 2021 as Needs Rise,” press release, January 26, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_202.
127 Zosia Wanat and Lili Bayer, “Brussels Takes Step Toward Rule-of-Law Penalty Process With Poland, Hungary,” Politico, November 19, 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-rule-of-law-penalty-process-poland-hungary/.
128 Robert Iddiols and Amy Cassidy, “Hungary ‘Has No Place in the EU Anymore,’ Dutch Leader Says,” CNN, June 25, 2021, https://edition.cnn.com/2021/06/24/europe/hungary-eu-lgbt-mark-rutte-intl/index.html.
129 Josep Borrell, “A Window on the World,” personal blog, EEAS, https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ethiopia/77199/window-world-personal-blog-hrvp-josep-borrell_en.
130 EEAS, “Towards a Strategic Compass,” November 15, 2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/89047/towards-strategic-compass_en.
131 Council of the EU, “Mozambique: EU Sets Up a Military Training Mission to Help Address the Crisis in Cabo Delgado,” press release, July 12, 2021, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/07/12/mozambique-eu-launches-a-military-training-mission-to-help-address-the-crisis-in-cabo-delgado/.
132 EEAS, “The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC),” n.d., https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eutm-rca/5438/civilian-planning-and-conduct-capability-cpcc_en.
133 Silvia D’Amato, “Patchwork of Counterterrorism: Analyzing European Types of Cooperation in Sahel,” International Studies Review 23, no. 4 (2021) 1518–40, https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viab024.
134 “Which Way Out? France’s Forever War in the Sahel,” Economist, February 17, 2021, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2021/02/17/frances-forever-war-in-the-sahel; John Campbell, “EU Task Force Takuba in Mali,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 8, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/blog/eu-task-force-takuba-mali.
135 José Naranjo, “The Reduction of French Troops Brings Concern to the Sahel,” El Pais, September 6, 2021, https://elpais.com/internacional/2021-09-06/la-reduccion-de-tropas-francesas-lleva-la-inquietud-al-sahel.html.
136 John Irish and Tangi Salaün, “With Eye on Islamist Fight, France Backs Chad Military Takeover,” Reuters, April 22, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/france-defends-chad-military-takeover-needed-ensure-stability-2021-04-22/.
137 Alexandra Brzozowski and Benjamin Fox, “EU to review its African military missions following Wagner link,” Euractiv, December 17, 2021, https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/news/eu-to-review-its-african-military-missions-following-wagner-link/.
138 Ishaan Tharoor, “As U.S. Leaves Afghanistan, Europe Sours on Biden,” Washington Post, August 31, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/08/31/europe-america-shift-afghanistan/.
139 Council of the EU, “Council Conclusions on EU Peace Mediation,” December 7, 2020, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13573-2020-INIT/en/pdf.
140 Mediation Support Team of the EU, “EU Peace Mediation in Times of Uncertainty: Video-Report on the 2021 EU Community of Practice on Peace Mediation,” EEAS, April 27-29, 2021, https://www.eupeacemediation.info/.
End of document
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
SALW-related assistance to states in sub-Saharan Africa: Hitting the target or missing the mark?
SALW-related assistance to states in sub-Saharan Africa: Hitting the target or missing the mark?
STOCKHOLM - The cost of poorly designed or weakly enforced controls on small arms and light weapons (SALW) on crime, conflict and development in sub-Saharan Africa is well documented. Through efforts like the African Union’s Silencing the Guns initiative, African states continue to focus international attention on addressing these challenges. In August 2021 Sierra Leone used its chairmanship of the seventh conference of states parties to the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) to highlight efforts to eradicate the illicit trade in SALW through improved stockpile management. In October 2021 Kenya used its one-month United Nations Security Council presidency to organize a thematic discussion on illicit SALW proliferation and the threats posed to peacekeeping operations.
A wide range of programmes have been established to provide states in sub-Saharan Africa with technical, financial and material assistance to strengthen controls on the production, trade and ownership of SALW. Mechanisms exist via the UN Programme of Action on SALW (UNPOA), the ATT and the 2001 UN Firearms Protocol for states to request and receive assistance. Nonetheless, ensuring that assistance programmes effectively address states’ needs has long proved challenging.
Since 2015 SIPRI has maintained the Mapping ATT-relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities database to map assistance provided to states in SALW and arms transfer controls. In 2021 the database was updated to provide a timelier and more accurate picture of assistance in SALW controls provided to states in sub-Saharan Africa. In connection with this update, this SIPRI Topical Backgrounder seeks to assess the extent to which this assistance is effectively addressing the needs and priorities of states in the region. To do this, it compares the types of assistance that states have requested via their reports on the implementation of the UNPOA with the information collected in the SIPRI database on the types of assistance provided.
The picture that emerges indicates that effectively matching offers and requests for assistance in the field of SALW controls continues to be a challenge. In key areas, the types of SALW control-related assistance offered to states in sub-Saharan Africa do not appear to address the needs and priorities of national governments. More generally, the systems through which states can request such assistance are not operating effectively. Based on this overview, this Topical Backgrounder presents recommendations for both future research and steps that could be taken by states, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international organizations to improve the coordination and effectiveness of SALW-related assistance efforts in sub-Saharan Africa.
Mapping requests for assistance in SALW controls in sub-Saharan Africa
The UNPOA outlines steps that should be taken at the international, regional and national level to counter the illicit trade in SALW ‘in all its aspects’. Since its adoption in 2001, states have stressed the necessity for international assistance aimed at helping states to implement its provisions. To facilitate this process, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) created a template for states to use when reporting on their implementation of the UNPOA that allows them to request assistance.
Requests are categorised according to the eight main provisions of the UNPOA—manufacturing, transfer, brokering, stockpile management, destruction, seizure, record keeping and tracing—as well as ten additional categories that touch on broader issues of state capacity-building.
States can also indicate whether they have developed a proposal for a specific project activity. In 2012 UNODA tried to match assistance needs and resources by circulating project proposals based on UNPOA national reports. Although UNODA did not maintain this effort, it continues to present information that states report on assistance requested, offered, and delivered in a searchable database.
The UNPOA shows the same inconsistent levels of participation that characterize most reporting instruments in the field of arms transfers and SALW controls. However, recent years have seen an upwards trend in reporting levels among states in sub-Saharan Africa and globally, both of which peaked in 2018. From 2011 until 2021, 35 states in sub-Saharan Africa submitted 99 national reports using the reporting template, which constitutes 40 per cent of the reports due over that period.
Regional differences are significant: only 16 per cent of due national reports are available from Central Africa compared to 51 per cent for West Africa (see figure 1). Some countries such as Burkina Faso and Namibia have submitted a report in each cycle, while others such as Chad and Cameroon have not submitted any reports. Several countries including Cabo Verde, the Comoros, Lesotho and Mauritania have only reported once.
Requests for assistance have remained persistently high over time and across sub-regions. In more than 70 per cent of reports, states requested assistance in some or all of the eight main categories during each reporting cycle (see figure 2). The rate of requests in the additional categories was much lower, largely between 10 per cent and 20 per cent. The degree to which states have provided details on the assistance they require differs considerably.
Besides a yes or no question on whether the state wants to request a specific type of assistance, the reporting template allows states to provide details about the assistance required. While this option has been widely used, oftentimes the details merely state the type of assistance such as technical, financial, material, legislative, or logistical without any further descriptions. Since 2012, only 45 per cent of requests provided details beyond the type of assistance. This is despite experts noting that donors and implementers are less likely to respond to assistance requests that lack details or are seen as low quality.
Since the UNODA reporting template has not changed significantly, the 99 reports that used the reporting template offer consistent, comparable and publicly available data on states’ identified needs in the field of SALW assistance. However, underreporting, differences in the quality of reports, and the lack of detailed information on the specific areas where states are requesting assistance limit the conclusions drawn from this analysis.
