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SALW-related assistance to states in sub-Saharan Africa: Hitting the target or missing the mark?
SALW-related assistance to states in sub-Saharan Africa: Hitting the target or missing the mark?
STOCKHOLM - The cost of poorly designed or weakly enforced controls on small arms and light weapons (SALW) on crime, conflict and development in sub-Saharan Africa is well documented. Through efforts like the African Union’s Silencing the Guns initiative, African states continue to focus international attention on addressing these challenges. In August 2021 Sierra Leone used its chairmanship of the seventh conference of states parties to the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) to highlight efforts to eradicate the illicit trade in SALW through improved stockpile management. In October 2021 Kenya used its one-month United Nations Security Council presidency to organize a thematic discussion on illicit SALW proliferation and the threats posed to peacekeeping operations.
A wide range of programmes have been established to provide states in sub-Saharan Africa with technical, financial and material assistance to strengthen controls on the production, trade and ownership of SALW. Mechanisms exist via the UN Programme of Action on SALW (UNPOA), the ATT and the 2001 UN Firearms Protocol for states to request and receive assistance. Nonetheless, ensuring that assistance programmes effectively address states’ needs has long proved challenging.
Since 2015 SIPRI has maintained the Mapping ATT-relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities database to map assistance provided to states in SALW and arms transfer controls. In 2021 the database was updated to provide a timelier and more accurate picture of assistance in SALW controls provided to states in sub-Saharan Africa. In connection with this update, this SIPRI Topical Backgrounder seeks to assess the extent to which this assistance is effectively addressing the needs and priorities of states in the region. To do this, it compares the types of assistance that states have requested via their reports on the implementation of the UNPOA with the information collected in the SIPRI database on the types of assistance provided.
The picture that emerges indicates that effectively matching offers and requests for assistance in the field of SALW controls continues to be a challenge. In key areas, the types of SALW control-related assistance offered to states in sub-Saharan Africa do not appear to address the needs and priorities of national governments. More generally, the systems through which states can request such assistance are not operating effectively. Based on this overview, this Topical Backgrounder presents recommendations for both future research and steps that could be taken by states, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international organizations to improve the coordination and effectiveness of SALW-related assistance efforts in sub-Saharan Africa.
Mapping requests for assistance in SALW controls in sub-Saharan Africa
The UNPOA outlines steps that should be taken at the international, regional and national level to counter the illicit trade in SALW ‘in all its aspects’. Since its adoption in 2001, states have stressed the necessity for international assistance aimed at helping states to implement its provisions. To facilitate this process, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) created a template for states to use when reporting on their implementation of the UNPOA that allows them to request assistance.
Requests are categorised according to the eight main provisions of the UNPOA—manufacturing, transfer, brokering, stockpile management, destruction, seizure, record keeping and tracing—as well as ten additional categories that touch on broader issues of state capacity-building.
States can also indicate whether they have developed a proposal for a specific project activity. In 2012 UNODA tried to match assistance needs and resources by circulating project proposals based on UNPOA national reports. Although UNODA did not maintain this effort, it continues to present information that states report on assistance requested, offered, and delivered in a searchable database.
The UNPOA shows the same inconsistent levels of participation that characterize most reporting instruments in the field of arms transfers and SALW controls. However, recent years have seen an upwards trend in reporting levels among states in sub-Saharan Africa and globally, both of which peaked in 2018. From 2011 until 2021, 35 states in sub-Saharan Africa submitted 99 national reports using the reporting template, which constitutes 40 per cent of the reports due over that period.
Regional differences are significant: only 16 per cent of due national reports are available from Central Africa compared to 51 per cent for West Africa (see figure 1). Some countries such as Burkina Faso and Namibia have submitted a report in each cycle, while others such as Chad and Cameroon have not submitted any reports. Several countries including Cabo Verde, the Comoros, Lesotho and Mauritania have only reported once.
Requests for assistance have remained persistently high over time and across sub-regions. In more than 70 per cent of reports, states requested assistance in some or all of the eight main categories during each reporting cycle (see figure 2). The rate of requests in the additional categories was much lower, largely between 10 per cent and 20 per cent. The degree to which states have provided details on the assistance they require differs considerably.
Besides a yes or no question on whether the state wants to request a specific type of assistance, the reporting template allows states to provide details about the assistance required. While this option has been widely used, oftentimes the details merely state the type of assistance such as technical, financial, material, legislative, or logistical without any further descriptions. Since 2012, only 45 per cent of requests provided details beyond the type of assistance. This is despite experts noting that donors and implementers are less likely to respond to assistance requests that lack details or are seen as low quality.
Since the UNODA reporting template has not changed significantly, the 99 reports that used the reporting template offer consistent, comparable and publicly available data on states’ identified needs in the field of SALW assistance. However, underreporting, differences in the quality of reports, and the lack of detailed information on the specific areas where states are requesting assistance limit the conclusions drawn from this analysis.
Moreover, studies have noted that states with the least capacity for SALW control are likely to have less capacity for compiling national reports which mean that the data presented are likely to underrepresent the actual assistance needs.
There are considerable regional differences in reported assistance needs. For instance, while states from Southern Africa requested assistance with ‘seizure’ in only 43 per cent of cases, states from all other regions did so more than 80 per cent of the time (see figure 2). Similarly, states from Western Africa included requests for assistance in developing controls on ‘manufacturing’ in 83 per cent of reports and developing controls on ‘transfers’ in 88 per cent of reports.
States from Southern Africa did so in 30 per cent and 48 per cent of reports. These differences might reflect the particular challenges in each sub-region but they could also be influenced by the work of different regional organizations—such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)—in helping to coordinate assistance requests. Some differences are also the result of unequal submission rates of reports skewing the statistic.
For instance, in Central Africa, the Central African Republic, Congo, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) were the only states that submitted any reports. Thus, it is unclear, for instance, whether a request rate of 100 per cent for ‘manufacturing’ in Central Africa is representative. In contrast, the higher rates of reporting in East Africa and especially Western Africa give a better picture for both regions.
Other mechanisms for matching offers and requests for assistance
The range of issues covered by the UNPOA, and hence, the range of areas covered by requests for assistance overlaps with other international instruments in the field of SALW controls and arms transfer controls which have also created mechanisms for reporting offers and requests for assistance. Instruments that also include mechanisms for requesting and receiving assistance in areas covered by the UNPOA include the Firearms Protocol and the ATT.
As part of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) review process established in 2018, the self-assessment questionnaire of the Firearms Protocol includes requests for international assistance. In contrast to the UNPOA, where all national reports are published, states can decide whether or not to make their self-assessments publicly available. ATT states parties must submit an initial report on the status of their national transfer control system which can provide information on possible gaps where assistance might be needed. The most recent version of the initial report template, adopted in 2021, will allow states parties to articulate more precisely what kind of assistance they can provide or require. Among the 28 sub-Saharan African ATT states parties, only 13 have submitted an initial report and only six are publicly available.
States can and do request assistance through a range of other channels, of which national reports are only one. ATT states parties can directly request assistance to the ATT Voluntary Trust Fund (ATT VTF). Since 2017, 20 sub-Saharan Africa states parties benefited from the ATT VTF in a range of areas including assistance on transfers, record-keeping, stockpile management, marking, or customs enforcement. Implementing organizations can directly or on behalf of states submit project proposals to dedicated funding mechanisms such as the UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR). Relevant assistance can now be provided through the newly established Saving-Lives Entity (SALIENT) fund. In 2013–19 sub-Saharan Africa was the region where the highest number of UNSCAR projects (44) were implemented. Pilot activities funded by SALIENT were implemented in Cameroon and South Sudan. These multiple channels give states a variety of possibilities to request SALW assistance. However, they also create the potential to create duplication and missed opportunities, with different providers and recipients of assistance focusing their attention on different instruments.
Mapping the provision of assistance in SALW controls in sub-Saharan Africa
SIPRI’s Mapping ATT-relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities database provides an additional and publicly available source to identify assistance in the fields of both SALW and arms transfer controls that have involved sub-Saharan African states. Although the database is not comprehensive, it represents a useful and unique tool for understanding the overall content, type and focus of assistance activities that have taken place. Therefore, it is a useful source to compare with information that states in the region have submitted through their reports to the instruments outlined above.
As of 8 December 2021, the database includes 876 assistance activities implemented from 2012 onwards of which 386 involved states in sub-Saharan Africa and focused on SALW controls. A significant proportion of entries included a thematic focus on inventory and stockpile management (157), followed by ammunition (99), tracing (89), and marking (75). Most of these activities included an institutional capacity-building component (236) or were partly or fully aiming at sensitizing the recipient countries on specific topics (164) or providing technical, material or financial assistance (114).
