Targeted Assassinations and the Threat of Regional War – Council Views
Middle East Council on Global Affairs, August 1, 2024
Middle East (ME) Council experts assess the impact of Israel’s war on Gaza, 300 days in, and the recent assassinations of senior leaders of Hamas and Hizballah.
On July 31, Hamas’ politburo chief Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran shortly after attending the inauguration of incoming President Masoud Pezeshkian. Just hours before, an Israeli drone strike killed one of the founders of Hizballah, Fuad Shukr, in a southern suburb of Beirut. The dual assassinations occurred during an escalation in the fighting between Hizballah and Israel on the Lebanese border that has drawn serious concern of provoking a regional war, and nearly 300 days into the catastrophic assault on Gaza that has killed at least 40,000 people and displaced millions. In this Council Views, Middle East Council experts examine the recent events and analyze the implications for the region.
Iran Will Respond, but How?
Hamidreza Azizi
The assassination of Hamas’ political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran has significant implications for Iran. First, the attack occurred just hours after the inauguration of Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian. Many observers view this as a deliberate attempt by Israel to challenge Iran at a politically sensitive moment and undermine Pezeshkian’s plans to improve Iran’s relations with the West.
Haniyeh was stationed in a complex owned by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, where heightened security protocols are expected. The attack, apparently conducted by a rocket launched from within Iran, highlights a severe intelligence failure, exposing vulnerabilities in the country’s security apparatus. This incident not only damages Iran’s homeland security but also its prestige and deterrence capabilities, revealing its inability to protect even high-profile allies within its borders.
Given this, there is little doubt that Iran will respond to the attack. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei’s vow of severe punishment, along with similar statements from other Iranian officials, suggests that a decision to retaliate has been made. The only question remaining is about the methods of retaliation.
Currently, the most probable scenario is a coordinated response by Iran and Hizballah, possibly involving other members of the “Axis of Resistance,” such as Iraqi militias and Yemen’s Houthis. By doing so, Iran and its allies aim to demonstrate continued coordination within the axis despite the killing of top figures in Lebanon (Hizballah commander Fuad Shukr) and Tehran. The main risk is that, depending on the scope of Iran’s response, Israel might escalate its approach to the conflict with Iran and the axis, potentially triggering the major regional war that so many have tried to avoid.
Biden’s Lame Duck Presidency Is Dangerous
Tarik M. Yousef
Not long after Iran accused Israel of carrying out the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran and pledged a harsh response did the U.S. government provide the first official reaction through Secretary of State Antony Blinken: a denial of any prior knowledge or involvement in the operation. Against the backdrop of unprecedented U.S. military and intelligence support for Israel in her ongoing war on Gaza and defense of her security, such claims of ignorance and inaction will not be taken seriously in the region or elsewhere and will further deplete U.S. credibility.
But if true, the Middle East should start preparing for a dangerous phase in the fading presidency of Joe Biden. Traditionally, U.S. presidents begin to lose influence and limit policy initiatives in the waning months between an election and the inauguration of a new administration. In Biden’s case, this lame duck period extends for almost half a year and coincides with growing evidence of the president’s cognitive decline. In other words, U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East during a dangerous phase of conflict will be guided by a diminished president presiding over a constrained administration.
Viewed from this perspective, Blinken’s denials would appear to confirm the loss of remaining American influence over Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his extremist allies as they continue the war in Gaza and aim to draw Iran and Hizballah into a wider regional conflict that the U.S. has repeatedly claimed she wants to prevent. Pressed to accept a cease-fire deal just a week ago at the White House, Netanyahu responded by ordering the killing of Hamas’s political leader and key negotiator, and with him the prospects for any deal, at least for a while. With a lame duck Biden, Netanyahu is unhinged, and things will get more dangerous in the Middle East between now and January 2025.
300 Days of Hostilities and Provocations Are Creating a Witches’ Brew
Omar H. Rahman
For ten months, as Israel’s calamitous war on Gaza has dragged on, the threat of a regional conflagration has been ever-present. With each passing day of hostilities, the possibility that one attack or counterattack will provoke a dramatic escalation on one, or all, of the many fronts stretching from southern Lebanon to southern Yemen should be expected. Indeed, the latest decision by Israel to target a founding member of Hizballah in Beirut and Hamas’ chief political leader in Tehran within hours of each other, could be such a catalyst.
Whether Benjamin Netanyahu is trying to provoke a regional war or not is unknown. The Israeli prime minister has his reasons to do so but could be calculating that Iran will remain prudent and find a way to respond without dramatically escalating. In that way, he will have achieved something in the eyes of his public—taking out two high-profile figures deep in enemy territory, however symbolic and fleeting—at a time when victories are few and far between and Israel looks weaker than ever before.
While the Haniyeh assassination in the heart of Iran also carries a potent message for the Iranian regime—that Israel can do what it wants, where it wants—it exemplifies the type of brinksmanship whose outcome can never be calculated. Amid escalating attacks between Israel and Hizballah, the witches’ brew of war provocations is only ripening. And with no end in sight to the killing in Gaza, full de-escalation is impossible and regional war near-inevitable.
Haniyeh Joins a Long List of Hamas Leaders Martyred for their Cause
Beverley Milton-Edwards, is the co-author of Hamas, the Quest for Power, Polity Press, 2024
Following the assassination of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh, there are major fears that a regional inferno involving Israel and Iran is one step nearer to being realized. This is a nightmare scenario for all the actors involved. It is thus no surprise that diplomatic weight is urgently being brought to bear to try halt such an escalation.
For Hamas, the organization has been hit hard. A leader has been erased in a place where he should have been protected—a safe-house provided by the Iranian government in Tehran.