Moreover, studies have noted that states with the least capacity for SALW control are likely to have less capacity for compiling national reports which mean that the data presented are likely to underrepresent the actual assistance needs.
There are considerable regional differences in reported assistance needs. For instance, while states from Southern Africa requested assistance with ‘seizure’ in only 43 per cent of cases, states from all other regions did so more than 80 per cent of the time (see figure 2). Similarly, states from Western Africa included requests for assistance in developing controls on ‘manufacturing’ in 83 per cent of reports and developing controls on ‘transfers’ in 88 per cent of reports.
States from Southern Africa did so in 30 per cent and 48 per cent of reports. These differences might reflect the particular challenges in each sub-region but they could also be influenced by the work of different regional organizations—such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)—in helping to coordinate assistance requests. Some differences are also the result of unequal submission rates of reports skewing the statistic.
For instance, in Central Africa, the Central African Republic, Congo, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) were the only states that submitted any reports. Thus, it is unclear, for instance, whether a request rate of 100 per cent for ‘manufacturing’ in Central Africa is representative. In contrast, the higher rates of reporting in East Africa and especially Western Africa give a better picture for both regions.
Other mechanisms for matching offers and requests for assistance
The range of issues covered by the UNPOA, and hence, the range of areas covered by requests for assistance overlaps with other international instruments in the field of SALW controls and arms transfer controls which have also created mechanisms for reporting offers and requests for assistance. Instruments that also include mechanisms for requesting and receiving assistance in areas covered by the UNPOA include the Firearms Protocol and the ATT.
As part of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) review process established in 2018, the self-assessment questionnaire of the Firearms Protocol includes requests for international assistance. In contrast to the UNPOA, where all national reports are published, states can decide whether or not to make their self-assessments publicly available. ATT states parties must submit an initial report on the status of their national transfer control system which can provide information on possible gaps where assistance might be needed. The most recent version of the initial report template, adopted in 2021, will allow states parties to articulate more precisely what kind of assistance they can provide or require. Among the 28 sub-Saharan African ATT states parties, only 13 have submitted an initial report and only six are publicly available.
States can and do request assistance through a range of other channels, of which national reports are only one. ATT states parties can directly request assistance to the ATT Voluntary Trust Fund (ATT VTF). Since 2017, 20 sub-Saharan Africa states parties benefited from the ATT VTF in a range of areas including assistance on transfers, record-keeping, stockpile management, marking, or customs enforcement. Implementing organizations can directly or on behalf of states submit project proposals to dedicated funding mechanisms such as the UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR). Relevant assistance can now be provided through the newly established Saving-Lives Entity (SALIENT) fund. In 2013–19 sub-Saharan Africa was the region where the highest number of UNSCAR projects (44) were implemented. Pilot activities funded by SALIENT were implemented in Cameroon and South Sudan. These multiple channels give states a variety of possibilities to request SALW assistance. However, they also create the potential to create duplication and missed opportunities, with different providers and recipients of assistance focusing their attention on different instruments.
Mapping the provision of assistance in SALW controls in sub-Saharan Africa
SIPRI’s Mapping ATT-relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities database provides an additional and publicly available source to identify assistance in the fields of both SALW and arms transfer controls that have involved sub-Saharan African states. Although the database is not comprehensive, it represents a useful and unique tool for understanding the overall content, type and focus of assistance activities that have taken place. Therefore, it is a useful source to compare with information that states in the region have submitted through their reports to the instruments outlined above.
As of 8 December 2021, the database includes 876 assistance activities implemented from 2012 onwards of which 386 involved states in sub-Saharan Africa and focused on SALW controls. A significant proportion of entries included a thematic focus on inventory and stockpile management (157), followed by ammunition (99), tracing (89), and marking (75). Most of these activities included an institutional capacity-building component (236) or were partly or fully aiming at sensitizing the recipient countries on specific topics (164) or providing technical, material or financial assistance (114).
The European Union (EU) (93), Germany (89) and the United States (52) were donors in most of these entries. This picture is also partially confirmed because these donors were the largest providers of Official Development Assistance in support of activities in the field of ‘Reintegration and SALW controls’ in this region during 2012–19. Multi-donor funds such as UNSCAR and the ATT VTF are also indicated to have funded some of these activities.
Activities funded by these donors have included projects aimed at improving states’ technical capacities in different areas of SALW controls. For instance, the EU and Germany have supported the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa’s (UNREC) assistance work in the field of physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) in the Sahel and training in marking and record-keeping procedures in Togo and Mali.
The USA has supported the work of the Mines Advisory Group and the Halo Trust in reducing excess stockpiles or providing weapons and ammunition management-relevant assistance in several sub-Saharan African countries. The USA has also funded assistance work implemented by the Regional Centre for Small Arms (RECSA) at the sub-regional level. Other activities were part of projects aiming to help states establish tools to criminalize, investigate and prosecute firearms trafficking-related offences or strengthen their transfer control systems.
These included, for example, training activities implemented by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and INTERPOL as well as capacity building in support of the implementation of the ATT. Finally, a series of activities, such as those implemented by the Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies, have focused on supporting African regional and sub-regional organizations, e.g. the African Union and ECOWAS, with a view to promote coordinated approaches in the implementation of relevant regional and international standards.
Comparing assistance requested and assistance provided in sub-Saharan Africa
Comparing the assistance requests submitted through the UNPOA reports with the information on assistance provided that has been included in the SIPRI database in recent years points to several cases where the focus of requests for assistance and assistance provided align.
For example, in its 2014 report, Burkina Faso indicated the need for assistance in the field of stockpile management and specifically the construction of weapons and ammunition storage and related training. In 2015, it received support from the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) in the construction and rehabilitation of armouries and in 2016, it was involved in a regional project implemented by UNREC and aiming at improving PSSM in the Sahel.
In 2016, both Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, under the category ‘tracing’ specifically sought assistance for the use of INTERPOL’s iARMS database. INTERPOL Firearms Programme conducted iARMS training courses for Ivorian and Ghanaian officials in 2017 and 2018, respectively. Côte d’Ivoire also received legislative assistance on transfers as requested in its 2016 and 2018 reports. In 2019, Madagascar received UNREC’s support on stockpile management, marking and record-keeping, as requested in its 2018 UNPOA report.
The comparison also points to some discrepancies between assistance requested and provided. For example, there are countries that have received assistance in areas on which they did not request any support. During 2016–21, the DRC was involved in at least six activities that included a focus on ‘border controls’—e.g. workshops or meetings on cross-border cooperation—without indicating an assistance need in this field in any of its reports.
The same applied to Burundi. Further, the Republic of the Congo did not seek any support for stockpile management in its 2018 and 2021 reports but there are four activities in the SIPRI database that were implemented in the same period which indicate that this country received assistance in this field, including a PSSM training organized in 2021 by RECSA and the International Peace Support Training Centre. Other states have submitted assistance requests that may have never been followed up to or have been answered with some delays.
For instance, Burundi requested assistance on enforcement in 2012 but according to the SIPRI database it was involved in relevant activities only in 2018 and 2019. In 2018 and 2020, Rwanda requested technical and financial assistance in the field of destruction, marking and tracing; Togo has requested technical and financial assistance for tracing since 2016. However, the SIPRI database has not identified any relevant activities implemented in these countries in this timeframe.
There are also some inconsistencies in the distribution of assistance activities among regions in sub-Saharan Africa in the SIPRI database in comparison with the assistance requests that states have submitted through formal channels. According to the SIPRI database, countries in West Africa have been involved in 228 assistance activities with a focus on SALW controls, followed by Central African (153) and East African (140) states.