The European Union (EU) (93), Germany (89) and the United States (52) were donors in most of these entries. This picture is also partially confirmed because these donors were the largest providers of Official Development Assistance in support of activities in the field of ‘Reintegration and SALW controls’ in this region during 2012–19. Multi-donor funds such as UNSCAR and the ATT VTF are also indicated to have funded some of these activities.
Activities funded by these donors have included projects aimed at improving states’ technical capacities in different areas of SALW controls. For instance, the EU and Germany have supported the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa’s (UNREC) assistance work in the field of physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) in the Sahel and training in marking and record-keeping procedures in Togo and Mali.
The USA has supported the work of the Mines Advisory Group and the Halo Trust in reducing excess stockpiles or providing weapons and ammunition management-relevant assistance in several sub-Saharan African countries. The USA has also funded assistance work implemented by the Regional Centre for Small Arms (RECSA) at the sub-regional level. Other activities were part of projects aiming to help states establish tools to criminalize, investigate and prosecute firearms trafficking-related offences or strengthen their transfer control systems.
These included, for example, training activities implemented by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and INTERPOL as well as capacity building in support of the implementation of the ATT. Finally, a series of activities, such as those implemented by the Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies, have focused on supporting African regional and sub-regional organizations, e.g. the African Union and ECOWAS, with a view to promote coordinated approaches in the implementation of relevant regional and international standards.
Comparing assistance requested and assistance provided in sub-Saharan Africa
Comparing the assistance requests submitted through the UNPOA reports with the information on assistance provided that has been included in the SIPRI database in recent years points to several cases where the focus of requests for assistance and assistance provided align.
For example, in its 2014 report, Burkina Faso indicated the need for assistance in the field of stockpile management and specifically the construction of weapons and ammunition storage and related training. In 2015, it received support from the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) in the construction and rehabilitation of armouries and in 2016, it was involved in a regional project implemented by UNREC and aiming at improving PSSM in the Sahel.
In 2016, both Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, under the category ‘tracing’ specifically sought assistance for the use of INTERPOL’s iARMS database. INTERPOL Firearms Programme conducted iARMS training courses for Ivorian and Ghanaian officials in 2017 and 2018, respectively. Côte d’Ivoire also received legislative assistance on transfers as requested in its 2016 and 2018 reports. In 2019, Madagascar received UNREC’s support on stockpile management, marking and record-keeping, as requested in its 2018 UNPOA report.
The comparison also points to some discrepancies between assistance requested and provided. For example, there are countries that have received assistance in areas on which they did not request any support. During 2016–21, the DRC was involved in at least six activities that included a focus on ‘border controls’—e.g. workshops or meetings on cross-border cooperation—without indicating an assistance need in this field in any of its reports.
The same applied to Burundi. Further, the Republic of the Congo did not seek any support for stockpile management in its 2018 and 2021 reports but there are four activities in the SIPRI database that were implemented in the same period which indicate that this country received assistance in this field, including a PSSM training organized in 2021 by RECSA and the International Peace Support Training Centre. Other states have submitted assistance requests that may have never been followed up to or have been answered with some delays.
For instance, Burundi requested assistance on enforcement in 2012 but according to the SIPRI database it was involved in relevant activities only in 2018 and 2019. In 2018 and 2020, Rwanda requested technical and financial assistance in the field of destruction, marking and tracing; Togo has requested technical and financial assistance for tracing since 2016. However, the SIPRI database has not identified any relevant activities implemented in these countries in this timeframe.
There are also some inconsistencies in the distribution of assistance activities among regions in sub-Saharan Africa in the SIPRI database in comparison with the assistance requests that states have submitted through formal channels. According to the SIPRI database, countries in West Africa have been involved in 228 assistance activities with a focus on SALW controls, followed by Central African (153) and East African (140) states.
Countries in Southern Africa have been involved in the least amount of these activities (55). While in the case of West Africa and Southern Africa, this overview appears to reflect the level of assistance requests that countries have submitted through their reports to the UNPOA, for Central and Eastern Africa it indicates that there may be more need than is actually being reported.
Finally, there is also a certain tendency for states to continue to request assistance in areas where they have already received support. For example, Kenya has requested assistance in the field of stockpile management from 2016 until 2020 and according to the SIPRI database it has been involved in at least 24 activities with this focus since 2012.
In 2012 and 2018 Mali has indicated a need to improve its record-keeping capacities, including its marking practices. In the database, Mali is indicated as a beneficiary country in 23 activities implemented since 2012 and aiming at building capacity or providing technical assistance in the field of marking.
A state that repeats a previous request for assistance may be indicating that no relevant assistance has been provided or that help has been provided but that fixing capacity issues requires considerable time and support from different implementers. At the same time, an official might copy-paste a previous report without updating it. Conversely, a change in the assistance requested might reflect a change in the staff or the government agencies that are drafting or providing input on the assistance requests rather than a change of needs.
Conclusions
Mapping SALW control-related assistance in sub-Saharan Africa and comparing them with the actual needs of states in the region remains challenging due to several factors. These include the fragmentation and inconsistency of relevant information provided across several platforms and many states’ low level of engagement with reporting instruments both in terms of the quantity and quality of submissions.
There is also a need for more dynamic mechanisms that would help beneficiary states to develop their assistance requests in more detail and then enable them to work with assistance providers in designing the activities and assessing their impact. As one official from sub-Saharan Africa who was interviewed as part of this project noted, the current UNPOA reporting system has produced limited results because ‘it is not complemented by tools to effectively and adequately communicate to and sensitize states about available resources.’
This mechanism does not provide a platform through which ‘states can participate in articulating their needs and accessing the assistance.’ Efforts have been made to fill these gaps and to create processes to work with states to identify their assistance needs. However, the UNPOA and other reporting processes have not significantly changed over the years.
In the case of assistance focused on supporting the implementation of the ATT, mapping SALW control-related assistance is made even more difficult by the lack of a tool that systematically collects and presents information on assistance needed or offered in this field.
This gap will soon be filled through the creation of a database for matching offers and requests for assistance for ATT implementation. Together with the newly amended ATT initial reporting template, states will be able to elaborate more at length, although still on a voluntary basis, about their assistance needs. While the existence of several tools through which states can seek assistance is useful to facilitate the matching of needs and requests, this also risks creating an overlap of efforts if bridges are not built between the different forums and initiatives for offering and requesting assistance in SALW controls.
The analysis outlined above also shows that the SIPRI database could be used to mitigate some of these challenges, including by providing a better understanding of what requests for support have been met and by filling some gaps in the information shared by sub-Saharan African states on their assistance needs. In any case, further investigating and better understanding the reasons behind the discrepancies emerged in the comparison between the assistance requested and the assistance delivered as described earlier in this piece—and whether it points to limitations in the structure or use of the reporting instruments—should be a key focus of attention for states, NGOs and international organizations.
Lucile Robin, former SIPRI Research Assistant, contributed to the researching and writing of this Topical Backgrounder.
About the authors
Mark Bromley (United Kingdom) is the Director of the SIPRI Dual-Use and Arms Trade Control Programme.
Giovanna Maletta (Italy) is a Researcher with SIPRI’s Dual-Use and Arms Trade Control Programme.
Ruben Nicolin (Germany) was an intern with SIPRI’s Dual-Use and Arms Trade Control Programme.
2021 Islamophobia in Review
By Bridge Initiative Team, Washington DC, January 2022
WASHINGTON - Overall, 2021 demonstrated that Islamophobia remains a constant and growing threat around the globe. Anti-Muslim racism in 2021 remained ever present as hate crimes and individual attacks targeting Muslims persisted.
Across the globe, the key players of anti-Muslim racism were again states themselves, as this year witnessed increasing discriminatory legislation and policies.
China continued to deny the growing body of evidence pointing to genocide being committed against Uyghur Muslims and an international tribunal was held in the U.K. with testimony from survivors of Xinjiang’s concentration camps.
In Canada, a man killed a Muslim family of four in a horrific calculated hit-and-run, leading to Canadian Muslims demanding the government take concrete measures to tackle Islamophobic violence.
In France, President Emmanuel Macron’s government took a page from China’s book by implementing legislation aimed at constructing a state-approved Islam, resulting in widespread discrimination targeting Muslim civil society and curtailing the rights of French Muslims, especially women.
Similarly, the Austrian government took measures to intimidate and silence Austrian Muslim activists and organizations, even going so far as to publish a map detailing the locations of hundreds of mosques and associations. In the United Kingdom, the ruling Conservative party persisted in evading calls to address institutional Islamophobia within its ranks.
