The African Union at 20: Much Accomplished, More Challenges Ahead

By Paul Nantulya, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, February 22, 2022

To be more meaningful to the lives of citizens and to better realize the vision of its founders, the African Union will need to empower its technical, legislative, and judicial institutions.

Africa marks the 20th anniversary of the founding of the African Union (AU) in 2022. Much has been achieved. African countries have an institutional platform to engage other global agencies, financial institutions, and external actors.

Progress has also been made toward operationalizing the African Standby Force. The doctrine, command and control, force allocations, deployment scenarios, and logistics plans are in place and regularly exercised up to the brigade level. This was a long-held dream of the founders of the AU’s predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

The challenges ahead are enormous, however. Contrary to the vision articulated in its Constitutive Act, the AU’s legislative, judicial, and technical organs remain weak, especially relative to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, which comprises the leaders of its 55 member states. The Pan-African Parliament and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council—designed to give civil society organizations a voice within AU institutions—remain consultative bodies with no power. The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, established to protect human rights and reduce impunity at the national level, remains hamstrung. Only 32 countries have ratified its protocol and of these, just eight accept its jurisdiction to hear complaints from citizens. Moreover, it is not permitted to sanction or investigate incumbent presidents.

Unsurprisingly, more than a third of Africans feel alienated from the AU or have no opinion on it.

The lack of political will to empower these regional institutions also weakens the commitment to common norms. Under the 2000 Lomé Declaration, the AU established a protocol for condemning coups and expelling offending member states. This rule has been implemented in Egypt (2013), Burkina Faso (2015, 2022), Guinea (2021), Mali (2020, 2021), and Sudan (2019, 2022). However, it was silent on others, such as Zimbabwe and Chad in 2017 and 2021, respectively. Furthermore, even in the cases where the AU implemented the protocol, the modalities for rehabilitation are unclear, as most offenders eventually wind up back in the AU with little or no consequences.

The AU is also not united over how to deal with term-limit violations. ECOWAS led the way in 2015 by introducing a nonretroactive two-term limit rule for its 15 members. However, resistance by two authoritarian members at the time—Togo and Gambia—caused it to stall, though the issue remains on the ECOWAS agenda. ECOWAS sent troops to remove Gambia’s Yahya Jammeh who refused to step down after losing an election in 2017. However, 2 years later, ECOWAS failed to stop Faure Gnassingbé from bypassing Togo’s constitution to hand himself a third term amidst a wave of deadly violence. The Gnassingbé family has ruled Togo as a hereditary dynasty since 1975.

Widespread frustration over such inconsistencies leads some Africans to dismiss the AU as a “presidents club” in the mold of its predecessor, the OAU, which faced similar criticism even from founding fathers like the late Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere. Some say the AU should be disbanded as it is perennially cash-strapped, unwieldy, and bites off more than it can chew. Others say the AU is being unfairly judged against impossible ideals as it is ultimately an organization of member states who must commit themselves to these norms.

Vision and Evolution

Established in 1963, the OAU led Africa out of colonialism but was ill-equipped for the new era. Two events in April 1994 crystalized the need for reform: the genocide in Rwanda and the end of apartheid in South Africa—stigma and euphoria. Intensive public consultations to amend the OAU Charter drew on debates launched by the Africa Leadership Forum in 1989, the OAU’s 1990 Declaration on fundamental changes in the world, and the findings of its investigative panel on the 1994 genocide.

As a result of these consultations, a powerful vision was laid out in the new AU’s Constitutive Act signed in 2000. The OAU’s “non-interference” principle was amended to a posture of “non-indifference” and “responsibility to protect,” even without consent—a lesson from Rwanda. The Act calls on the body to condemn coups and other unconstitutional changes of government. It also spells out conditions under which the AU can intervene when countries fail to govern responsibly, including genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. To that end, the African Peace and Security Architecture was established, and within it the African Standby Force.