Countries in Southern Africa have been involved in the least amount of these activities (55). While in the case of West Africa and Southern Africa, this overview appears to reflect the level of assistance requests that countries have submitted through their reports to the UNPOA, for Central and Eastern Africa it indicates that there may be more need than is actually being reported.
Finally, there is also a certain tendency for states to continue to request assistance in areas where they have already received support. For example, Kenya has requested assistance in the field of stockpile management from 2016 until 2020 and according to the SIPRI database it has been involved in at least 24 activities with this focus since 2012.
In 2012 and 2018 Mali has indicated a need to improve its record-keeping capacities, including its marking practices. In the database, Mali is indicated as a beneficiary country in 23 activities implemented since 2012 and aiming at building capacity or providing technical assistance in the field of marking.
A state that repeats a previous request for assistance may be indicating that no relevant assistance has been provided or that help has been provided but that fixing capacity issues requires considerable time and support from different implementers. At the same time, an official might copy-paste a previous report without updating it. Conversely, a change in the assistance requested might reflect a change in the staff or the government agencies that are drafting or providing input on the assistance requests rather than a change of needs.
Conclusions
Mapping SALW control-related assistance in sub-Saharan Africa and comparing them with the actual needs of states in the region remains challenging due to several factors. These include the fragmentation and inconsistency of relevant information provided across several platforms and many states’ low level of engagement with reporting instruments both in terms of the quantity and quality of submissions.
There is also a need for more dynamic mechanisms that would help beneficiary states to develop their assistance requests in more detail and then enable them to work with assistance providers in designing the activities and assessing their impact. As one official from sub-Saharan Africa who was interviewed as part of this project noted, the current UNPOA reporting system has produced limited results because ‘it is not complemented by tools to effectively and adequately communicate to and sensitize states about available resources.’
This mechanism does not provide a platform through which ‘states can participate in articulating their needs and accessing the assistance.’ Efforts have been made to fill these gaps and to create processes to work with states to identify their assistance needs. However, the UNPOA and other reporting processes have not significantly changed over the years.
In the case of assistance focused on supporting the implementation of the ATT, mapping SALW control-related assistance is made even more difficult by the lack of a tool that systematically collects and presents information on assistance needed or offered in this field.
This gap will soon be filled through the creation of a database for matching offers and requests for assistance for ATT implementation. Together with the newly amended ATT initial reporting template, states will be able to elaborate more at length, although still on a voluntary basis, about their assistance needs. While the existence of several tools through which states can seek assistance is useful to facilitate the matching of needs and requests, this also risks creating an overlap of efforts if bridges are not built between the different forums and initiatives for offering and requesting assistance in SALW controls.
The analysis outlined above also shows that the SIPRI database could be used to mitigate some of these challenges, including by providing a better understanding of what requests for support have been met and by filling some gaps in the information shared by sub-Saharan African states on their assistance needs. In any case, further investigating and better understanding the reasons behind the discrepancies emerged in the comparison between the assistance requested and the assistance delivered as described earlier in this piece—and whether it points to limitations in the structure or use of the reporting instruments—should be a key focus of attention for states, NGOs and international organizations.
Lucile Robin, former SIPRI Research Assistant, contributed to the researching and writing of this Topical Backgrounder.
About the authors
Mark Bromley (United Kingdom) is the Director of the SIPRI Dual-Use and Arms Trade Control Programme.
Giovanna Maletta (Italy) is a Researcher with SIPRI’s Dual-Use and Arms Trade Control Programme.
Ruben Nicolin (Germany) was an intern with SIPRI’s Dual-Use and Arms Trade Control Programme.
2021 Islamophobia in Review
By Bridge Initiative Team, Washington DC, January 2022
WASHINGTON - Overall, 2021 demonstrated that Islamophobia remains a constant and growing threat around the globe. Anti-Muslim racism in 2021 remained ever present as hate crimes and individual attacks targeting Muslims persisted.
Across the globe, the key players of anti-Muslim racism were again states themselves, as this year witnessed increasing discriminatory legislation and policies.
China continued to deny the growing body of evidence pointing to genocide being committed against Uyghur Muslims and an international tribunal was held in the U.K. with testimony from survivors of Xinjiang’s concentration camps.
In Canada, a man killed a Muslim family of four in a horrific calculated hit-and-run, leading to Canadian Muslims demanding the government take concrete measures to tackle Islamophobic violence.
In France, President Emmanuel Macron’s government took a page from China’s book by implementing legislation aimed at constructing a state-approved Islam, resulting in widespread discrimination targeting Muslim civil society and curtailing the rights of French Muslims, especially women.
Similarly, the Austrian government took measures to intimidate and silence Austrian Muslim activists and organizations, even going so far as to publish a map detailing the locations of hundreds of mosques and associations. In the United Kingdom, the ruling Conservative party persisted in evading calls to address institutional Islamophobia within its ranks.
State hostility and prejudice towards Muslims was present across the European continent, with rulings aimed at restricting Muslim identity such as halal meat and hijab bans. In India, the country’s growing Hindu nationalist forces retained last year’s theme of conspiracy theories, claiming Indian Muslims were engaging in “love jihad,” “economic jihad,” and even “narcotics jihad.”
Additionally, there were large episodes of anti-Muslim violence in various parts of the country such as Tripura, Gurgaon, and Assam, all of which were supported by the rising Hindu nationalist voices. The year was also spent uncovering the role of social media platforms in larger campaigns of violence targeting Muslims as seen in India and Myanmar.
In the United States, the country marked twenty years since the deadly September 11th attacks and reckoned with the impacts and consequences of two decades of the War on Terror at home and abroad.
2021 demonstrated that Islamophobia remains a constant and growing threat around the globe. Anti-Muslim racism in 2021 remained ever present as hate crimes and individual attacks targeting Muslims persisted. Across the globe, the key players of anti-Muslim racism were again states themselves, as this year witnessed increasing discriminatory legislation and policies.
ARTICLES:
United States: With the inauguration of Joe Biden as the country’s 46th president, American Muslims welcomed the new administration and celebrated as Biden reversed Trump’s Muslim Ban. While applauding the measure, many noted that a reversal would not bring back the time and lives lost as a result of the previous discriminatory measure, and called on Biden to use this moment to tackle the presence of anti-Muslim racism in society, calling for accountability and justice.
India: Throughout 2021, Indian Muslims found themselves on the receiving end of countless mob attacks and state violence as Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government continued to embolden the country’s right-wing Hindu nationalist forces. Further, conspiracy theories constructing Indian Muslims as a threat to the Hindu majoritarian population gained credibility thanks to the rhetoric and actions of politicians and the government.
The right-ward shift in the subcontinent also led many commentators and experts in the region to fear that Modi’s rule was leading to a decay in the world’s largest democracy as journalists critical of the government were targeted and imprisoned and counter-terror legislation was used to silence critics. In a testament to increasing state hostility, even elite actors and actresses of India’s Bollywood were not immune to the Hindu nationalist government’s assault on free speech.
China: In 2021, the world heard more personal testimonies from Uyghurs who had survived China’s network of concentration camps as a growing international movement called on countries to boycott the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics. This year also involved Chinese authorities restructuring their targeting of Uyghurs, moving many prisoners to forced labor camps and institutionalizing discriminatory practices, such as removing domes from mosques, aimed at erasing Uyghur culture and identity.
Growing calls from activists and rights organizations for action from the international community also contributed to an unofficial tribunal held in the UK, which found that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is committing genocide, a conclusion made by a number of countries this year including the Canadian parliament, MPs in the UK, Dutch parliament, and the Lithuanian parliament.
China’s campaign targeting Uyghurs goes back decades and must be understood in the settler-colonial context of the region. However, following 9/11 and the introduction of the war on terror discourse, Chinese authorities adopted this rhetoric framing Uyghur Muslims as a security threat to the state and began slowly criminalizing various aspect of Uyghur culture and identity, all under the banner of tackling the “three evil forces” of separatism, extremism, and terrorism. The establishment of concentration camps, dubbed “re-education” centers by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), in 2017 and the projected growth of these fortresses of torture and psychological manipulation is just one aspect of China’s wider campaign in the occupied Uyghur homeland (which Chinese authorities refer to as Xinjiang).