State hostility and prejudice towards Muslims was present across the European continent, with rulings aimed at restricting Muslim identity such as halal meat and hijab bans. In India, the country’s growing Hindu nationalist forces retained last year’s theme of conspiracy theories, claiming Indian Muslims were engaging in “love jihad,” “economic jihad,” and even “narcotics jihad.”
Additionally, there were large episodes of anti-Muslim violence in various parts of the country such as Tripura, Gurgaon, and Assam, all of which were supported by the rising Hindu nationalist voices. The year was also spent uncovering the role of social media platforms in larger campaigns of violence targeting Muslims as seen in India and Myanmar.
In the United States, the country marked twenty years since the deadly September 11th attacks and reckoned with the impacts and consequences of two decades of the War on Terror at home and abroad.
2021 demonstrated that Islamophobia remains a constant and growing threat around the globe. Anti-Muslim racism in 2021 remained ever present as hate crimes and individual attacks targeting Muslims persisted. Across the globe, the key players of anti-Muslim racism were again states themselves, as this year witnessed increasing discriminatory legislation and policies.
ARTICLES:
United States: With the inauguration of Joe Biden as the country’s 46th president, American Muslims welcomed the new administration and celebrated as Biden reversed Trump’s Muslim Ban. While applauding the measure, many noted that a reversal would not bring back the time and lives lost as a result of the previous discriminatory measure, and called on Biden to use this moment to tackle the presence of anti-Muslim racism in society, calling for accountability and justice.
India: Throughout 2021, Indian Muslims found themselves on the receiving end of countless mob attacks and state violence as Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government continued to embolden the country’s right-wing Hindu nationalist forces. Further, conspiracy theories constructing Indian Muslims as a threat to the Hindu majoritarian population gained credibility thanks to the rhetoric and actions of politicians and the government.
The right-ward shift in the subcontinent also led many commentators and experts in the region to fear that Modi’s rule was leading to a decay in the world’s largest democracy as journalists critical of the government were targeted and imprisoned and counter-terror legislation was used to silence critics. In a testament to increasing state hostility, even elite actors and actresses of India’s Bollywood were not immune to the Hindu nationalist government’s assault on free speech.
China: In 2021, the world heard more personal testimonies from Uyghurs who had survived China’s network of concentration camps as a growing international movement called on countries to boycott the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics. This year also involved Chinese authorities restructuring their targeting of Uyghurs, moving many prisoners to forced labor camps and institutionalizing discriminatory practices, such as removing domes from mosques, aimed at erasing Uyghur culture and identity.
Growing calls from activists and rights organizations for action from the international community also contributed to an unofficial tribunal held in the UK, which found that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is committing genocide, a conclusion made by a number of countries this year including the Canadian parliament, MPs in the UK, Dutch parliament, and the Lithuanian parliament.
China’s campaign targeting Uyghurs goes back decades and must be understood in the settler-colonial context of the region. However, following 9/11 and the introduction of the war on terror discourse, Chinese authorities adopted this rhetoric framing Uyghur Muslims as a security threat to the state and began slowly criminalizing various aspect of Uyghur culture and identity, all under the banner of tackling the “three evil forces” of separatism, extremism, and terrorism. The establishment of concentration camps, dubbed “re-education” centers by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), in 2017 and the projected growth of these fortresses of torture and psychological manipulation is just one aspect of China’s wider campaign in the occupied Uyghur homeland (which Chinese authorities refer to as Xinjiang).
In 2021, the world heard more harrowing stories from survivors of China’s crackdown in the region: a project involving torture, rape, detention, indoctrination, and psychological abuse.
Europe: In 2021, Islamophobia in Europe was further institutionalized within policies and programs that effectively criminalized Muslim civil society on the continent. In France, President Emmanuel Macron introduced the anti-Separatism law restricting the rights of French Muslim citizens and essentially forcing Muslims religious leader to take an oath of loyalty. Meanwhile in Switzerland, the government approved a ban on the burqa, adding to the growing number of countries that have restricted Muslim women’s right to religious freedom.
The trend on the continent has been to construct Europe’s Muslims as both a security and cultural threat, using arguments framed under counterterrorism and secularism to justify discriminatory and harmful rhetoric and practices that have severely curtailed the basic rights of Muslims.
In a review of 2021, Austrian academic and Bridge Senior Researcher Farid Hafez described the Europe’s right-ward shift as the continent entering an age of “McCarthyism against Islam,” with government policies framing Muslim citizenry as potential threats, suspicious, and ultimately untrustworthy. With the current status quo, it appears that “guilty until proven innocent increasingly becomes authorities’ approach to Muslims,” and Hafez demonstrated this by highlighting France, Austria, and Denmark’s collective approach to fighting “political Islam.”
In neighboring France, President Emmanuel Macron solidified his presidency as one marked by state-led Islamophobia, where under his leadership the government instituted measures that stigmatized and collectively punished France’s nearly 6 million Muslims. Much like Austria, Macron’s government hinged on the “political Islam” boogeyman to justify measures that not only severely curtailed the rights of Muslims but many argued also was an attack on French secularism. In late 2020, under the guise of fighting “political Islam,” Macron gave Muslim religious leaders an ultimatum, essentially forcing Imams to sign a charter or otherwise be considered a threat and enemy to the state. In March 2021, a coalition of civil society organizations urged the European Commission to investigate France at the European Court of Justice over the charter, saying that it “violates Muslims’ right to free speech and religious freedoms.”
In 2020, Macron also introduced the anti-separtism bill, which was approved by Members of Parliament in February 2021 and adopted by the National Assembly on July 23, 2021.
French legal scholar Rim-Sarah Alouane described the bill as an “attack” on civil liberties, stating, “I see a blatant attack on freedom of association. This bill has no safeguards of potential abuse from public authorities,” and further noted that “French Muslims are paying the price of the failure of the state to prevent terrorist attacks from happening.” Further the bill also included measures aimed at increasing restrictions on Muslim women’s ability to wear the hijab, with the argument of religious neutrality used to extend the hijab ban to private companies under contract with the state.
In January 2021, a coalition of thirty-six organizations from thirteen countries submitted a twenty-eight-page document to the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), calling on the international body to “open formal infringement procedures against France’s government for entrenching Islamophobia and structural discrimination against Muslims.” The organizations alleged that under Macron’s governance, France’s recent “actions and policies in relation to Muslim communities violated international and European laws.”
Many critics noted that these actions were being taken by the government to play on the ongoing culture wars, and to silence any group or individual who called out the government’s Islamophobia, by linking anyone on the left with “‘Islamism,’ the eternal bogeyman in French society.”
The measures aimed at dismantling French Muslim civil society remained in force as a French court confirmed the dissolution of the Collective Against Islamophobia in France (CCIF), a leading anti-discrimination group that tracked Islamophobia in the country. Adding to this, in 2021 the government shut down a Muslim publishing house. In October 2021, Interior Minister Gerard Darmanin announced the government would close 7 more mosques and associations in the country by the end of the year, and stated that since Macron had taken office, “some 13 associations have been closed along with 92 of the 2,500 mosques in the country.” Under the pretense of tackling “radicalization” and “political Islam,” the French government has taken measures to dismantle Muslim civil society and strike fear in the French Muslim community.
Experts, commentators, and writers all noted how the current political climate in France involved a surge in the far-right and an overall massive shift right-ward in the country. Given the upcoming 2022 presidential elections, it appears that candidates in the running to lead the country are attempting to outdo each other when it comes to blatant anti-Muslim bigotry.
In 2021, Europe continued on a right-ward path as anti-Muslim racism became the norm in media, politics, and society. While some political leaders dragged their feet in addressing the issue of Islamophobia, many others openly incorporated dangerous and discriminatory anti-Muslim rhetoric into their agenda.
Canada: In July of 2021, Mustafa Farooq of the National Council of Canadian Muslims (NCCM) made a chilling observation: “The reality is that Canada has suffered more mass killings motivated by Islamophobia in the last five years than any other country in the G7. This cannot be allowed to continue.” Farooq’s comments came a little over a month after a deadly targeted hit-and-run in London, Ontario that killed four members of a Canadian Muslim family, with the sole survivor being a 9-year-old boy. The incident sent shockwaves across the country, and Canadian Muslims called on the government to take greater action against rising anti-Muslim hatred in the country beginning with tackling bigoted rhetoric and support for discriminatory policies amongst those in power.