The Act was designed for citizens’ interests to be at the center of all decisions. A Pan-African Parliament to be elected through universal suffrage, was created to ensure citizen participation. The Act also created the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), an elected assembly of civil society organizations, including professional associations, labor unions, and service bodies. A Citizens and Diaspora Directorate (CIDO) was established to facilitate the AU’s engagement with the African diaspora, which was recognized as the AU’s sixth region. African overseas citizens and people of African descent would have the right to sit on the ECOSOCC, engage the Pan-African Parliament, and participate in pre-AU Summit forums.

Inside the AU’s Program for Revitalization and Reform

Reformers have suggested that a revitalized AU is achievable if the Constitutive Act is judiciously implemented without fear or favor. For this to happen, the AU must pare back, undertake deep reforms, rationalize its institutions, and renew itself. In 2016, the AU appointed Rwandan President Paul Kagame to lead what it called an “urgent and necessary” institutional overhaul. A team of eminent Africans from government, civil society, private sector, and international agencies was assembled to consult widely and deliver recommendations. They identified four bottlenecks:

- The AU was highly fragmented with too many focus areas.

- Its complicated structure and limited managerial capacity made it inefficient and unaccountable.

- It was neither financially independent nor self-sustaining.

- There was poor coordination between it and the Regional Economic Communities.

After 2 years of deliberations, they came up with a comprehensive plan for AU renewal:

- Refocus the AU’s priorities on fewer areas.

- Review its structure to realign institutions.

- Safeguard and expand citizens’ participation.

- Improve operational effectiveness.

- Enhance financial independence.

Specific proposals under each item were tabled before an extraordinary AU Reform Summit in November 2018. The merger of some organs and technical agencies, elimination of others, reduction of senior leadership and middle-management positions, and reorganization of the staff structure were quickly approved.

Proposals that had implications for the influence of heads of state, however, did not get as much traction. These included greater independence of the AU Commission, empowering it to recruit commissioners (the AU’s senior leadership team), and establishing full legislative power for the Pan-African Parliament to include voting by universal suffrage.

Other reform proposals sought to curtail the roles of the Permanent Representatives Committee (ambassadors) and the Executive Council (ministers) relative to the technocratic AU Commission. A motion to create a fully empowered African Court of Justice and Human Rights by merging the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Court of Justice was also tabled. The protocol for this merger was adopted in 2008 but has not been ratified. The reform team urged the AU Assembly to revisit the matter, describing the failure to ratify it as “a lack of commitment” by member states.

These proposals were considered by some as encroaching on the Assembly of Heads of States’ powers. Even approving the 0.2-percent import levy to boost the AU’s financial independence proved to be too much. Moreover, some political actors believe that the reforms would turn the AU into a technocratic agency like the UN, which has an institutional identity outside its member states—something opponents find unpalatable. Others believe that a more technocratic AU run by a professional and independent Commission with designated technical agencies could deliver more for the African people.

The issue of how much authority members are prepared to share to make the AU more functional is also a factor. Some believe that ultimate authority should rest with the Assembly of Heads of State rather than with a technocratic Commission sitting in Addis (AU headquarters) or an elected body in Midrand (the seat of the PAP in South Africa). Others push back from this interpretation, invoking Pan-Africanism—a core tenet of the OAU and AU—that emphasizes the transnational dimensions of African solidarity as well as its practical economic and security applications for addressing continental challenges. Its adherents argue that if AU reforms are anchored in Pan-Africanism instead of state-centrism, then its organs would be empowered, and it could then bring citizens to the center of its work.

Taking Stock: Restructuring Sans Renewal?

For now, the interests of the heads of state continue to prevail. They retain the power to select the AU Commission’s 6 commissioners. With the support of the AU Commission, its priorities were cut to four: political affairs, peace and security, economic integration, and amplifying Africa’s voice. The political affairs and peace and security dockets were merged into the new Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) Department. Since the import levy has not been universally accepted, reliable independent funding for peace and security priorities remains an issue.

The larger reform agenda of enhancing citizens’ participation by empowering the legislative and judicial organs and giving more voice to ECOSOCC remain unresolved. The PAP has been variously described as toothless, pointless, and an empty shell—an indictment on member states. Rather than being elected directly by the people, parliamentary members are selected by national parliaments. They are restricted to collecting information and debating, and cannot make laws or binding decisions.