In 2021, the world heard more harrowing stories from survivors of China’s crackdown in the region: a project involving torture, rape, detention, indoctrination, and psychological abuse.
Europe: In 2021, Islamophobia in Europe was further institutionalized within policies and programs that effectively criminalized Muslim civil society on the continent. In France, President Emmanuel Macron introduced the anti-Separatism law restricting the rights of French Muslim citizens and essentially forcing Muslims religious leader to take an oath of loyalty. Meanwhile in Switzerland, the government approved a ban on the burqa, adding to the growing number of countries that have restricted Muslim women’s right to religious freedom.
The trend on the continent has been to construct Europe’s Muslims as both a security and cultural threat, using arguments framed under counterterrorism and secularism to justify discriminatory and harmful rhetoric and practices that have severely curtailed the basic rights of Muslims.
In a review of 2021, Austrian academic and Bridge Senior Researcher Farid Hafez described the Europe’s right-ward shift as the continent entering an age of “McCarthyism against Islam,” with government policies framing Muslim citizenry as potential threats, suspicious, and ultimately untrustworthy. With the current status quo, it appears that “guilty until proven innocent increasingly becomes authorities’ approach to Muslims,” and Hafez demonstrated this by highlighting France, Austria, and Denmark’s collective approach to fighting “political Islam.”
In neighboring France, President Emmanuel Macron solidified his presidency as one marked by state-led Islamophobia, where under his leadership the government instituted measures that stigmatized and collectively punished France’s nearly 6 million Muslims. Much like Austria, Macron’s government hinged on the “political Islam” boogeyman to justify measures that not only severely curtailed the rights of Muslims but many argued also was an attack on French secularism. In late 2020, under the guise of fighting “political Islam,” Macron gave Muslim religious leaders an ultimatum, essentially forcing Imams to sign a charter or otherwise be considered a threat and enemy to the state. In March 2021, a coalition of civil society organizations urged the European Commission to investigate France at the European Court of Justice over the charter, saying that it “violates Muslims’ right to free speech and religious freedoms.”
In 2020, Macron also introduced the anti-separtism bill, which was approved by Members of Parliament in February 2021 and adopted by the National Assembly on July 23, 2021.
French legal scholar Rim-Sarah Alouane described the bill as an “attack” on civil liberties, stating, “I see a blatant attack on freedom of association. This bill has no safeguards of potential abuse from public authorities,” and further noted that “French Muslims are paying the price of the failure of the state to prevent terrorist attacks from happening.” Further the bill also included measures aimed at increasing restrictions on Muslim women’s ability to wear the hijab, with the argument of religious neutrality used to extend the hijab ban to private companies under contract with the state.
In January 2021, a coalition of thirty-six organizations from thirteen countries submitted a twenty-eight-page document to the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), calling on the international body to “open formal infringement procedures against France’s government for entrenching Islamophobia and structural discrimination against Muslims.” The organizations alleged that under Macron’s governance, France’s recent “actions and policies in relation to Muslim communities violated international and European laws.”
Many critics noted that these actions were being taken by the government to play on the ongoing culture wars, and to silence any group or individual who called out the government’s Islamophobia, by linking anyone on the left with “‘Islamism,’ the eternal bogeyman in French society.”
The measures aimed at dismantling French Muslim civil society remained in force as a French court confirmed the dissolution of the Collective Against Islamophobia in France (CCIF), a leading anti-discrimination group that tracked Islamophobia in the country. Adding to this, in 2021 the government shut down a Muslim publishing house. In October 2021, Interior Minister Gerard Darmanin announced the government would close 7 more mosques and associations in the country by the end of the year, and stated that since Macron had taken office, “some 13 associations have been closed along with 92 of the 2,500 mosques in the country.” Under the pretense of tackling “radicalization” and “political Islam,” the French government has taken measures to dismantle Muslim civil society and strike fear in the French Muslim community.
Experts, commentators, and writers all noted how the current political climate in France involved a surge in the far-right and an overall massive shift right-ward in the country. Given the upcoming 2022 presidential elections, it appears that candidates in the running to lead the country are attempting to outdo each other when it comes to blatant anti-Muslim bigotry.
In 2021, Europe continued on a right-ward path as anti-Muslim racism became the norm in media, politics, and society. While some political leaders dragged their feet in addressing the issue of Islamophobia, many others openly incorporated dangerous and discriminatory anti-Muslim rhetoric into their agenda.
Canada: In July of 2021, Mustafa Farooq of the National Council of Canadian Muslims (NCCM) made a chilling observation: “The reality is that Canada has suffered more mass killings motivated by Islamophobia in the last five years than any other country in the G7. This cannot be allowed to continue.” Farooq’s comments came a little over a month after a deadly targeted hit-and-run in London, Ontario that killed four members of a Canadian Muslim family, with the sole survivor being a 9-year-old boy. The incident sent shockwaves across the country, and Canadian Muslims called on the government to take greater action against rising anti-Muslim hatred in the country beginning with tackling bigoted rhetoric and support for discriminatory policies amongst those in power.
10 Conflicts to Watch in 2022
International Crisis Group, 29 December 2021
Troubling undercurrents in 2021 – from the U.S. to Afghanistan, Ethiopia or the climate emergency – didn’t send battle deaths soaring or set the world ablaze. But as our look ahead to 2022 shows, many bad situations round the world could easily get worse.
After a year that saw an assault on the U.S. Capitol, horrific bloodshed in Ethiopia, a Taliban triumph in Afghanistan, great-power showdowns over Ukraine and Taiwan amid dwindling U.S. ambition on the global stage, COVID-19, and a climate emergency, it’s easy to see a world careening off the tracks.
But maybe one could argue things are better than they seem.
After all, by some measures, war is in retreat. The number of people killed in fighting worldwide has mostly declined since 2014—if you count only those dying directly in combat. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, figures through the end of 2020 show battle deaths are down from seven years ago, mostly because Syria’s terrible slaughter has largely subsided.
The number of major wars has also descended from a recent peak. Despite Russian President Vladimir Putin menacing Ukraine, states rarely go to war with one another. More local conflicts rage than ever, but they tend to be of lower intensity. For the most part, 21st-century wars are less lethal than their 20th-century predecessors.
A more cautious United States might also have an upside. The 1990s bloodletting in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia; the post-9/11 Afghanistan and Iraq wars; Sri Lanka’s murderous campaign against the Tamils; and the collapse of Libya and South Sudan all happened at a time of—and, in some cases, thanks to—a dominant U.S.-led West. That recent U.S. presidents have refrained from toppling enemies by force is a good thing. Besides, one shouldn’t overstate Washington’s sway even in its post-Cold War heyday; absent an invasion, it has always struggled to bend recalcitrant leaders (former Sudanese leader Omar al-Bashir, for example) to its will.
Still, if these are silver linings, they’re awfully thin.
Battle deaths, after all, tell just a fraction of the story. Yemen’s conflict kills more people, mostly women and young children, due to starvation or preventable disease than violence. Millions of Ethiopians suffer acute food insecurity because of the country’s civil war. Fighting involving Islamists elsewhere in Africa often doesn’t entail thousands of deaths but drives millions of people from their homes and causes humanitarian devastation.
Afghanistan’s violence levels have sharply dropped since the Taliban seized power in August, but starvation, caused mostly by Western policies, could leave more Afghans dead—including millions of children—than past decades of fighting. Worldwide, the number of displaced people, most due to war, is at a record high. Battle deaths may be down, in other words, but suffering due to conflict is not.