10 Conflicts to Watch in 2022
International Crisis Group, 29 December 2021
Troubling undercurrents in 2021 – from the U.S. to Afghanistan, Ethiopia or the climate emergency – didn’t send battle deaths soaring or set the world ablaze. But as our look ahead to 2022 shows, many bad situations round the world could easily get worse.
After a year that saw an assault on the U.S. Capitol, horrific bloodshed in Ethiopia, a Taliban triumph in Afghanistan, great-power showdowns over Ukraine and Taiwan amid dwindling U.S. ambition on the global stage, COVID-19, and a climate emergency, it’s easy to see a world careening off the tracks.
But maybe one could argue things are better than they seem.
After all, by some measures, war is in retreat. The number of people killed in fighting worldwide has mostly declined since 2014—if you count only those dying directly in combat. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, figures through the end of 2020 show battle deaths are down from seven years ago, mostly because Syria’s terrible slaughter has largely subsided.
The number of major wars has also descended from a recent peak. Despite Russian President Vladimir Putin menacing Ukraine, states rarely go to war with one another. More local conflicts rage than ever, but they tend to be of lower intensity. For the most part, 21st-century wars are less lethal than their 20th-century predecessors.
A more cautious United States might also have an upside. The 1990s bloodletting in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia; the post-9/11 Afghanistan and Iraq wars; Sri Lanka’s murderous campaign against the Tamils; and the collapse of Libya and South Sudan all happened at a time of—and, in some cases, thanks to—a dominant U.S.-led West. That recent U.S. presidents have refrained from toppling enemies by force is a good thing. Besides, one shouldn’t overstate Washington’s sway even in its post-Cold War heyday; absent an invasion, it has always struggled to bend recalcitrant leaders (former Sudanese leader Omar al-Bashir, for example) to its will.
Still, if these are silver linings, they’re awfully thin.
Battle deaths, after all, tell just a fraction of the story. Yemen’s conflict kills more people, mostly women and young children, due to starvation or preventable disease than violence. Millions of Ethiopians suffer acute food insecurity because of the country’s civil war. Fighting involving Islamists elsewhere in Africa often doesn’t entail thousands of deaths but drives millions of people from their homes and causes humanitarian devastation.
Afghanistan’s violence levels have sharply dropped since the Taliban seized power in August, but starvation, caused mostly by Western policies, could leave more Afghans dead—including millions of children—than past decades of fighting. Worldwide, the number of displaced people, most due to war, is at a record high. Battle deaths may be down, in other words, but suffering due to conflict is not.
Moreover, states compete fiercely even when they’re not fighting directly. They do battle with cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, election interference, economic coercion, and by instrumentalizing migrants. Major and regional powers vie for influence, often through local allies, in war zones. Proxy fighting has not so far sparked direct confrontation among meddling states. Indeed, some navigate the danger adeptly: Russia and Turkey maintain cordial relations despite backing competing sides in the Syrian and Libyan conflicts. Still, foreign involvement in conflicts creates the risk that local clashes light bigger fires.
Standoffs involving major powers look increasingly dangerous. Putin may gamble on another incursion into Ukraine. A China-U.S. clash over Taiwan is unlikely in 2022, but the Chinese and U.S. militaries increasingly bump up against each another around the island and in the South China Sea, with all the peril of entanglement that entails. If the Iran nuclear deal collapses, which now seems probable, the United States or Israel may attempt—possibly even early in 2022—to knock out Iranian nuclear facilities, likely prompting Tehran to sprint toward weaponization while lashing out across the region. One mishap or miscalculation, in other words, and interstate war could make a comeback.
And whatever one thinks of U.S. influence, its decline inevitably brings hazards, given that American might and alliances have structured global affairs for decades. No one should exaggerate the decay: U.S. forces are still deployed around the globe, NATO stands, and Washington’s recent Asia diplomacy shows it can still marshal coalitions like no other power. But with much in flux, Washington’s rivals are probing to see how far they can go.
Today’s most dangerous flash points—whether Ukraine, Taiwan, or confrontations with Iran—relate in some way to the world struggling for a new equilibrium. Dysfunction in the United States hardly helps. A delicate transition of global power requires cool heads and predictability—not fraught elections and policy seesawing from one administration to the next.
As for COVID-19, the pandemic has exacerbated the world’s worst humanitarian disasters and propelled the impoverishment, rising living costs, inequality, and joblessness that fuel popular anger. It had a hand this past year in a power grab in Tunisia, Sudan’s coup, and protests in Colombia. The economic hurt COVID-19 is unleashing could strain some countries to a breaking point. Although it’s a leap from discontent to protest, from protest to crisis, and from crisis to conflict, the pandemic’s worst symptoms may yet lie ahead.
So while today’s troubling undercurrents haven’t yet set battle deaths soaring or the world ablaze, things still look bad. As this year’s list shows all too starkly, they could easily get worse.
1. Ukraine
Whether Russia, which has been massing troops on the Ukrainian border, will again invade its neighbor remains unclear. But dismissing the menace as a bluff would be a mistake.
The Ukraine war began in 2014 when Putin, angered at what he saw as a Western-backed overthrow of a president friendly to Moscow, annexed Crimea and backed separatists in Ukraine’s eastern Donbass region. Facing a military rout, Ukraine signed two peace accords, the Minsk agreements, largely on Russia’s terms. Since then, separatists have held two breakaway areas in the Donbass.
What was for several years a simmering conflict heated up in 2021. A truce agreed to by Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who came to power in 2019 promising to make peace, fell apart. In the spring of 2021, Putin amassed more than 100,000 troops near the border, only to withdraw many of them weeks later after a meeting with U.S. President Joe Biden. Since November, he’s built up similar numbers.
Russia’s grievances are clear enough. Moscow is upset at Ukraine’s lack of follow-through with the Minsk agreements, particularly its denial of “special status” to the breakaway regions—which entails autonomy and, as Moscow defines it, a say in foreign policy.
Putin, angry at what Moscow sees as decades of Western encroachment, has drawn a new red line on NATO, rejecting not only the idea that Ukraine would join the alliance, which (in reality) won’t take place any time soon, but also growing military collaboration among Kyiv and NATO members, which is already happening. Russia proposes a new European order that would prevent NATO’s further enlargement east and curb its military deployments and activities.
Russia may intend for the buildup to force concessions. But given Putin’s track record and underestimation of the hostility Moscow inspires among Ukrainians outside separatist-held areas, no one should rule out another military adventure. If Russia plans to fight, its options vary from limited support of separatists to a full-scale assault.
Western powers, which too often have relied on bluster packaged as strategic ambiguity, need to clarify what they would do to support Ukraine, relay that to Moscow, and hold fast to red lines. Biden, who will meet Putin one-on-one in early January, has made a start by threatening damaging sanctions and a larger military buildup on NATO’s eastern flank. Western leaders might also warn of reactions they don’t intend but might struggle to control, perhaps including NATO members deploying more personnel to Ukraine itself, with all the attendant risks.
But deterrence will be short lived without efforts to de-escalate and lay the groundwork for more sustainable settlements in Ukraine and beyond. Choreographed de-escalation could involve Moscow pulling back forces, both sides limiting military exercises in the Black and Baltic Seas, a return to Minsk agreement negotiations, and talks on European security—even if the one-sided arrangement Russia proposes is out of the question.
In reality, no one will get what they want from the standoff. Kyiv may not like the Minsk agreements, but it signed them, and they remain the internationally accepted way out of the crisis. Putin hopes for a pliant neighbor in Ukraine, but that’s a pipe dream—unless he’s ready for a painful and costly occupation. Europe and the United States can neither deter without some risk of escalation nor resolve the Ukraine crisis without grappling with broader European security. As for Biden, he may want to focus on China but can’t relegate Russia to the back burner.
2. Ethiopia
Two years ago, Ethiopia was a good news story. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed appeared to be turning the page on decades of repressive rule. Instead, more than a year of fighting between Abiy’s federal army and forces from the northern Tigray region has torn the country apart. A small window may have just opened up to bring the war to a close.
Battlefield dynamics have fluctuated dramatically. Abiy first ordered federal troops into Tigray in November 2020 following a deadly attack on a military garrison there by loyalists of the region’s ruling party, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Federal forces, supported by troops from enemy-turned-friend Eritrea, quickly advanced alongside forces from Ethiopia’s Amhara region, which borders Tigray, installing an interim administration in the Tigrayan capital, Mekele, in December 2020.
Over subsequent months, TPLF leaders regrouped in the countryside, mobilizing Tigrayans livid at massacres, rapes, and havoc wreaked by federal and Eritrean troops. In a startling reversal, the rebels drove their enemies out of most of Tigray at the end of June before marching south. They then formed an alliance with an insurgent group in Ethiopia’s populous, central Oromia region. An assault on the capital, Addis Ababa, appeared in the offing. Mid-November, however, brought another about-face. A counteroffensive by federal troops and allied militia forced Tigray forces to withdraw back to their home region.