To be fair, institutions do not become functional overnight. The European Parliament, on which the PAP is modeled, also developed in fits and starts. It took 29 years to evolve from a marginal consultative organ into a powerful one that is elected by universal suffrage, exercises legislative power, and carries equal weight with the European Commission (the executive arm of the European Union) on matters of law, policy, and budget. Again, however, strong political will is needed for such institutional developments.

Similar frustrations abound about the AU’s financial position. The AU’s approved budget for 2022 was $650 million. Of this, $176 million was for general operations and $195 million for programs. Member state contributions cover 72 percent of these operational costs, which while commendable still falls below the goal of self-financing. Meanwhile, the entire peace and security budget of $279 million is still largely funded by donors.

In looking at this mixed picture, many within the AU fear that the heads of state have taken a minimalist view of reform focused on selective restructuring as opposed to renewal, which requires political will to allow AU organs to function properly. Consequently, organs like the African Standby Force risk remaining irrelevant no matter the competencies they have gained.

In June 2021, the AU was accused of double standards when it failed to sanction the generals in Chad after they imposed Mahamat ibn Idriss Déby Itno as ruler following his father’s untimely death. The AU justified its tolerance of the so-called Transitional Military Council by rationalizing that Chad was attacked by foreign mercenaries. The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) was castigated for this controversial decision, but the real problem came from the presidents in the region who wanted the generals to stay and were loath to have them expelled from the AU. The AU, thus, is faced with the nearly irreconcilable task of balancing the enforcement of democratic norms with catering to individual leaders’ political interests.

“Honesty requires us to acknowledge that the root problem is not primarily technical, but rather the result of a deeper deficiency,” the Kagame Report found. “Reform does not start with the Commission. It starts and ends with the leaders, who must set the right expectations and tempo.” The misalignment between the Assembly and other organs as explained in this report will continue to hamper the AU.

In December 2015, the PSC took a decision to deploy a peacekeeping mission to Burundi to stem the escalating violence triggered by then President Pierre Nkurunziza’s third term—a move deemed unconstitutional by EAC Attorneys General. This would have been the first deployment under the African Standby Force, and all systems were in place to put it on the ground by March. However, the Assembly of Heads of State swiftly rebuked the PSC accusing it of “overstepping its bounds.” AU credibility to serve as deterrent further evaporated when its Special Representative to the Great Lakes Region, Ibrahima Fall, said it never really intended to go in, describing the measure as “simply unimaginable.”

Public frustration over such dysfunction is shared by many inside the AU itself. A former Peace and Security Commissioner says that the AU must update the Lomé Declaration to explicitly outlaw the manipulation of constitutions, adopt a nonretroactive two-term limit rule, and craft a sanctions regime. This should be part of the security agenda as the abuse of term limits often leads to increased political instability and conflict.

The Elephant in the Room

The gap between vision and reality is compounded by the elephant in room. Many within the Assembly of Heads of State do not want a functional supranational body that empowers citizens, has the potential to hold leaders accountable, and may intervene if needed to protect African citizens. Instead, as currently organized, the Assembly can overrule the AU’s executive, legislative, and legal bodies. This imbalance is seen in the increasingly divisive issue of term limits. Incumbents who pursue such measures can outmaneuver those working to preserve established democratic norms even though such norms are part of the Constitutive Act and the legally binding African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.

A middle ground is possible. This would be an AU that responds to political direction but has the technical, managerial, and institutional competence to discharge its responsibilities.

For now, though, many Africans see the AU as an ad hoc mechanism that caters to presidents and prime ministers, rather than a functional agency that can deliver for them as envisioned in its protocols and conventions.

For many Africans, the viable pathway for the AU is the judicious implementation of the letter and spirit of its founding documents and additional protocols, particularly those relating to bodies designed to facilitate citizen inputs. The Pan-African Parliament is a good place to start. Only when the AU becomes truly Pan-Africanist, people-centered, and democratic, will African citizens feel they can readily support and defend the AU’s decisions, and even own its challenges.

