Prospects for EU-Ghana defence partnership: Local agency and views on security cooperation 

By Oliver Milland, FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, 09 February 2024

The volatile security situation in the Sahel is having a seriously destabilising effect that goes beyond the borders of the countries immediately affected. National efforts and Western-led security support have largely failed to contain the threat in the past decade, leading to a schism between Sahelian states and various Euro-pean actors. As Sahelian militant groups are now at the doorstep of littoral West Africa, European actors are scrambling to redefine their security support by placing greater emphasis on building new partner-ships in the region. Ghana is one of two countries with whom the EU is looking to expand its cooperation. However, in a bid to avoid making miscalculations akin to those made in other Sahelian states, there is an urgency of gaining an improved understanding of local agency and views on security cooperation in a bid to design more effective and durable security responses.

Introduction

The political and security situation in the Sahel region is dire. What began as a Tuareg secessionist insurgency in northern Mali in 2012 has transformed into a regional multidimensional crisis, including an extensive presence of various Islamist non-state armed groups and ethnic militias, in a situation of intercommunal hostility and military takeovers across the Sahel.

Furthermore, low- intensity attacks have been reported in northern parts of Benin (2019), Côte d’Ivoire (2020), and Togo (2022) during the past four years. In tandem with this, political animosity and geo-political competition have increased, not only among countries in the region but also towards and between extra-regional actors.

The presence of Western military actors, in particular France, has become a critical fric-tion point, with local public opinion and leadership becoming increasingly hostile to the French military presence. Since February 2022, the French military has withdrawn from three Sahelian states at the request of their junta-led governments.
(1) Bamako also demanded that the UN peacekeeping mission, MINUSMA, leave by the end of 2023.(2)

MINUSMA handed over control of its last major camps in the northern town of Timbuktu a few days before the end of the deadline.(3)The presence of other Western security actors, including the European Union and the United States, is also being challenged because of their normative focus on the promotion of democracy and human rights.

The EU’s Training Mission in Mali has drastically reduced the number of its personnel, while the Nigerien junta in December 2023 announced the cancellation within six months of two security and defence cooperation agreements with the European bloc.(4) The first was the EU’s civilian capacity-building mission, EUCAP Sahel Niger, which had been in place since 2012. The second was the EU Military Partnership Mission to Niger, which deployed in February 2023.(5) On the same day, Niger signed a defence cooperation with Russia.(6)

The extent and speed at which Sahelian states severed their relations with France, downgraded their relationships with other European states, and took a more positive stance towards Russian support appeared to take many in Europe by surprise. What is more, some African countries’ refusal to side with European positions in UN General Assembly votes condemning Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine caused some consternation in European diplomatic circles.(7)

Importantly, it highlighted diverging interpretations between Western and African actors. While some in Europe were quick to blame this development on Russian disinformation campaigns, others have sought to question the effectiveness of the European response.(8)Against this backdrop, Western actors, including the EU, France and the US, are attempting to reframe existing relations or build new partnerships with African actors.

France announced in February 2023 that it would reframe its engagement in Africa on a model of partnerships with local actors, including by reducing its military presence.(9) By the same token, the Council of the EU announced a new initiative, in August 2023, that established a new civilian-military mission in countries along the Gulf of Guinea that will last for two years.

So far, only Benin and Ghana have invited the EU to deploy, but the mission may be extended to other countries as well. Again, the mission emphasises “an integrated approach for a security and defence partnership.”(10) The decision promises to deploy military advisors to EU delegations as well as provide training and capacity-building for local security forces.

What is less clear from these moves is what support local actors want or what role they want to play. Part of the challenges that emerged in the Sahel in recent years was the inability of external actors to adequately respond to their host communities’ security needs.(11)

Other assessments have posited that Western security assistance has been too supply-driven, failing to account for the needs or conditions on the demand-side, and resulting in ineffective and sometimes counterproductive policies.(12) As such, this brief assesses, in four parts, the prospects for European actors to build an effective and durable partnership with Ghana. It draws the conclusion that there are good prospects for this for three reasons.

Firstly, the security situation in Ghana is problematic but nowhere near as critical as the situation among its northern neighbours. Secondly, Ghana sees itself as a natural leader in Africa generally and has a long tradition of partaking in various security cooperation arrangements.

Thirdly, Ghanaian actors are broadly positive towards the EU’s willingness to support but wants to maintain ownership and emphasise the need for effectiveness. They are also wary of France’s historical leadership in the region or potential hidden EU agendas. The empirical material for this study consists of government documents, such as annual reports and speeches, as well as other open-source material, including media reports, data on political violence, and reports by civil-society organisations and security-sector specialists.

Furthermore, the local perceptions expressed in this brief derive from 13 semi-structured interviews with in-country persons within government, civil service, academia, media, diplomatic corps, and civil society. These interviews were conducted in Accra in September 2023. The perceptions and views expressed in the interviews by no means represent an exhaustive account of how Ghanaians see cooperation with the EU, but they do express some sentiment that guides the broader Ghanaian narrative.

Endnotes

1- Gunnarson, C. & Körling, G. “Relationerna mellan Frankrike och Mali 2017–2022: Historien om en skilsmässa.” FOI- R--5347--SE. Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), 2023. Available at www.foi.se. Accessed 19 November 2023.

2- Nichols, M. “Mali asks United Nations to withdraw peacekeep-ing force,” Reuters, 16 June 2023. Available at www.reuters.com. Accessed 27 November 2023.

3- De Simone, D. “Mali: UN peacekeeping mission ends after dec-ade”, BBC News, 31 December 2023. Available at www.bbc.comAccessed 12 January 2024

4- “Le Niger met fin à des partenariats de sécurité et de défense avec l’UE”, Le Figaro with Agence France Presse, 4 December 2023. Available at www.lefigaro.fr Accessed: 12 January 2024

5- By the same token, the US has suspended most of its security assistance, such as military training and equipment, to Niger after designating the July 26 toppling of Mohamed Bazoum a coup. However, the US continues to operate a drone base in the north for surveillance and reconnaissance.

6- Tasamba, J. “Niger ends EU defense, security partnerships, Anadolu Agency,

7- Chadwick, V. “Exclusive: Internal report shows EU fears losing Africa over Ukraine,” Devex, 22 July 2022.

8- Tull, D.M. “Security Force Assistance under Geopolitical Stress: The EU’s ‘Strategic Review’ of its CSDP Missions in Mali,” Megatrends Afrika Spotlight, 20 May 2022. Available at www.swp-berlin.org. Accessed 28 November 2023.

9- One month later, the US announced a new 10-year plan to pre-vent conflict and promote stability that promised to “innovate how the U.S. government works with partners”; L’Élysée, “Le partenariat Afrique-France: Conférence de presse du Président Emmanuel Macron,” YouTube, 27 February 2023. Available at www.youtube.com. Accessed 27 November 2023.

10- Official Journal of the European Union, COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2023/1599 of 3 August 2023 on a European Union Security and Defence Initiative in support of West African countries of the Gulf of Guinea, 4 August 2023. Available at www.eur-lex.europa.eu. Accessed 27 November 2023.

11- International Crisis Group, MINUSMA at a Crossroads – Q&A, 1 December 2022. Available at www.crisisgroup.org. Accessed 28 November 2023.

12- Tull, D.M. “Security Force Assistance.”

For the full paper, visit: file:///Users/alibahaijoub/Downloads/FOI%20Memo%208445