But if federal forces, for now, are ascendant, both sides command strong support and could drum up more recruits. Neither is likely to deliver a mortal blow.
Brutal fighting has embittered an already acrimonious dispute. Abiy casts the war as a battle for the Ethiopian state’s survival. Many Ethiopians outside Tigray revile the TPLF, which dominated a repressive regime that ruled Ethiopia for decades before Abiy’s election.
Abiy paints TPLF leaders as power-hungry spoilers, bent on trashing his modernized vision for the country. In contrast, Tigrayan leaders said their initial attack that triggered the war preempted a campaign to subjugate Tigray by Abiy and the TPLF’s old foe, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, with whom Abiy signed a 2018 peace deal. They see Abiy’s reforms as an attempt to water down Ethiopian regions’ rights to self-rule.
More war would spell more disaster. Fighting has already killed tens of thousands of people and uprooted millions of Ethiopians from their homes. All sides stand accused of atrocities. Much of Tigray, denied aid by federal authorities, is nearing famine. The wounds the bloodletting has left on Ethiopia’s social fabric will be hard to heal. Neighbors beyond Eritrea could get pulled in. Sudan, another good news story that turned sour in 2021 when its generals grabbed power, has its own disputes with Ethiopia over territory in the fertile borderlands of al-Fashqa and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile, where Addis Ababa has started to fill the reservoir. With Ethiopia in turmoil, Sudan—along with Egypt—could see a moment to press its advantage.
Recent battlefield developments may have opened a small window. Tigrayan leaders have dropped a key condition for talks, namely that Amhara forces leave disputed areas they seized in western Tigray. In late December, federal authorities announced they would not advance further to try and vanquish Tigrayan forces. Diplomats should now push for a truce to get humanitarian aid into Tigray and explore whether compromise might be feasible. Without that, bloodshed and hunger will continue, with terrible consequences for Ethiopians and, potentially, the region.
3. Afghanistan
If 2021 brought one chapter of Afghanistan’s decades long tragedy to a close, another is starting. Since the Taliban’s seizure of power in August, a humanitarian catastrophe has loomed. U.N. data suggests millions of Afghan children could starve. Western leaders shoulder much of the blame.
The Taliban’s win was swift but long in the making. For years, and especially since early 2020, when Washington signed a deal with the Taliban pledging to withdraw U.S. forces, insurgents advanced through the countryside, encircling provincial and district centers. In the Spring and Summer of 2021, they began seizing towns and cities, often persuading Afghan army commanders demoralized by the impending end of Western support to surrender. The government collapsed in mid-August, and the Taliban entered Kabul mostly without a fight. It was a stunning end to a political order Western powers had spent two decades helping to build.
The world responded to the Taliban’s takeover by freezing Afghan state assets, halting budgetary aid, and offering only limited sanctions relief for humanitarian purposes. (The Taliban are sanctioned by the United Nations and Western governments.)
The new government can’t pay civil servants. The economy has tanked. The financial sector is paralyzed. All this comes on top of a punishing drought. Although overall violence levels are significantly down from a year ago, the Taliban face a vicious fight against the Islamic State’s local branch.
The new regime has done little to endear itself to donors. Its interim cabinet includes almost exclusively Taliban figures, no women, and mostly ethnic Pashtuns. Early Taliban decisions, notably closing girls’ schools in many provinces, sparked international outrage (some have since reopened). Reports have emerged of extrajudicial killings of former soldiers and police.
Still, Western decision-makers bear the lion’s share of responsibility for Afghans’ plight. The sudden cutoff of funds to an entirely aid-dependent state has been devastating. The United Nations estimates 23 million people, more than half the population, will suffer from hunger this winter. Humanitarian support alone can’t stave off disaster. Donors are squandering genuine gains their funds helped deliver over the past two decades, notably in health and education.
There is another way. International financial institutions, having released a small part of the almost $2 billion earmarked for Afghanistan, should disperse the rest. The United Nations and United States, which have now lifted some sanctions to allow in humanitarian aid, should go further by easing restrictions to permit regular economic activity. Biden should release Afghanistan’s frozen assets, with an initial tranche to test the waters.
If the White House, loath to underwrite Taliban rule, won’t take that step, internationally supervised currency swaps could infuse dollars into the economy. Propping up health care, the education system, food provision, and other basic services should be priorities—even if this requires Western policymakers to work through Taliban ministries.
The alternative is to let Afghans die, including millions of children. Of all the blunders the West has made in Afghanistan, this one would leave the ugliest stain.
4. The United States and China
Shortly after pulling out of Afghanistan, the United States announced a new pact with Australia and the United Kingdom to counter China. Known as AUKUS, the deal will help Canberra acquire nuclear-powered submarines. It was a stark illustration of Washington’s aspirations to move from combating Islamist militants to major power politics and deterring Beijing.
In Washington, one of the few views shared across the aisle is that China is an adversary the United States is inexorably at loggerheads with. U.S. leaders see past decades of engaging China as enabling the rise of a rival that exploits international bodies and rules to its own ends, repressing opposition in Hong Kong, behaving atrociously in Xinjiang, and bullying its Asian neighbors. Competition with China is becoming an ordering principle of U.S. policy.
Biden’s China strategy, while not precisely articulated, entails keeping the United States the dominant power in the Indo-Pacific, where Beijing’s military capacity has ballooned. Biden appears to see the costs of Chinese regional primacy as graver than the risk of confrontation. Concretely, that meant shoring up U.S. alliances and partnerships in Asia as well as elevating the importance of Taiwan’s security to U.S. interests. Top officials also make stronger statements backing Southeast Asian countries’ maritime claims in the South China Sea.
Beijing sees things differently. Chinese leaders, having hoped at first for improved ties with Washington under Biden, now worry more about him than they did about former U.S. President Donald Trump, a leader they hoped was an anomaly. They express disappointment at Biden’s decision not to roll back trade tariffs or sanctions as well as his efforts to mobilize other countries. They recoil at rhetoric about democracy and human rights, which they view as ideological bombast that implicitly calls their government’s legitimacy into question.
In essence, Beijing wants a sphere of influence in which its neighbors are sovereign but deferential. It views dominance of the first island chain—which stretches from the Kuril Islands, past Taiwan, and into the South China Sea—as vital to its growth, security, and ambition to be a world naval power.
Over the past year, while not disavowing its official “peaceful reunification” policy, Beijing escalated military activity near Taiwan, flying record numbers of jets and bombers as well as conducting drills near the island. Beijing’s growing military clout and assertiveness have provoked more dire assessments in Washington about the threat of a Chinese assault on Taiwan.
A virtual meeting in November between Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping took some of the edge off the frosty rhetoric of previous months. It could yield more working-level engagement, including the resumption of defense dialogues. In 2022, with the Beijing Winter Olympics, the 20th Party Congress, and U.S. midterm congressional elections, both sides likely want quiet fronts abroad, even if they rattle sabers for audiences at home. The nightmare scenario—a Chinese attempt to seize Taiwan, potentially forcing the United States to come to Taipei’s defense—is unlikely for now.
Still, the two giants’ rivalry casts a long shadow over world affairs and heightens dangers across flash points in East Asia. Beijing sees scant benefits in cooperating on issues like climate change when Washington frames the relationship as competitive. Along the first island chain, things are particularly frightening. Warplanes flying close to one another near Taiwan, for example, or warships crossing paths in the South China Sea are more common. A mishap would ratchet up tensions.
When U.S. and Chinese planes collided in 2001 during a period of reasonable calm between Beijing and Washington, it took months of intense diplomacy to resolve the spat. Today, it would be harder—and the danger of escalation greater.
5. Iran vs. the United States and Israel
The nail-biting brinkmanship between Tehran and Washington instigated under Trump may be over. But as hope of reviving the Iran nuclear deal fades, another escalation looms.
Biden took office pledging to rejoin the nuclear deal. His predecessor had unilaterally withdrawn Washington in 2018, reimposing sanctions on Iran—which, in turn, stepped up its nuclear development and power projection across the Middle East. The Biden administration lost time posturing about who should make the first move and refusing substantive goodwill gestures. Still, for a few months, talks made some progress.
Then, in June, Ebrahim Raisi won Iran’s presidential election, giving hard-liners control of all the Islamic Republic’s key power centers. After a five-month hiatus, Iran returned to the table, driving a harder bargain. At the same time, it is accelerating nuclear development. When the deal took effect six years ago, Iran’s breakout time—the time it would take to enrich enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon—was around 12 months. It’s now estimated at three to six weeks and shrinking.