Additional Resources

- Institute for Security Studies, “As the AU turns 20, it must speak with one voice,” PSC Insights, January 10, 2022.

- Ambassador Said Djinnit, “The Case for updating the African Union Policy on Unconstitutional Changes of Government,” Policy and Practice Brief, African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), October 2021.

- Liesl Louw-Vaudran, “Pan-African Parliament’s woes reflect a crisis in leadership,” ISS Today, Institute for Security Studies, June 10, 2021.

- Joseph Siegle and Candace Cook, “Presidential Term Limits Key to Democratic Progress and Security in Africa,” Orbis 65, no. 3 (2021).

- Paul Nantulya, “The African Union Wavers between Reform and More of the Same,” Spotlight, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, April 19, 2019.

- Lynsey Chutel, “The African Union has a brilliant plan for Africa, if it could get it right,” Quartz Africa, February 16, 2019.

- Institute for Security Studies, “The slow pace of ‘changing mindsets’ on AU reform,” PSC Insights, December 7, 2018.

- Peter Fabricius, “Does Africa really want a continental Parliament?” ISS Today, Institute for Security Studies, October 19, 2017.

https://africacenter.org/spotlight/african-union-20-much-accomplished-more-challenges-ahead/

Global arms trade falls slightly, but imports to Europe, East Asia rise

STOCKHOLM - International transfers of major arms saw a slight drop between 2012–16 and 2017–21 (–4.6 per cent). Nevertheless, exports by the United States and France increased substantially, as did imports to states in Europe (+19 per cent), East Asia (+20 per cent) and Oceania (+59 per cent). Transfers to the Middle East remained high, while those to Africa and the Americas decreased, according to new data on global arms transfers published today by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

‘The small decrease in global arms transfers masks large variations between regional trends,’ said Pieter D. Wezeman, Senior Researcher with the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme. ‘Whereas there were some positive developments, including South American arms imports reaching their lowest level in 50 years, increasing or continuing high rates of weapons imports to places like Europe, East Asia, Oceania and the Middle East contributed to worrying arms build-ups.’

Europe sees biggest growth in arms imports

The biggest growth in arms imports among world regions occurred in Europe. In 2017–21 imports of major arms by European states were 19 per cent higher than in 2012–16 and accounted for 13 per cent of global arms transfers. The largest arms importers in Europe were the United Kingdom, Norway and the Netherlands. Other European states are also expected to increase their arms imports significantly over the coming decade, having recently placed large orders for major arms, in particular combat aircraft from the USA. Despite armed conflict in eastern Ukraine throughout 2017–21, the country’s imports of major arms in the period were very limited.

‘The severe deterioration in relations between most European states and Russia was an important driver of growth in European arms imports, especially for states that cannot meet all their requirements through their national arms industries,’ said Pieter D. Wezeman, Senior Researcher with the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme. ‘Arms transfers also play an important role in transatlantic security relationships.’

Asia and Oceania imports down, but rising in some subregions

Asia and Oceania remained the largest importing region for major arms, receiving 43 per cent of global transfers in 2017–21, and six states in the region were among the 10 largest importers globally: India, Australia, China, South Korea, Pakistan and Japan. Transfers to the region overall fell slightly (–4.7 per cent), but there was wide variation among different subregions.

Arms imports to South Asia fell by 21 per cent and those to South East Asia fell by 24 per cent between 2012–16 and 2017–21. In the same period, arms imports to Oceania grew by 59 per cent, due to a 62 per cent increase in Australia’s imports, and imports to East Asia rose by 20 per cent.

‘Tensions between China and many states in Asia and Oceania are the main driver of arms imports in the region,’ said Siemon T. Wezeman, Senior Researcher with the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme. ‘These tensions are also a major factor in US arms transfers to the region. The USA remains the largest supplier to Asia and Oceania, as arms exports are an important element of US foreign policy aimed at China.’

Indian arms imports decreased by 21 per cent between 2012–16 and 2017–21. However, it remained the largest importer globally and India is planning large-scale arms imports in the next few years from several suppliers.