Moreover, states compete fiercely even when they’re not fighting directly. They do battle with cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, election interference, economic coercion, and by instrumentalizing migrants. Major and regional powers vie for influence, often through local allies, in war zones. Proxy fighting has not so far sparked direct confrontation among meddling states. Indeed, some navigate the danger adeptly: Russia and Turkey maintain cordial relations despite backing competing sides in the Syrian and Libyan conflicts. Still, foreign involvement in conflicts creates the risk that local clashes light bigger fires.
Standoffs involving major powers look increasingly dangerous. Putin may gamble on another incursion into Ukraine. A China-U.S. clash over Taiwan is unlikely in 2022, but the Chinese and U.S. militaries increasingly bump up against each another around the island and in the South China Sea, with all the peril of entanglement that entails. If the Iran nuclear deal collapses, which now seems probable, the United States or Israel may attempt—possibly even early in 2022—to knock out Iranian nuclear facilities, likely prompting Tehran to sprint toward weaponization while lashing out across the region. One mishap or miscalculation, in other words, and interstate war could make a comeback.
And whatever one thinks of U.S. influence, its decline inevitably brings hazards, given that American might and alliances have structured global affairs for decades. No one should exaggerate the decay: U.S. forces are still deployed around the globe, NATO stands, and Washington’s recent Asia diplomacy shows it can still marshal coalitions like no other power. But with much in flux, Washington’s rivals are probing to see how far they can go.
Today’s most dangerous flash points—whether Ukraine, Taiwan, or confrontations with Iran—relate in some way to the world struggling for a new equilibrium. Dysfunction in the United States hardly helps. A delicate transition of global power requires cool heads and predictability—not fraught elections and policy seesawing from one administration to the next.
As for COVID-19, the pandemic has exacerbated the world’s worst humanitarian disasters and propelled the impoverishment, rising living costs, inequality, and joblessness that fuel popular anger. It had a hand this past year in a power grab in Tunisia, Sudan’s coup, and protests in Colombia. The economic hurt COVID-19 is unleashing could strain some countries to a breaking point. Although it’s a leap from discontent to protest, from protest to crisis, and from crisis to conflict, the pandemic’s worst symptoms may yet lie ahead.
So while today’s troubling undercurrents haven’t yet set battle deaths soaring or the world ablaze, things still look bad. As this year’s list shows all too starkly, they could easily get worse.
1. Ukraine
Whether Russia, which has been massing troops on the Ukrainian border, will again invade its neighbor remains unclear. But dismissing the menace as a bluff would be a mistake.
The Ukraine war began in 2014 when Putin, angered at what he saw as a Western-backed overthrow of a president friendly to Moscow, annexed Crimea and backed separatists in Ukraine’s eastern Donbass region. Facing a military rout, Ukraine signed two peace accords, the Minsk agreements, largely on Russia’s terms. Since then, separatists have held two breakaway areas in the Donbass.
What was for several years a simmering conflict heated up in 2021. A truce agreed to by Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who came to power in 2019 promising to make peace, fell apart. In the spring of 2021, Putin amassed more than 100,000 troops near the border, only to withdraw many of them weeks later after a meeting with U.S. President Joe Biden. Since November, he’s built up similar numbers.
Russia’s grievances are clear enough. Moscow is upset at Ukraine’s lack of follow-through with the Minsk agreements, particularly its denial of “special status” to the breakaway regions—which entails autonomy and, as Moscow defines it, a say in foreign policy.
Putin, angry at what Moscow sees as decades of Western encroachment, has drawn a new red line on NATO, rejecting not only the idea that Ukraine would join the alliance, which (in reality) won’t take place any time soon, but also growing military collaboration among Kyiv and NATO members, which is already happening. Russia proposes a new European order that would prevent NATO’s further enlargement east and curb its military deployments and activities.
Russia may intend for the buildup to force concessions. But given Putin’s track record and underestimation of the hostility Moscow inspires among Ukrainians outside separatist-held areas, no one should rule out another military adventure. If Russia plans to fight, its options vary from limited support of separatists to a full-scale assault.
Western powers, which too often have relied on bluster packaged as strategic ambiguity, need to clarify what they would do to support Ukraine, relay that to Moscow, and hold fast to red lines. Biden, who will meet Putin one-on-one in early January, has made a start by threatening damaging sanctions and a larger military buildup on NATO’s eastern flank. Western leaders might also warn of reactions they don’t intend but might struggle to control, perhaps including NATO members deploying more personnel to Ukraine itself, with all the attendant risks.
But deterrence will be short lived without efforts to de-escalate and lay the groundwork for more sustainable settlements in Ukraine and beyond. Choreographed de-escalation could involve Moscow pulling back forces, both sides limiting military exercises in the Black and Baltic Seas, a return to Minsk agreement negotiations, and talks on European security—even if the one-sided arrangement Russia proposes is out of the question.
In reality, no one will get what they want from the standoff. Kyiv may not like the Minsk agreements, but it signed them, and they remain the internationally accepted way out of the crisis. Putin hopes for a pliant neighbor in Ukraine, but that’s a pipe dream—unless he’s ready for a painful and costly occupation. Europe and the United States can neither deter without some risk of escalation nor resolve the Ukraine crisis without grappling with broader European security. As for Biden, he may want to focus on China but can’t relegate Russia to the back burner.
2. Ethiopia
Two years ago, Ethiopia was a good news story. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed appeared to be turning the page on decades of repressive rule. Instead, more than a year of fighting between Abiy’s federal army and forces from the northern Tigray region has torn the country apart. A small window may have just opened up to bring the war to a close.
Battlefield dynamics have fluctuated dramatically. Abiy first ordered federal troops into Tigray in November 2020 following a deadly attack on a military garrison there by loyalists of the region’s ruling party, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Federal forces, supported by troops from enemy-turned-friend Eritrea, quickly advanced alongside forces from Ethiopia’s Amhara region, which borders Tigray, installing an interim administration in the Tigrayan capital, Mekele, in December 2020.
Over subsequent months, TPLF leaders regrouped in the countryside, mobilizing Tigrayans livid at massacres, rapes, and havoc wreaked by federal and Eritrean troops. In a startling reversal, the rebels drove their enemies out of most of Tigray at the end of June before marching south. They then formed an alliance with an insurgent group in Ethiopia’s populous, central Oromia region. An assault on the capital, Addis Ababa, appeared in the offing. Mid-November, however, brought another about-face. A counteroffensive by federal troops and allied militia forced Tigray forces to withdraw back to their home region.
But if federal forces, for now, are ascendant, both sides command strong support and could drum up more recruits. Neither is likely to deliver a mortal blow.
Brutal fighting has embittered an already acrimonious dispute. Abiy casts the war as a battle for the Ethiopian state’s survival. Many Ethiopians outside Tigray revile the TPLF, which dominated a repressive regime that ruled Ethiopia for decades before Abiy’s election.
Abiy paints TPLF leaders as power-hungry spoilers, bent on trashing his modernized vision for the country. In contrast, Tigrayan leaders said their initial attack that triggered the war preempted a campaign to subjugate Tigray by Abiy and the TPLF’s old foe, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, with whom Abiy signed a 2018 peace deal. They see Abiy’s reforms as an attempt to water down Ethiopian regions’ rights to self-rule.
More war would spell more disaster. Fighting has already killed tens of thousands of people and uprooted millions of Ethiopians from their homes. All sides stand accused of atrocities. Much of Tigray, denied aid by federal authorities, is nearing famine. The wounds the bloodletting has left on Ethiopia’s social fabric will be hard to heal. Neighbors beyond Eritrea could get pulled in. Sudan, another good news story that turned sour in 2021 when its generals grabbed power, has its own disputes with Ethiopia over territory in the fertile borderlands of al-Fashqa and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile, where Addis Ababa has started to fill the reservoir. With Ethiopia in turmoil, Sudan—along with Egypt—could see a moment to press its advantage.