In his home city of Gaza, and the Shatti refugee camp from which he hails, his killing is being mourned amid the rubble, and he has been declared a martyr to the Palestinian cause. He joins a long line of Hamas leaders who have met the same fate at Israel’s avenging hands.
Israel’s policy of decapitating the Hamas leadership has been carried out in large-scale bomb and missile attacks for decades. Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, his deputy Abdel Aziz Rantisi, Saleh Shehadeh, and Saleh Arouri, to name but a few. Haniyeh’s own family members, including his sons, grandchildren, and sister, have also been killed in Israeli airstrikes and missile attacks during the current war on Gaza.
The Hamas leadership and its supporters will respond—of that there is little doubt. Israel’s strategists and military planners will have drawn up their defense preparations and readied themselves. For the families of hostages, and for the beleaguered population of the Gaza Strip, which daily starves for lack of access to humanitarian supplies that Israel impedes, there is little hope, however, of peace and freedom in the immediate future.
The Assassinations Give Netanyahu a Much Needed “Win,” but May Not Salvage His Premiership
Adel Abdel Ghafar
Israeli opinion polls, taken before the assassination, show that nearly three-quarters of the Israeli public want Netanyahu to resign against the backdrop of the ongoing war in Gaza, with half the country also preferring earlier elections for its parliament, the Knesset. However, now that the Knesset has entered its summer recess, this gives Netanyahu some breathing room, with his current coalition having at least a few more months in its current configuration. In the short term, the assassinations themselves will most likely give Netanyahu a bump in his polling numbers, giving him further room to maneuver.
There has been growing pressure on Netanyahu domestically to wind down the war, with a recent poll finding that 60% of Israelis back the proposed hostage-for-ceasefire deal. The question is, did Netanyahu order Haniyeh’s assassination to torpedo the ceasefire negotiations, or to accept them from a position of strength? As the Qatari prime minister aptly put it, “how can mediation succeed when one party assassinates the negotiator on the other side?”
Despite resisting the deal so far, the assassination of Haniyeh puts Netanyahu in a better position domestically to accept the deal—armed with the argument that Hamas’ leadership has been decimated and that Israel is entering the ceasefire from a position of strength. As these dynamics unfold over the next few days, one thing is clear: Netanyahu is happy to take the whole region to the brink of war for his own political survival.
The Assassination of Haniyeh Will Add Oil to the Fire
Jin Liangxiang
Although no organizations or countries officially claimed responsibility for the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, Israel was widely and reasonably suspected of having conducted the operation. Supposing the suspicion is right, the reasons could be numerous, but there are two that are particularly worth mentioning.
The first is the aim of disrupting ceasefire negotiations. The reason why a ceasefire agreement has not been made in the past nine months is simply that the Israeli government led by Netanyahu intends to maintain the freedom of the use of military force in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, while Hamas has demanded a permanent ceasefire. By assassinating Haniyeh, Hamas will have to leave the negotiating table, which will lead to the suspension of talks, and Israel will justify its military operation in the Gaza Strip.
The second reason is to disrupt any potential reconciliation between Iran and the United States. History tells us that Israel is always ready to undermine any Iran-U.S. rapprochement every time the possibility appears. Similar cases occurred in the mid-1990s, early 2000s and between 2015-2018.
Iran’s newly inaugurated President Masoud Pezeshkian had expressed very clearly that Iran would seek engagement with the world, which could be interpreted as the U.S. and the West. But it seems that Israel led by Netanyahu has zero tolerance for any potential Iran-U.S. reconciliation. By assassinating Haniyeh in Iran, Israel might mean to nip the possibility at the beginning.
All in all, the assassination is likely a carefully calculated move by Israel, with an expectation that the resulting situation will favor Israel. But the real evolution of events could be very dangerous for the region. While Palestinians living in Gaza could have an even more difficult time, the region could see new momentum toward unification around the Palestinian cause.
Why Assassinations Are No Longer Effective
Mohammad Abu Hawash
Israel’s tactic of decapitating the heads of resistance factions belongs in the twentieth century. It is no longer effective at defeating, weakening, or even destabilizing Israel’s adversaries.
This tactic worked in the 1970s and ‘80s, when Israel’s Mossad launched “Operation Wrath of God” and other expansive assassination campaigns to eliminate key militant leaders within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). These campaigns shook the Palestinian governance structure to its core, because it relied on charismatic figures, such as Abu Iyad, Abu Jihad, and Ali Hassan Salameh—all killed by Israel—to drive recruitment and diplomatic engagement.
With Hamas or Hizballah, however, the assassination of their leading figures is usually followed by a spike in both recruitment and diplomatic engagement. This has been reflected in the most recent assassinations in Beirut and Tehran, with Türkiye, Qatar, Jordan, Egypt, and other key regional players issuing harshly worded condemnations and accusing Israel of sowing chaos.
Israel’s tactic has repeatedly failed against consolidated organizations like Hamas or Hizballah because, for them, “brand” supersedes cult of personality. Both organizations learned from the experience of predecessors who suffered greatly from the elimination of their charismatic leaders. They have taken measures to mitigate this risk by creating highly devolved structures where no individual holds disproportionate influence.
Ismail Haniyeh said this himself nearly seven months ago—following Israel’s assassination of Hamas’ deputy chairman Saleh al-Arouri and two Qassam Brigades commanders—when he remarked that “all these assassinations and all these tactics will make us stronger and more determined than ever… this is the history of our movement, this is what we’ve always done following the assassination of our commanders.”
Disclaimer
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Middle East Council on Global Affairs or CEMAS Board.