Although Tehran hasn’t unilaterally pulled out of the deal like Trump did, it’s still playing with fire. Failure to restore the deal in the months ahead would likely make the original agreement moot, given Iran’s technological advances. There are options: Diplomats could pursue a more comprehensive deal, though that would be a hard slog given the bad blood the original deal’s demise would entail, or they could seek an interim “less-for-less” arrangement that caps Iran’s continued nuclear progress for limited sanctions relief. But a collapse of negotiations is a real possibility.
That would be a disaster. Iran’s nuclear program would continue unhindered. For Washington, accepting Iran as a threshold nuclear state—one able to build a bomb even if not yet having done so—will likely prove to be too bitter a pill to swallow. The alternative would be to approve or join Israeli strikes aimed at setting back Tehran’s nuclear capability.
If that happened, Iran’s leaders—whose calculations are likely informed by the toppling of former Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi, who forfeited his nuclear weapons program, and the respect Trump showed toward nuclear-armed North Korea—may well sprint toward weaponization.
Tehran would also likely lash out across the Middle East. Nascent efforts at de-escalation between Iran and Persian Gulf monarchies may help lower risks, but Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria would all be in the crossfire. Incidents could heighten the danger of direct confrontation between Iran and the United States, Israel, or the two allies together, which the parties have thus far avoided despite provocations. Such clashes could easily spin out of control on the ground, at sea, in cyberspace, or through covert operations.
Talks fizzling could, in other words, combine all the dangers from the period before the 2015 deal with the worst worries of the Trump years.
6. Yemen
Yemen’s war faded from headlines in 2021 but remains devastating and could be poised to get worse.
Houthi rebels have encircled and advanced into the oil- and gas-rich governorate of Marib. Long underrated as a military force, the rebels appear to be running an agile and evolving multifront campaign, pairing offensives with outreach to soften local tribal leaders’ resistance. They now control Al-Bayda, a governorate neighboring Marib, and have made inroads into Shabwa, farther east, thus cutting off supply lines to Marib. Of Marib governorate itself, only the main city and hydrocarbon facilities nearby remain in the hands of President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi’s internationally recognized government.
Should those sites fall, it would mark a sea change in the war. The Houthis would score an economic as well as a military victory. With Marib’s oil and gas, the Houthis will be able to bring down fuel and electricity prices in areas under their control, thus bolstering their image as a governing authority deserving of international legitimacy. The loss of Marib, the Hadi government’s last bastion in the north, would likely herald the president’s political demise.
Some nominally Hadi-aligned Yemenis already mutter about replacing him with a presidential council. That would further undercut the government’s international status, likely reinforcing the Houthis’ resistance to peace talks.
Anyone hoping that a Houthi win would presage the war’s end is banking on an illusion. In southern Yemen, anti-Houthi factions outside Hadi’s coalition—namely southern separatists backed by the United Arab Emirates and a faction led by Tareq Saleh, nephew of Yemen’s late long-serving leader—would battle on. The Houthis, who see the war as pitting their nationalist forces against neighboring Saudi Arabia—which backs Hadi with air power—would likely continue cross-border attacks.
The United Nations’ new envoy for Yemen, Hans Grundberg, who assumed his role at the helm of international peacemaking efforts last September, needs to do two things at once. First, he should seek to avert a battle for Marib city by hearing out, without necessarily accepting, Houthi proposals and pushing for a government counteroffer that reflects the reality of today’s power balance. The U.N. also needs a new peacemaking approach that goes beyond two-party talks between the Houthis, on the one hand, and the Hadi government and its Saudi backers, on the other. Yemen’s war is a multiparty conflict, not a binary power struggle; any hope of reaching a genuine settlement requires more seats at the table.
7. Israel-Palestine
This past year saw the fourth and most destructive Gaza-Israel war in just over a decade, illustrating again that the peace process is dead and a two-state solution looks less likely than ever.
The trigger for this latest outbreak was occupied East Jerusalem. The threatened eviction of Palestinian residents of the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood coincided in April 2021 with clashes during Ramadan between stone-throwing youth and Israeli police using lethal force on the compound that comprises the Haram al-Sharif, holy to Muslims, and the Temple Mount, holy to Jews.
That set off a chain reaction. Hamas, which controls Gaza, fired long-distance rockets indiscriminately into Israel. Israel responded with a harsh aerial assault, sparking an 11-day conflict that killed more than 250 people, almost all Palestinians, and left in ruins what remained of Gaza’s civilian infrastructure. West Bank Palestinians demonstrating in solidarity were met with the Israeli army’s live fire. In Israeli cities, Palestinian citizens took to the streets, sometimes clashing with West Bank settlers and other right-wing Jews, often supported by Israeli police.
While hostilities were all too familiar, this bout brought new elements. Palestinians, for the first time in decades, transcended their fragmentation by joining voices across the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza, and Israel itself. Also striking was debate in Western capitals, Washington especially. Democrats, including mainstream figures, used unusually stern language about Israel’s bombardment, suggesting that, among the party, views of the conflict are evolving.
Still, fundamentals remain unchanged. Though Israelis were apparently taken aback by the intensity of Hamas’s rocket fire, the war provoked no rethink of Israel’s Gaza policy—economic strangulation to weaken Hamas and divide Palestinians; “mowing the grass” every few years to stifle attacks—or its general treatment of Palestinians. Abroad, most capitals wrung their hands but did little. The Biden administration, despite Democrats’ new tone, claimed to conduct “quiet, intensive diplomacy” but more or less allowed the conflict to run its course.
Nor have the months since brought hope. A hodgepodge coalition ousted Israel’s longest-serving prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, in June. After Netanyahu’s belligerence, the new government put a softer face on Israel’s foreign relations and declared its hope to “shrink” the conflict by improving the occupied territories’ economies and marginally strengthening the Palestinian Authority, which partly rules the West Bank. Yet it continues to expand illegal settlements and repress Palestinians much as its predecessors did. In October, it outlawed six respected Palestinian civil society groups on specious terrorism charges.
For anyone still eager to renew negotiations, the last year was cause for despair. The center of gravity in Israeli politics has long since shifted away from peace, as successive governments have abandoned talks in all but name. Most Palestinians have lost faith they will win statehood through negotiations.
There are ways to buy quiet: a longer-term truce and opening up of Gaza; ending expulsions of Palestinians in East Jerusalem; returning to preexisting arrangements that kept the holy sites reasonably calm.
But those can only stave off the next war for so long. Diplomats’ lip service to a two-state solution that is all but out of reach gives cover for Israel to advance de facto annexation of the West Bank. Better now would be to try to end Israeli impunity for violations of Palestinian rights. It’s time, in other words, to address the situation on the ground as it is.
8. Haiti
The Caribbean nation has long been tormented by political crises, gang warfare, and natural disasters. Nevertheless, this past year stands out for many Haitians as particularly bleak. Few expect a brighter 2022.
In July, hit men assassinated President Jovenel Moïse in his home; his security detail apparently did nothing about it. Shellshocked elites squabbled over who would run the country. (Succession lines were muddled as Moïse had appointed Ariel Henry as his new prime minister but Henry had not yet been sworn in.) Henry eventually became the country’s interim leader but has struggled to assert authority.
An earthquake in August destroyed much of southern Haiti. Rampant kidnappings by gangs that lord over much of the capital of Port-au-Prince have hampered international relief efforts. Criminals’ seizure of oil terminals brought the country to a standstill in early November. Haiti, meanwhile, lags behind the rest of the Americas in distributing COVID-19 vaccines. Increasing numbers of Haitians are seeking better prospects abroad; many new departures—and indeed many Haitians who left the island some time ago—are camped out along the southern U.S. border.
As for the post-Moïse transition, two factions propose competing plans. Henry and several parties have inked a deal allowing him to rule until elections in 2022. In contrast, the Commission for a Haitian Solution to the Crisis, an umbrella group of civil society organizations and political parties, insists the country’s wounds cut so deep that only root-and-branch reform can stanch the bleeding. They want a two-year transition, with a council more representative of society holding power until new polls. With the constitution largely a dead letter (postponed elections mean two-thirds of Senate seats are empty) and responsibility for Moïse’s killing unclear, Haiti’s immediate stability requires reconciling these two options.