Recent battlefield developments may have opened a small window. Tigrayan leaders have dropped a key condition for talks, namely that Amhara forces leave disputed areas they seized in western Tigray. In late December, federal authorities announced they would not advance further to try and vanquish Tigrayan forces. Diplomats should now push for a truce to get humanitarian aid into Tigray and explore whether compromise might be feasible. Without that, bloodshed and hunger will continue, with terrible consequences for Ethiopians and, potentially, the region.
3. Afghanistan
If 2021 brought one chapter of Afghanistan’s decades long tragedy to a close, another is starting. Since the Taliban’s seizure of power in August, a humanitarian catastrophe has loomed. U.N. data suggests millions of Afghan children could starve. Western leaders shoulder much of the blame.
The Taliban’s win was swift but long in the making. For years, and especially since early 2020, when Washington signed a deal with the Taliban pledging to withdraw U.S. forces, insurgents advanced through the countryside, encircling provincial and district centers. In the Spring and Summer of 2021, they began seizing towns and cities, often persuading Afghan army commanders demoralized by the impending end of Western support to surrender. The government collapsed in mid-August, and the Taliban entered Kabul mostly without a fight. It was a stunning end to a political order Western powers had spent two decades helping to build.
The world responded to the Taliban’s takeover by freezing Afghan state assets, halting budgetary aid, and offering only limited sanctions relief for humanitarian purposes. (The Taliban are sanctioned by the United Nations and Western governments.)
The new government can’t pay civil servants. The economy has tanked. The financial sector is paralyzed. All this comes on top of a punishing drought. Although overall violence levels are significantly down from a year ago, the Taliban face a vicious fight against the Islamic State’s local branch.
The new regime has done little to endear itself to donors. Its interim cabinet includes almost exclusively Taliban figures, no women, and mostly ethnic Pashtuns. Early Taliban decisions, notably closing girls’ schools in many provinces, sparked international outrage (some have since reopened). Reports have emerged of extrajudicial killings of former soldiers and police.
Still, Western decision-makers bear the lion’s share of responsibility for Afghans’ plight. The sudden cutoff of funds to an entirely aid-dependent state has been devastating. The United Nations estimates 23 million people, more than half the population, will suffer from hunger this winter. Humanitarian support alone can’t stave off disaster. Donors are squandering genuine gains their funds helped deliver over the past two decades, notably in health and education.
There is another way. International financial institutions, having released a small part of the almost $2 billion earmarked for Afghanistan, should disperse the rest. The United Nations and United States, which have now lifted some sanctions to allow in humanitarian aid, should go further by easing restrictions to permit regular economic activity. Biden should release Afghanistan’s frozen assets, with an initial tranche to test the waters.
If the White House, loath to underwrite Taliban rule, won’t take that step, internationally supervised currency swaps could infuse dollars into the economy. Propping up health care, the education system, food provision, and other basic services should be priorities—even if this requires Western policymakers to work through Taliban ministries.
The alternative is to let Afghans die, including millions of children. Of all the blunders the West has made in Afghanistan, this one would leave the ugliest stain.
4. The United States and China
Shortly after pulling out of Afghanistan, the United States announced a new pact with Australia and the United Kingdom to counter China. Known as AUKUS, the deal will help Canberra acquire nuclear-powered submarines. It was a stark illustration of Washington’s aspirations to move from combating Islamist militants to major power politics and deterring Beijing.
In Washington, one of the few views shared across the aisle is that China is an adversary the United States is inexorably at loggerheads with. U.S. leaders see past decades of engaging China as enabling the rise of a rival that exploits international bodies and rules to its own ends, repressing opposition in Hong Kong, behaving atrociously in Xinjiang, and bullying its Asian neighbors. Competition with China is becoming an ordering principle of U.S. policy.
Biden’s China strategy, while not precisely articulated, entails keeping the United States the dominant power in the Indo-Pacific, where Beijing’s military capacity has ballooned. Biden appears to see the costs of Chinese regional primacy as graver than the risk of confrontation. Concretely, that meant shoring up U.S. alliances and partnerships in Asia as well as elevating the importance of Taiwan’s security to U.S. interests. Top officials also make stronger statements backing Southeast Asian countries’ maritime claims in the South China Sea.
Beijing sees things differently. Chinese leaders, having hoped at first for improved ties with Washington under Biden, now worry more about him than they did about former U.S. President Donald Trump, a leader they hoped was an anomaly. They express disappointment at Biden’s decision not to roll back trade tariffs or sanctions as well as his efforts to mobilize other countries. They recoil at rhetoric about democracy and human rights, which they view as ideological bombast that implicitly calls their government’s legitimacy into question.
In essence, Beijing wants a sphere of influence in which its neighbors are sovereign but deferential. It views dominance of the first island chain—which stretches from the Kuril Islands, past Taiwan, and into the South China Sea—as vital to its growth, security, and ambition to be a world naval power.
Over the past year, while not disavowing its official “peaceful reunification” policy, Beijing escalated military activity near Taiwan, flying record numbers of jets and bombers as well as conducting drills near the island. Beijing’s growing military clout and assertiveness have provoked more dire assessments in Washington about the threat of a Chinese assault on Taiwan.
A virtual meeting in November between Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping took some of the edge off the frosty rhetoric of previous months. It could yield more working-level engagement, including the resumption of defense dialogues. In 2022, with the Beijing Winter Olympics, the 20th Party Congress, and U.S. midterm congressional elections, both sides likely want quiet fronts abroad, even if they rattle sabers for audiences at home. The nightmare scenario—a Chinese attempt to seize Taiwan, potentially forcing the United States to come to Taipei’s defense—is unlikely for now.
Still, the two giants’ rivalry casts a long shadow over world affairs and heightens dangers across flash points in East Asia. Beijing sees scant benefits in cooperating on issues like climate change when Washington frames the relationship as competitive. Along the first island chain, things are particularly frightening. Warplanes flying close to one another near Taiwan, for example, or warships crossing paths in the South China Sea are more common. A mishap would ratchet up tensions.
When U.S. and Chinese planes collided in 2001 during a period of reasonable calm between Beijing and Washington, it took months of intense diplomacy to resolve the spat. Today, it would be harder—and the danger of escalation greater.
5. Iran vs. the United States and Israel
The nail-biting brinkmanship between Tehran and Washington instigated under Trump may be over. But as hope of reviving the Iran nuclear deal fades, another escalation looms.
Biden took office pledging to rejoin the nuclear deal. His predecessor had unilaterally withdrawn Washington in 2018, reimposing sanctions on Iran—which, in turn, stepped up its nuclear development and power projection across the Middle East. The Biden administration lost time posturing about who should make the first move and refusing substantive goodwill gestures. Still, for a few months, talks made some progress.
Then, in June, Ebrahim Raisi won Iran’s presidential election, giving hard-liners control of all the Islamic Republic’s key power centers. After a five-month hiatus, Iran returned to the table, driving a harder bargain. At the same time, it is accelerating nuclear development. When the deal took effect six years ago, Iran’s breakout time—the time it would take to enrich enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon—was around 12 months. It’s now estimated at three to six weeks and shrinking.
Although Tehran hasn’t unilaterally pulled out of the deal like Trump did, it’s still playing with fire. Failure to restore the deal in the months ahead would likely make the original agreement moot, given Iran’s technological advances. There are options: Diplomats could pursue a more comprehensive deal, though that would be a hard slog given the bad blood the original deal’s demise would entail, or they could seek an interim “less-for-less” arrangement that caps Iran’s continued nuclear progress for limited sanctions relief. But a collapse of negotiations is a real possibility.