Middle Eastern arms imports level off after sharp increase

Middle Eastern states imported 2.8 per cent more arms in 2017–21 than they did in 2012–16. This followed an 86 per cent increase in arms imports to the region between 2007–11 and 2012–16.

As the conflict in Yemen continued and tensions between Iran and other states in the region remained high, arms imports played an important role in security developments in the Gulf. Arms imports by Saudi Arabia—the world’s second largest arms importer—increased by 27 per cent between 2012–16 and 2017–21. Qatar’s arms imports grew by 227 per cent, propelling it from the 22nd largest arms importer to the 6th largest. In contrast, arms imports by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) shrank by 41 per cent between 2012–16 and 2017–21, taking it from the third largest to the ninth largest arms importer globally. All three of these states and Kuwait have placed large orders for major arms planned for delivery in the coming years.

US, French arms exports rise; Russian, Chinese and German arms exports fall

Arms exports by the USA grew by 14 per cent between 2012–16 and 2017–21, increasing its global share from 32 per cent to 39 per cent. Arms exports by the USA in 2017–21 were more than double (108 per cent more) those of the second largest exporter, Russia. The Middle East accounted for 43 per cent of US arms transfers. Especially important for the growth of US arms exports was an increase in deliveries of major arms to Saudi Arabia, by 106 per cent.

Russia, which accounted for 19 per cent of all exports of major arms in 2017–21, saw its exports shrink by 26 per cent between 2012–16 and 2017–21. The overall decrease in Russia’s arms exports was almost entirely due to a fall in arms deliveries to two recipients: India and Viet Nam. However, several large arms deliveries from Russia to India are expected in the coming years.

France accounted for 11 per cent of global arms exports in 2017–21, making it the third largest arms exporter. France increased its arms exports by 59 per cent between 2012–16 and 2017–21.

In 2017–21 China was the fourth largest arms exporter and Germany the fifth largest. Arms exports by China decreased by 31 per cent between 2012–16 and 2017–21, while Germany’s arms exports fell by 19 per cent.

Other notable developments:

- Italian arms exports represented 3.1 per cent of the global total in 2017–21 and were 16 per cent higher than in 2012–16.

- Arms exports by the United Kingdom dropped by 41 per cent between 2012–16 and 2017–21. The UK accounted for 2.9 per cent of total arms exports in 2017–21.

- Between 2012–16 and 2017–21 there were overall decreases in arms imports by states in three world regions: the Americas (–36 per cent), Africa (–34 per cent), and Asia and Oceania (–4.7 per cent).

- In 2017–21 arms imports by South American states were lower than in any five-year period in the past half century. Brazil is the only state in South America with substantial deliveries of arms pending.

- Myanmar’s arms imports fell by 32 per cent between 2012–16 and 2017–21. It accounted for 0.6 per cent of global arms transfers in 2017–21.

- In 2017–21 the five largest arms importers in sub-Saharan Africa were Angola, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Mali and Botswana.

- Taiwan’s arms imports shrank by 68 per cent between 2012–16 and 2017–21, but are scheduled to increase significantly in the coming years.

- Israeli arms imports increased by 19 per cent between 2012–16 and 2017–21.

- Egypt's arms imports grew by 73 per cent between 2012–16 and 2017–21, making it the third largest arms importer globally.

“Today’s Morocco is Not That of the Past”

“Today’s Morocco is Not That of the Past”

By Dr Tarik Oumazzane, first published by the Global Politics magazine, 12 February 2022

Any follower of Moroccan foreign policy will recognise an unprecedented dynamism and momentum in recent years. The best catchphrase that illustrates this dynamism is the one by Morocco Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita: “maghrib alyawm lays hu maghrib al’ams – [today’s Morocco is not that of the past]”. This expression is argued not only to highlight Morocco’s increased agency in the realm of international relations, but also it sums up the changing relations between the Global North and the Global South. This is a relationship that goes beyond the dependency of the neo-colonial era in favour of a new dispensation where the Global South is strengthening its position on the world stage and slowly, but steadily, changing the rules of the game.