Gangs also have political clout. Jimmy “Barbecue” Chérizier, a former police officer who is capo of the so-called G9 criminal alliance that seized the oil terminals, has demanded that Henry resign. Police corruption, an enfeebled judicial system, and the hemisphere’s highest poverty rates provide ideal conditions for gangs to recruit and expand. Chérizier himself combines brute force with politicking designed to appeal to impoverished, unemployed young men.
Many Haitians bristle at the idea of a new U.N. peacekeeping mission, let alone U.S. military intervention, but without some overseas help it is hard to see Haiti escaping its predicament. Donors supporting a specialized joint Haitian-U.N. office tasked with prosecuting top officials, police, and judges accused of serious crimes could help reduce violence and sever ties between criminals and politicians.
The first priority, though, is for Haitians to agree on a new transition plan. Without it, they will face another year of gridlock, crime, and unrest as more depart in search of better lives elsewhere.
9. Myanmar
Since the February 2021 coup, a crackdown by the country’s military (known as the Tatmadaw) on mostly peaceful protests has fueled broad-based resistance, ranging from civil disobedience to armed clashes with security forces. A deadly stalemate exacts a terrible human toll.
If the generals hoped to reboot Myanmar’s politics, they miscalculated. Piqued at Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy’s landslide win in the November 2020 elections, military leaders called the vote rigged and detained civilian politicians. Their plans for new elections seemingly aimed to install friendlier faces to power. Instead, mass protests against military involvement in politics rocked towns and cities. A crackdown resulting in hundreds of deaths fueled fiercer resistance.
Since then, deposed lawmakers set up their own National Unity Government (NUG) and in September called for revolt against the regime. While the NUG is still developing its own military capability, resistance forces, many of which support the NUG but are mostly not under its direct control, stage attacks daily, ambushing military convoys, bombing regime-linked targets, and assassinating local officials, suspected informants, and others they see as junta loyalists.
Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups, some of which comprise tens of thousands of fighters and control vast upland areas, have themselves adapted. Some have remained aloof; others, responding to constituents’ anger at the coup, have resumed fighting the Tatmadaw. Some shelter dissidents, provide them military training, and are negotiating with the NUG. For its part, the NUG has sought to win over armed groups, including by promising a federal system for Myanmar.
Majority views about ethnic minorities are also changing: Long blamed for Myanmar’s problems, minorities’ demands for a fairer share of power today enjoy more support. While a united front against the regime is unlikely, given rebels’ historical rivalries, significant political and military cooperation is taking place.
For its part, the Tatmadaw has doubled down. It detains, sometimes executes, and routinely tortures opponents, often abducting kin as hostages. Battalions have crushed urban dissent, using tactics that aim to kill as many people as possible. (A U.N.-backed investigation’s preliminary analysis suggests crimes against humanity.)
In rural areas, the army fights new resistance groups with old counterinsurgency methods, namely its “four cuts” strategy, aimed at denying rebels food, funds, intelligence, and recruits. It targets civilians; in the latest of many reported incidents, credible accounts suggest that at the end of December the military massacred dozens of civilians fleeing violence in eastern Myanmar. The regime has also attempted to persuade armed groups from entering formal alliances with the NUG, in some cases keeping groups—including the Arakan Army, with which it fought a brutal war in 2019-2020—off the battlefield.
Having locked up their rivals—Aung San Suu Kyi has already been sentenced to two years’ imprisonment and could end up locked up for life—the generals are moving to amend electoral rules in their favor and hold a vote in 2023. However, any poll that would usher in a military-backed government would be seen as a farce.
The standoff’s human cost is devastating. Myanmar’s economy is freefalling, the national currency has crashed, health and education systems have crumbled, poverty rates are estimated to have doubled since 2019, and half of all households cannot afford enough food. Myanmar’s generals, convinced of their role at the country’s helm, are steering it off a cliff.
For the most part, the world is losing interest. While outside actors have little influence on the Tatmadaw, it is critical that they keep trying to get aid in without empowering the regime. They can also usefully throw greater weight behind the diplomatic efforts of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which have so far been mostly dysfunctional, and the new U.N. special envoy. Beyond the human toll, a collapsed state in the heart of the strategically vital Indo-Pacific region serves no one’s interests.
10. Islamist militancy in Africa
Since 2017, when the Islamic State lost its so-called caliphate in the Middle East, Africa has suffered some of the world’s most ferocious battles between states and jihadis. Islamist militancy on the continent is nothing new, but revolts linked to the Islamic State and al Qaeda have surged in recent years.
Weak states struggle against nimble militant factions across vast hinterlands where central governments hold little sway. Parts of the Sahel have seen spiraling bloodshed, mostly due to fighting involving jihadis, whose reach has extended from northern Mali to the country’s center, into Niger, and across rural Burkina Faso.
Boko Haram’s insurgency has lost the swaths of northeastern Nigeria it controlled some years ago, and the movement has fractured. But splinter groups still wreak tremendous harm around Lake Chad. In East Africa, al-Shabab, the continent’s oldest-surviving Islamist rebellion, remains a potent force, despite more than 15 years of efforts to defeat it. The group holds large parts of Somalia’s rural south, operates shadow courts and extorts taxes beyond those areas, and occasionally mounts attacks in neighboring countries.
Africa’s newest jihadi fronts—in northern Mozambique and eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo—are also troubling. Insurgents who claim a new Islamic State province in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado region have stepped up attacks on security forces and civilians. Nearly a million people have fled the fighting. Militants have loose ties to Islamic State networks that stretch both up the continent’s east coast and into Congo’s war-torn east. There, another Islamist rebel group—a faction of the Allied Democratic Forces, a Ugandan militia that has long operated in Congo—now declares itself an Islamic State affiliate. It launched attacks in the Ugandan capital of Kampala last November.
Mozambique’s government, which long resisted outside involvement in Cabo Delgado, finally agreed last year to let in Rwandan troops and units from the Southern African Development Community (SADC), a regional bloc. Those forces have reversed insurgent gains, though militants appear to be regrouping. Rwandan and SADC forces risk a protracted war.
In Somalia and the Sahel, Western impatience could be decisive. Foreign forces—the EU-funded African Union Mission in Somalia, or AMISOM, and French and other European forces in the Sahel—help keep jihadis at bay. Yet military operations often alienate locals and further erode relations between them and state authorities.
There’s little to show for years of foreign efforts to build up indigenous armies. Malian colonels have seized power in Bamako twice in the space of just over a year, while the regional G5 Sahel force, comprising troops from Mali and its neighbors, also struggles against jihadis. (Chad recently pulled out some of its troops from the force, fearing upheaval at home.) As for the Somali security forces, units, caught up in political bickering, often shoot at each other.
If foreign efforts wind down, battlefield dynamics would undoubtedly shift, perhaps decisively, in the militants’ favor. In Somalia, al-Shabab could seize power in Mogadishu much as the Taliban did in Kabul. Intervening foreign powers are caught as they were in Afghanistan: unable to achieve their goals but fearful of what will follow if they exit. For now, they appear set to stay.
Even so, a rethink in both places—entailing a greater civilian role alongside military campaigns—is overdue. The Sahel governments need to improve their relations with citizens in the countryside. Somalia needs to repair relations among elites; late December saw another eruption in a drawn-out election feud. More controversial is talking to jihadis. It won’t be easy: Somalia’s neighbors, which contribute troops to AMISOM, oppose any engagement; and while Sahel governments have been more open, France rejects negotiations. No one knows whether compromise with militants is feasible, what it would entail, or how populations would view it.
But the military-centric approach has mostly spawned more violence. If foreign powers don’t want the same dilemma haunting them in a decade’s time, they need to prepare the ground for talks with militant leaders.
Originally published in Foreign Policy: 10 Conflicts to Watch in 2022.
Authors:
Comfort Ero,Crisis Group President & CEO
Richard Atwood,Crisis Group Executive Vice President
2021 Year in Review: UN support for countries in conflict
NEW YORK - Long-running conflicts continued in Syria and Yemen this year, whilst fresh unrest caused serious instability in Myanmar, Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Sudan. United Nations "Blue Helmet" peacekeepers suffered losses and injuries, particularly those serving in the peacekeeping missions in Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR). Nevertheless, the UN reaffirmed its commitment to protect those caught up in the fighting.
Syria: peace denied by a ‘gulf of mistrust’
The grim ten-year milestone of the Syrian conflict, which has killed more than 350,000 people, saw the UN Special Envoy for the country, Geir Pedersen, work tirelessly to advance the peace process, amid what he called the “slow tsunami” of crises, with economic collapse compounded by COVID-19, corruption and mismanagement.
Several times throughout the year, Mr. Pedersen delivered his realistic assessment of the humanitarian and security situation in the country, characterised by what he called a “gulf of mistrust” between warring parties, and frequent attacks on civilians.