That would be a disaster. Iran’s nuclear program would continue unhindered. For Washington, accepting Iran as a threshold nuclear state—one able to build a bomb even if not yet having done so—will likely prove to be too bitter a pill to swallow. The alternative would be to approve or join Israeli strikes aimed at setting back Tehran’s nuclear capability.
If that happened, Iran’s leaders—whose calculations are likely informed by the toppling of former Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi, who forfeited his nuclear weapons program, and the respect Trump showed toward nuclear-armed North Korea—may well sprint toward weaponization.
Tehran would also likely lash out across the Middle East. Nascent efforts at de-escalation between Iran and Persian Gulf monarchies may help lower risks, but Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria would all be in the crossfire. Incidents could heighten the danger of direct confrontation between Iran and the United States, Israel, or the two allies together, which the parties have thus far avoided despite provocations. Such clashes could easily spin out of control on the ground, at sea, in cyberspace, or through covert operations.
Talks fizzling could, in other words, combine all the dangers from the period before the 2015 deal with the worst worries of the Trump years.
6. Yemen
Yemen’s war faded from headlines in 2021 but remains devastating and could be poised to get worse.
Houthi rebels have encircled and advanced into the oil- and gas-rich governorate of Marib. Long underrated as a military force, the rebels appear to be running an agile and evolving multifront campaign, pairing offensives with outreach to soften local tribal leaders’ resistance. They now control Al-Bayda, a governorate neighboring Marib, and have made inroads into Shabwa, farther east, thus cutting off supply lines to Marib. Of Marib governorate itself, only the main city and hydrocarbon facilities nearby remain in the hands of President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi’s internationally recognized government.
Should those sites fall, it would mark a sea change in the war. The Houthis would score an economic as well as a military victory. With Marib’s oil and gas, the Houthis will be able to bring down fuel and electricity prices in areas under their control, thus bolstering their image as a governing authority deserving of international legitimacy. The loss of Marib, the Hadi government’s last bastion in the north, would likely herald the president’s political demise.
Some nominally Hadi-aligned Yemenis already mutter about replacing him with a presidential council. That would further undercut the government’s international status, likely reinforcing the Houthis’ resistance to peace talks.
Anyone hoping that a Houthi win would presage the war’s end is banking on an illusion. In southern Yemen, anti-Houthi factions outside Hadi’s coalition—namely southern separatists backed by the United Arab Emirates and a faction led by Tareq Saleh, nephew of Yemen’s late long-serving leader—would battle on. The Houthis, who see the war as pitting their nationalist forces against neighboring Saudi Arabia—which backs Hadi with air power—would likely continue cross-border attacks.
The United Nations’ new envoy for Yemen, Hans Grundberg, who assumed his role at the helm of international peacemaking efforts last September, needs to do two things at once. First, he should seek to avert a battle for Marib city by hearing out, without necessarily accepting, Houthi proposals and pushing for a government counteroffer that reflects the reality of today’s power balance. The U.N. also needs a new peacemaking approach that goes beyond two-party talks between the Houthis, on the one hand, and the Hadi government and its Saudi backers, on the other. Yemen’s war is a multiparty conflict, not a binary power struggle; any hope of reaching a genuine settlement requires more seats at the table.
7. Israel-Palestine
This past year saw the fourth and most destructive Gaza-Israel war in just over a decade, illustrating again that the peace process is dead and a two-state solution looks less likely than ever.
The trigger for this latest outbreak was occupied East Jerusalem. The threatened eviction of Palestinian residents of the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood coincided in April 2021 with clashes during Ramadan between stone-throwing youth and Israeli police using lethal force on the compound that comprises the Haram al-Sharif, holy to Muslims, and the Temple Mount, holy to Jews.
That set off a chain reaction. Hamas, which controls Gaza, fired long-distance rockets indiscriminately into Israel. Israel responded with a harsh aerial assault, sparking an 11-day conflict that killed more than 250 people, almost all Palestinians, and left in ruins what remained of Gaza’s civilian infrastructure. West Bank Palestinians demonstrating in solidarity were met with the Israeli army’s live fire. In Israeli cities, Palestinian citizens took to the streets, sometimes clashing with West Bank settlers and other right-wing Jews, often supported by Israeli police.
While hostilities were all too familiar, this bout brought new elements. Palestinians, for the first time in decades, transcended their fragmentation by joining voices across the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza, and Israel itself. Also striking was debate in Western capitals, Washington especially. Democrats, including mainstream figures, used unusually stern language about Israel’s bombardment, suggesting that, among the party, views of the conflict are evolving.
Still, fundamentals remain unchanged. Though Israelis were apparently taken aback by the intensity of Hamas’s rocket fire, the war provoked no rethink of Israel’s Gaza policy—economic strangulation to weaken Hamas and divide Palestinians; “mowing the grass” every few years to stifle attacks—or its general treatment of Palestinians. Abroad, most capitals wrung their hands but did little. The Biden administration, despite Democrats’ new tone, claimed to conduct “quiet, intensive diplomacy” but more or less allowed the conflict to run its course.
Nor have the months since brought hope. A hodgepodge coalition ousted Israel’s longest-serving prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, in June. After Netanyahu’s belligerence, the new government put a softer face on Israel’s foreign relations and declared its hope to “shrink” the conflict by improving the occupied territories’ economies and marginally strengthening the Palestinian Authority, which partly rules the West Bank. Yet it continues to expand illegal settlements and repress Palestinians much as its predecessors did. In October, it outlawed six respected Palestinian civil society groups on specious terrorism charges.
For anyone still eager to renew negotiations, the last year was cause for despair. The center of gravity in Israeli politics has long since shifted away from peace, as successive governments have abandoned talks in all but name. Most Palestinians have lost faith they will win statehood through negotiations.
There are ways to buy quiet: a longer-term truce and opening up of Gaza; ending expulsions of Palestinians in East Jerusalem; returning to preexisting arrangements that kept the holy sites reasonably calm.
But those can only stave off the next war for so long. Diplomats’ lip service to a two-state solution that is all but out of reach gives cover for Israel to advance de facto annexation of the West Bank. Better now would be to try to end Israeli impunity for violations of Palestinian rights. It’s time, in other words, to address the situation on the ground as it is.
8. Haiti
The Caribbean nation has long been tormented by political crises, gang warfare, and natural disasters. Nevertheless, this past year stands out for many Haitians as particularly bleak. Few expect a brighter 2022.
In July, hit men assassinated President Jovenel Moïse in his home; his security detail apparently did nothing about it. Shellshocked elites squabbled over who would run the country. (Succession lines were muddled as Moïse had appointed Ariel Henry as his new prime minister but Henry had not yet been sworn in.) Henry eventually became the country’s interim leader but has struggled to assert authority.
An earthquake in August destroyed much of southern Haiti. Rampant kidnappings by gangs that lord over much of the capital of Port-au-Prince have hampered international relief efforts. Criminals’ seizure of oil terminals brought the country to a standstill in early November. Haiti, meanwhile, lags behind the rest of the Americas in distributing COVID-19 vaccines. Increasing numbers of Haitians are seeking better prospects abroad; many new departures—and indeed many Haitians who left the island some time ago—are camped out along the southern U.S. border.
As for the post-Moïse transition, two factions propose competing plans. Henry and several parties have inked a deal allowing him to rule until elections in 2022. In contrast, the Commission for a Haitian Solution to the Crisis, an umbrella group of civil society organizations and political parties, insists the country’s wounds cut so deep that only root-and-branch reform can stanch the bleeding. They want a two-year transition, with a council more representative of society holding power until new polls. With the constitution largely a dead letter (postponed elections mean two-thirds of Senate seats are empty) and responsibility for Moïse’s killing unclear, Haiti’s immediate stability requires reconciling these two options.