The argument that the Global North is mostly favoured and the Global South is largely marginalised is well established in international relations. According to Cohn, the Global North has been exerting a dominant force in the post-World War II global political economy and in nearly all international institutions.[1] Bello argues that the Global South was disadvantaged by the world order that emerged after 1945 and that developing countries did not have much say in the international decision-making process.[2]

The existing asymmetrical power relationship between North and South is evident when considering the system that emerged between former colonisers and former colonies after decolonisation. Despite a large number of countries gaining their independence, the former master continued to exercise political and economic control over newly independent states, a concept known as Neo-colonialism or, in Kwame Nkrumah’s words, the “last stage of imperialism”[3]. For example, trade from the newly independent states (mainly raw materials) was geared to serve its former colonisers. Politically, states from the Global North continued to interfere in their former colonies’ domestic affairs. Who was in charge in Kinshasa, Tehran or Havana was hardly the result of people’s will, but was, to some extent, the decision of either Washington, Paris, London or Moscow.

The domination of the Global North went beyond the economic and political dimensions to what is social and cultural. Mahdi Elmandjra, former Head of cultural activities at UNESCO expressed this in his book عولمة العولمة [Globalising Globalisation ]:

“Despite living and interacting with different cultures for 30 years and despite my long work as the UNESCO Head of Cultural Activities, I came to one conclusion: despite the efforts of the South to understand the culture and civilisation of the North, I did not observe a true desire of the North to get closer to the South. The North’s preoccupation is to spread its values. The North considers that the weak and poor South does not have the right to promote its values, culture and civilisation.”[4]

In his earlier book Première Guerre Civilisationnelle, Elmandjra argued that the North has done little to understand, let alone speak, the language of the South; on this basis he predicted a North-South crisis.[5]

In this context of North-South inequality, it is refreshing to hear Bourita words “maghrib alyawm lays hu maghrib al’ams – today’s Morocco is not that of the past”. These words, expressed with confidence, were directed at Spain following the Spanish government’s attempt to covertly host the head of the Polisario Front under a false identity, which Morocco considered to be siding with separatism. Morocco moved from words to actions, calling back its ambassador from Madrid, lowering its security cooperation and for a short period halting its norther borders surveillance, prompting a migration crisis. Madrid reacted by accusing Rabat of ‘blackmailing’ and sought the support of the European Union. Spanish Defence Minister Margarita Robles stated “We will not accept blackmail.

The territorial integrity of Spain is non-negotiable and we will use all means necessary to protect our borders… This was an aggression against the borders of Spain and the European Union … With Spain, you cannot play these kinds of games.”[6] These harsh words from Madrid, which embody to some extent a colonial legacy, were responded to by Bourita with much objectivity and pragmatism: “today’s Morocco is not that of the past, and some circles in Spain need to understand this… Good neighborliness is not a one-way system.” Bourita added that Morocco “does not have the obligation to protect borders,” but it does so within the framework of partnership.[7] Reading between the lines, it is evident that Morocco’s foreign policy did not seek the victory of one party over the other as much it sought mutual respect and the respect of each country’s national interest and national sovereignty.

It is this objectivity and pragmatism that explain the unprecedented momentum and dynamism in Morocco’s foreign policy. Borrowing from Rational Choice Theory (RCT), one can deduce that the Kingdom of Morocco is acting more and more as a rational actor, using rational calculations to make rational choices and, therefore, achieving outcomes that are aligned with its national interest. In doing so, Morocco is not only maximising its own payoffs, but also those of other countries. According to RCT, states driven by self-interest and rationality will make decisions that lead to positive benefits for everyone (positive sum game).[8] In the past few years, Morocco has worked on developing a multi-dimensional foreign strategy and is it beginning to yield fruit.

On the African stage, Morocco has entrenched its position as a ‘Gateway to Africa’[9] with a combination of careful investment, active diplomacy, strategic business and far-reaching infrastructure investment. In 2017, Morocco resumed its seat in the African Union. This harked backed to the foreign policy tradition it had developed as one of the founding members of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (1963) and the Casablanca Group (1961).Economically, the Kingdom has emerged as one of the leading international investors in Africa with foreign direct investment (FDI) valued at about $4 billion in 2020.[10] Up to 85% of Moroccan FDI goes to Africa. In terms of connectivity with the continent, Morocco boasts weekly links to more than 40 ports in West Africa.[11] The Kingdom’s airline strategy expanded its connections with the continent at competitive rates, positioning Casablanca as a transit hub for African-bound businesses flying in from Europe and North America.