Attempts to find agreement on a new constitution for Syria began in October, but these efforts proved fruitless, at least for now. Mr. Pedersen acknowledged that the outcome was a disappointment but urged the members of the Constitutional Committee to continue their work.
Yemen: ‘knocking on the door of famine’
The desperate people of Yemen faced the highest levels of acute malnutrition since the beginning of the conflict there in 2015, with over half the population facing severe food shortages. UN food relief agency chief David Beasley warned in March that millions were “knocking on the door of famine”.
Spring saw a dramatic deterioration in the conflict, with fighting expanding on several fronts, and the UN confirmed that the country remained the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.
A new UN envoy for Yemen, Hans Grundberg, was appointed in September, with no illusions about the difficulty of bringing peace and stability to the country, as a UNICEF report showed that some 10,000 children had been killed or maimed since the beginning of the fighting.
Is there real hope for an end to the fighting? Yes, says the UN Development Programme (UNDP), which released a report in November showing that, if the warring parties can agree to stop fighting, extreme poverty could be eradicated within a generation.
Afghanistan: Taliban takeover
International attention turned to Afghanistan following the shockingly swift military victory by the Taliban, who swept into the capital, Kabul, in August following the withdrawal of most international troops by June.
The Taliban’s takeover had been preceded by a marked increase in violence: Particularly horrific were the bombing of a girl’s school in Kabul in May, which killed at least 60, including several schoolgirls.
The following month, 10 deminers from the HALO trust were killed in the northern region, in an attack described by the Security Council as “atrocious and cowardly”, and a report released in July revealed that more women and children were killed and wounded in Afghanistan in the first half of 2021 than in the first six months of any year since records began in 2009.
As it became clear that the Taliban had become the de facto rulers of Afghanistan, the UN focus shifted to ensuring that humanitarian support remained as strong as possible: millions faced starvation with the onset of winter, and aid flights to Kabul resumed in September. In December, the World Food Programme (WFP) urged countries to put politics aside and step up support to avert a potential catastrophe.
The UN is providing $20 million in CERF to mitigate the loss of livelihoods and declines in food consumption after erratic rainfall in parts of Ethiopia depleted water supplies.
‘Grave uncertainty’ in Ethiopia
The northern Tigray region has been the epicentre of fighting in Ethiopia, between Government troops and the regional forces of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front.
The unrest exacerbated humanitarian concerns: in February, people displaced by the violence were reportedly reduced to eating leaves to survive. By June, the WFP estimated that some 350,000 people were at risk of famine.
There were persistent reports of human rights violations in Tigray, including disturbing news of abuse of civilians, and aid workers being targeted. Three employees of the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) agency were killed in June, and in July senior UN officials appealed for immediate and unrestricted humanitarian access to Tigray, and for an end to the deadly attacks on aid workers.
However, violence continued to escalate, and the country was under a state of emergency by November, when the UN rights office shared reports of people of Tigrayan origin being rounded up and arrested in the capital, Addis Ababa and elsewhere.
The UN political chief, Rosemary Di Carlo, told the Security Council that the future of the country was now shrouded in “grave uncertainty”, and was affecting the stability of the entire Horn of Africa region.
Myanmar: a challenge to regional stability
The decision of Myanmar’s military to detain the country’s top political leaders and government officials in a coup, including State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint, was roundly condemned by UN Secretary-General António Guterres in February.
The detentions were followed by a state of emergency, and a violent, widespread crackdown on dissent. Nevertheless, demonstrations against the takeover grew in February, leading to the killing of several protestors.
The UN Special Envoy for Myanmar Christine Schraner Burgener, warned that the situation in the country was a challenge to the stability of the region.
During the months that followed, protests continued, violence against demonstrators escalated, and senior UN officials condemned the actions of the military. A UN report in April raised fears that the coup, coupled with the impact of COVID-19, could result in up to 25 million people – nearly half of the country’s population - living in poverty by early 2022.
The UN called for an urgent international response to prevent the crisis becoming a catastrophe for the whole of Southeast Asia but, by September, the power of the military seemed to have become entrenched. In December, the UN rights office warned that the country’s human rights situation was deteriorating at an unprecedented rate.
Mali: a peacekeeping danger zone
UN-backed attempts to broker peace in Mali, following 2020’s military coup, could not prevent a deteriorating security crisis in 2021.
The country, in Africa’s Sahel region, retained its status as the world’s most dangerous posting for UN peacekeepers and, sadly, more of them were to pay the ultimate price whilst serving their duty.
The first deadly attacks on the UN blue helmets took place on 14 January, when four were killed and five wounded, and another attack left a further peacekeeper dead just two days later.
The following month, a temporary operating base of the UN Integrated Stabilization Mission for Mali (MINUSMA) in Kerena, near Douentza in Central Mali was attacked, resulting in the death of one peacekeeper and the wounding of 27 others.
In April, the UN peacekeeping chief, Jean-Pierre Lacroix, warned that ‘blue helmets’, and the Malian Defence and Security Forces, continue to suffer repeated attacks and significant losses, while some large towns live under constant threat from armed groups.
The death toll continued to rise: attacks in October and November left two peacekeepers dead whilst, in December, seven were killed and three seriously injured, when their vehicle hit an improvised explosive device in the Bandiagara region. To date, more than 200 peacekeepers have been killed in Mali.
Their presence in the country, however, remains essential: some 400,000 people have been forced to flee their homes due to conflict, and around 4.7 million are reliant on some form of humanitarian aid.
Hotspots of tension
UN News followed events in many other countries hit by outbreaks of violence and conflict in 2021.
- Visiting Burkina Faso in December, UN human rights chief Michelle Bachelet lamented the fact that the West African nation faces “a multitude of challenges with severe impacts on a wide range of human rights of its people”. One attack in a rural part of the country in June left at least 132 dead, whilst another in August led to the death of around 80.
- Cameroon remained beset by tension throughout the year, with separatists in the English-speaking regions of the country fighting to create their own state. The UN revealed in December that over 700,000 children have been impacted by school closures due to insecurity and violence.
- The Central African Republic was hit by a wave of violence following presidential elections in late December, 2020, targeting civilians and UN peacekeepers. Hundreds of thousands were forced from their homes by the violence, and the senior UN official warned the Security Council in June of an “unprecedented humanitarian crisis”.
- The Democratic Republic of the Congo suffered yet another year of violent attacks against civilians, with incidents reported on UN News practically every month, from a series of village killings in January, to the condemnation of mass human rights abuses in July, and the thousands fleeing fighting in November. Throughout the year, aid workers and UN peacekeepers also came under attack.
- Haiti was already in a drawn-out political, security, and humanitarian crisis, long before the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July. By October, the senior UN official in the country was warning that Haiti was undergoing “one of the most fraught periods of its recent history”.
- Iraq was the scene of deadly bomb attacks, including a suicide bombing at a busy Baghdad market in January, and another in the capital just before the Eid al-Adha holiday in July. In November, the UN Mission in the country condemned an assassination attempt on Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, when his house was hit by a drone attack.
- Niger underwent a deadly Spring, during which hundreds of civilians were killed in terror attacks. In January, around 100 died in the west of the country as a result of armed violence, and some 200 civilians were killed in the Tahoua region in March, including around 30 children.
- In Nigeria, Mass kidnappings continued to be a threat to schoolchildren: UN chief António Guterres called for the unconditional release of around 30 students abducted from a school in the northwest of the country in March, and many schoolchildren remain missing following earlier kidnappings.
- Unrest in Palestine and Israel escalated in May, with at least 60 youngsters killed in the occupied Palestinian enclave of Gaza and another 444 injured over a fraught 10-day period. After 11 days of rocket and air attacks, a ceasefire was reached between Israel and Palestinian militant group Hamas, by which time some 240 were reportedly killed, and thousands injured, the majority in Gaza.
- In Somalia, following months of escalating tensions and violence, the UN welcomed summit talks in Spring, which were followed in August by an electoral agreement between the Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein Roble, and the heads of Somalia’s federal member states.
- People in most parts of South Sudan are coping with extreme violence and attacks, a UN-appointed investigation found in February. The UN Children’s Fund, UNICEF, warned that, a decade after the country achieved independence, more children are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance than ever before.
- Sudan’s experiment in joint power-sharing between the military and civilian leaders, following the ousting of long-time ruler Omar al-Bashir in 2019, was derailed in October by a military coup. With the Prime Minister later restored to his office, the UN Envoy, Volker Perthes, told the Security Council in December that, whilst discussions on the way forward are underway, restoring trust will be a challenge.
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