Gangs also have political clout. Jimmy “Barbecue” Chérizier, a former police officer who is capo of the so-called G9 criminal alliance that seized the oil terminals, has demanded that Henry resign. Police corruption, an enfeebled judicial system, and the hemisphere’s highest poverty rates provide ideal conditions for gangs to recruit and expand. Chérizier himself combines brute force with politicking designed to appeal to impoverished, unemployed young men.
Many Haitians bristle at the idea of a new U.N. peacekeeping mission, let alone U.S. military intervention, but without some overseas help it is hard to see Haiti escaping its predicament. Donors supporting a specialized joint Haitian-U.N. office tasked with prosecuting top officials, police, and judges accused of serious crimes could help reduce violence and sever ties between criminals and politicians.
The first priority, though, is for Haitians to agree on a new transition plan. Without it, they will face another year of gridlock, crime, and unrest as more depart in search of better lives elsewhere.
9. Myanmar
Since the February 2021 coup, a crackdown by the country’s military (known as the Tatmadaw) on mostly peaceful protests has fueled broad-based resistance, ranging from civil disobedience to armed clashes with security forces. A deadly stalemate exacts a terrible human toll.
If the generals hoped to reboot Myanmar’s politics, they miscalculated. Piqued at Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy’s landslide win in the November 2020 elections, military leaders called the vote rigged and detained civilian politicians. Their plans for new elections seemingly aimed to install friendlier faces to power. Instead, mass protests against military involvement in politics rocked towns and cities. A crackdown resulting in hundreds of deaths fueled fiercer resistance.
Since then, deposed lawmakers set up their own National Unity Government (NUG) and in September called for revolt against the regime. While the NUG is still developing its own military capability, resistance forces, many of which support the NUG but are mostly not under its direct control, stage attacks daily, ambushing military convoys, bombing regime-linked targets, and assassinating local officials, suspected informants, and others they see as junta loyalists.
Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups, some of which comprise tens of thousands of fighters and control vast upland areas, have themselves adapted. Some have remained aloof; others, responding to constituents’ anger at the coup, have resumed fighting the Tatmadaw. Some shelter dissidents, provide them military training, and are negotiating with the NUG. For its part, the NUG has sought to win over armed groups, including by promising a federal system for Myanmar.
Majority views about ethnic minorities are also changing: Long blamed for Myanmar’s problems, minorities’ demands for a fairer share of power today enjoy more support. While a united front against the regime is unlikely, given rebels’ historical rivalries, significant political and military cooperation is taking place.
For its part, the Tatmadaw has doubled down. It detains, sometimes executes, and routinely tortures opponents, often abducting kin as hostages. Battalions have crushed urban dissent, using tactics that aim to kill as many people as possible. (A U.N.-backed investigation’s preliminary analysis suggests crimes against humanity.)
In rural areas, the army fights new resistance groups with old counterinsurgency methods, namely its “four cuts” strategy, aimed at denying rebels food, funds, intelligence, and recruits. It targets civilians; in the latest of many reported incidents, credible accounts suggest that at the end of December the military massacred dozens of civilians fleeing violence in eastern Myanmar. The regime has also attempted to persuade armed groups from entering formal alliances with the NUG, in some cases keeping groups—including the Arakan Army, with which it fought a brutal war in 2019-2020—off the battlefield.
Having locked up their rivals—Aung San Suu Kyi has already been sentenced to two years’ imprisonment and could end up locked up for life—the generals are moving to amend electoral rules in their favor and hold a vote in 2023. However, any poll that would usher in a military-backed government would be seen as a farce.
The standoff’s human cost is devastating. Myanmar’s economy is freefalling, the national currency has crashed, health and education systems have crumbled, poverty rates are estimated to have doubled since 2019, and half of all households cannot afford enough food. Myanmar’s generals, convinced of their role at the country’s helm, are steering it off a cliff.
For the most part, the world is losing interest. While outside actors have little influence on the Tatmadaw, it is critical that they keep trying to get aid in without empowering the regime. They can also usefully throw greater weight behind the diplomatic efforts of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which have so far been mostly dysfunctional, and the new U.N. special envoy. Beyond the human toll, a collapsed state in the heart of the strategically vital Indo-Pacific region serves no one’s interests.
10. Islamist militancy in Africa
Since 2017, when the Islamic State lost its so-called caliphate in the Middle East, Africa has suffered some of the world’s most ferocious battles between states and jihadis. Islamist militancy on the continent is nothing new, but revolts linked to the Islamic State and al Qaeda have surged in recent years.
Weak states struggle against nimble militant factions across vast hinterlands where central governments hold little sway. Parts of the Sahel have seen spiraling bloodshed, mostly due to fighting involving jihadis, whose reach has extended from northern Mali to the country’s center, into Niger, and across rural Burkina Faso.
Boko Haram’s insurgency has lost the swaths of northeastern Nigeria it controlled some years ago, and the movement has fractured. But splinter groups still wreak tremendous harm around Lake Chad. In East Africa, al-Shabab, the continent’s oldest-surviving Islamist rebellion, remains a potent force, despite more than 15 years of efforts to defeat it. The group holds large parts of Somalia’s rural south, operates shadow courts and extorts taxes beyond those areas, and occasionally mounts attacks in neighboring countries.
Africa’s newest jihadi fronts—in northern Mozambique and eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo—are also troubling. Insurgents who claim a new Islamic State province in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado region have stepped up attacks on security forces and civilians. Nearly a million people have fled the fighting. Militants have loose ties to Islamic State networks that stretch both up the continent’s east coast and into Congo’s war-torn east. There, another Islamist rebel group—a faction of the Allied Democratic Forces, a Ugandan militia that has long operated in Congo—now declares itself an Islamic State affiliate. It launched attacks in the Ugandan capital of Kampala last November.
Mozambique’s government, which long resisted outside involvement in Cabo Delgado, finally agreed last year to let in Rwandan troops and units from the Southern African Development Community (SADC), a regional bloc. Those forces have reversed insurgent gains, though militants appear to be regrouping. Rwandan and SADC forces risk a protracted war.
In Somalia and the Sahel, Western impatience could be decisive. Foreign forces—the EU-funded African Union Mission in Somalia, or AMISOM, and French and other European forces in the Sahel—help keep jihadis at bay. Yet military operations often alienate locals and further erode relations between them and state authorities.
There’s little to show for years of foreign efforts to build up indigenous armies. Malian colonels have seized power in Bamako twice in the space of just over a year, while the regional G5 Sahel force, comprising troops from Mali and its neighbors, also struggles against jihadis. (Chad recently pulled out some of its troops from the force, fearing upheaval at home.) As for the Somali security forces, units, caught up in political bickering, often shoot at each other.
If foreign efforts wind down, battlefield dynamics would undoubtedly shift, perhaps decisively, in the militants’ favor. In Somalia, al-Shabab could seize power in Mogadishu much as the Taliban did in Kabul. Intervening foreign powers are caught as they were in Afghanistan: unable to achieve their goals but fearful of what will follow if they exit. For now, they appear set to stay.
Even so, a rethink in both places—entailing a greater civilian role alongside military campaigns—is overdue. The Sahel governments need to improve their relations with citizens in the countryside. Somalia needs to repair relations among elites; late December saw another eruption in a drawn-out election feud. More controversial is talking to jihadis. It won’t be easy: Somalia’s neighbors, which contribute troops to AMISOM, oppose any engagement; and while Sahel governments have been more open, France rejects negotiations. No one knows whether compromise with militants is feasible, what it would entail, or how populations would view it.
But the military-centric approach has mostly spawned more violence. If foreign powers don’t want the same dilemma haunting them in a decade’s time, they need to prepare the ground for talks with militant leaders.
Originally published in Foreign Policy: 10 Conflicts to Watch in 2022.
Authors:
Comfort Ero,Crisis Group President & CEO
Richard Atwood,Crisis Group Executive Vice President
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