Moroccan banks also led the charge into Africa. The top three Moroccan banks, Attijariwafa Bank, Bank of Africa, and Banque Centrale Populaire (BCP) boast thousands of branches in the African continent from Cairo to Brazaville and from Bamako to Dar es Salaam. In 2010, Morocco created Casablanca Finance City (CFC), a regional financial hub, with a mandate of becoming Africa financial heart.

In the energy sector, Morocco is leading the way to realising what has been described as the ‘the pan-African project of the century’ [12]: the Morocco-Nigeria Gas Pipeline (MNGP), an onshore and offshore gas pipeline (5,660 km) project that aims to deliver natural gas resources from Nigeria to Morocco and potentially into Europe.

Outside of Africa, Morocco has adopted the same pragmatism and objectivity in its relations with other international actors. In 2017, it resumed its diplomatic relations with Cuba after 37 years of estrangement. In 2020, Morocco’s decided to normalise its relationship with Israel as part of a tripartite agreement including the USA. Rabat became an active member of several forums and initiatives: the Morocco-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) forum, the African wide Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), the Turkey-Africa Forum, the India-Africa Forum, and China’s Belt and Road Initiative. As a result, trade between Morocco and some southern states expanded. For example, in 2021, Moroccan exports to Brazil broke a record at $1.9 billion, an increase of 95.5%, compared to the previous year.[13]

What is conspicuous in this dynamic foreign policy is that the Kingdom is acting more and more as a rational actor, making optimal decisions that aim to maximise its payoffs in a positive sum game with other countries. The principles which are thought to guide the new foreign policy are: mutual respect, reciprocal benefits, respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. If we add to those ingredients Morocco’s increasing capacity to adapt to geostrategic changes that the world is currently experiencing: growing South-South cooperation, the Chinese Belt and Road project, Britain’s exit from the European Union, and Russia’s increased involvement in Eastern Europe and parts of the Middle East. The result is a dynamic Moroccan foreign policy that aspires to strengthen the Kingdom’s regional agency and to boost its bargaining power in global affairs. In doing so, Morocco is contributing to changing the relationship between the Global North and the Global South from a lose-win equation to a win-win one.

Image courtesy of European External Action Service – EEAS. (CC BY-NC 4.0)

Author: Dr Tarik Oumazzane is Lecturer in History and International Relations at the University of Nottingham, United Kingdom.

Notes

[1] Cohn, T. H. (2016). Global Political Economy (6th ed.). New York: Routledge.

[2] Bello, W. (2004). Deglobalisation: Ideas for a New World Economy. Zed Books.

[3] Kwame Nkrumah, K. (1965). Neo-Colonialism, The Last Stage of Imperialism. London: Thomas Nelson & Sons.

[4] Elmandjra, M. (2015). عولمة العولمة [The Globalisation of Globalisation]. Rabat: Al-Zaman. pp.123-124.

[5] Elmandjra, M. (1991). Première Guerre Civilisationnelle. Casablanca : Toubkal.

[6] Robles, M. (20 May 2021).Radio Nacional de España.

[7] Bourita, N. (20 May 2021). Maghreb Arab Press.

[8] Glaser, C. (2010). Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation. (Princeton, Princeton University Press).

[9] Financial Times. Special Report: Morocco: Gateway to Africa (accessed 14 January 2022)

[10] The Moroccan Agency for Development of Investment and Export (AMDIE), 2020.

[11] Irwin-Hunt, A. (2020). ‘A signal for Morocco’s development’. FDI Intelligence. (accessed 12 January 2022)

[12] Naji, A. (2021) ‘The Morocco-Nigeria gas pipeline: Economic and geopolitical benefits’. Wall Street International.

[13] Brazilian Ministry of Economy, 2022.