Poland: A Foreign Policy of Chaotic Hypocrisy in 2015–2023

WOJCIECH PRZYBYLSKI, Carnegie Europe, April 18, 2024

Law and Justice (PiS) is a right-wing populist and national-conservative party that has shifted toward an increasingly negative attitude to European integration. PiS emphasizes the importance of hard security, energy independence, and the primacy of national law.

LAW AND JUSTICE: EVOLUTION AND PROFILE

Established in 2001, Poland’s right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party emerged from the Center Agreement, a Christian-democratic party founded in 1990. PiS is a member of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group in the European Parliament, where it has the highest number of seats in the group. Jarosław Kaczyński, the party’s founding leader, launched PiS with his late twin brother, Lech Kaczyński, who acted as the party’s official front man and served as Polish president until his death in a 2010 plane crash in Smolensk, Russia.

From 2005 to 2007, PiS formed a coalition government, initially with Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz as prime minister, followed by Jarosław Kaczyński. The coalition also included the populist-left Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland party and the nationalist League of Polish Families. For most of 2007, PiS ruled as a minority government in anticipation of that October’s snap election. The government’s main priorities were foreign and domestic security as well as energy security to counter Poland’s dependence on Russia. Other issues that the PiS emphasized were reducing perceptions of corruption and addressing the country’s communist legacy in the public sphere.

From 2015 to 2019, PiS had the largest parliamentary faction of any Polish political party since 1989, with 239 out of 460 members of parliament (MPs) by the end of the parliamentary term.1 The party led the governments of prime ministers Beata Szydło (2015–2017) and Mateusz Morawiecki (2017–2023), which included coalition partners such as Sovereign Poland and the Republican Party. During the 2015–2019 term, PiS did not preside over the parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee: this role was held by Grzegorz Schetyna, the then opposition leader.

In the 2019 election, PiS won an overall majority of seats in the parliament. Although the party contested the election in a coalition with two junior partners, all candidates were registered on behalf of PiS and joined the PiS parliamentary caucus. By the end of the term, because of internal divisions, the party officially controlled only 227 seats and technically no longer held a majority.2

In the 2023 election, PiS was unable to win back its majority and had to step down because no other parties were willing to enter a governing coalition with it. The extreme right-wing Confederation party also distanced itself from PiS on grounds of nationalist ideology. Confederation accused the outgoing government of having betrayed Poland’s right-wing electorate by admitting migrants from Africa and accepting the European Union’s (EU’s) Recovery and Resilience Facility, its rule-of-law conditionality mechanism, and a new system of EU financial resources.3

PiS’s ideology combines a strong Atlanticist outlook with a Euroskeptic stance. Szydło stated in 2015 that on matters of security and foreign policy, the party “attaches particular importance . . . to relations with the United States.”4 PiS takes a firm sovereigntist stance against further European integration and cooperation with Poland’s neighbors, particularly Germany and Russia. The party emphasizes hard security, energy independence, and the primacy of national law over the EU’s regulatory framework.

PiS’s foreign policy is characterized by the cherry-picking of issues that are important domestically and lacks any ambitions to expand Poland’s international position. PiS’s primary concern has always been to maintain power over the country, and the party considers the EU integration process a notable handicap to this goal. While PiS does not oppose the EU outright, it has expressed concerns about a possible conspiracy by Europe’s early-twentieth-century aggressors, namely Russia and Germany, to covertly control Poland’s agenda and, hence, undermine the country’s national interests.5

The primary factor that determines PiS’s foreign policy is the party’s vague language of sovereignty, which is dictated by the party leader and results in what this author has called “chaotic hypocrisy.”6 Such hypocrisy allows for fluid political positions. For example, PiS once supported women’s right to choose whether to have an abortion. Yet, in 2020, the party succumbed to internal pressure from its radical faction and restricted abortion. Against a public outcry, Kaczyński said that abortion was still legal and that “women are free to travel abroad [in the EU] to have it”—undermining the moral integrity of PiS’s position on the question while accepting the role of EU integration in providing individual freedoms.7

PiS also demonstrated its chaotic hypocrisy through the party leader’s positions on Russia and Ukraine. After allowing an increase in Poland’s coal imports from Russia against Warsaw’s declared energy security interests, the PiS government pursued better relations with Ukraine after Russia’s 2022 invasion. In December 2021, Warsaw hosted pro-Russia politicians from across the EU to help them increase their influence in the EU Council and the European Parliament. The summit brought together actors like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and France’s Marine Le Pen, among others.8 Yet, only a few months later, Kaczyński and Morawiecki traveled to Kyiv and distanced themselves from Orbán’s pro-Russia electoral campaign, showing that Polish voters’ demand for security against Russia had prevailed over PiS’s cherry-picking. Building on this approach, PiS tried to frame Poland’s opposition parties as a pro-Russia, pro-Germany, and, hence, anti-Poland political force.9

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EU

In the run-up to Poland’s 2003 referendum on EU accession, PiS focused its campaign on the concept of “A Strong Poland in Europe.”10 The party embraced the idea of EU integration, highlighting its potential to give Poland a voice in matters that directly affected the nation. PiS argued that rejecting EU membership would mean giving up control over national affairs, which, the party believed, would be a mistake. However, although PiS supported EU integration, the party opposed the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, preferring the provisions of the 2001 Nice Treaty, which promised a more favorable position for Poland in the EU.

PiS emphasizes the importance of preserving Poland’s sovereignty—which the party sees as rooted in the country’s deep Christian culture and traditions—as the most effective means of achieving Poland’s political, economic, social, and cultural aspirations. PiS believes that a sovereign Polish state would ensure Poles’ full enjoyment of civil rights, freedoms, and the benefits of democracy. As a result, PiS is against any transformation of the EU into a federation that would diminish the role of the member states.11 The party unequivocally supports Poland’s continued participation in the EU but points out that the bloc’s treaties allow the country to leave the EU if necessary.12

On foreign policy, Lech Kaczyński sought to engage the EU on matters concerning the bloc’s Eastern flank, especially during the 2008 Russia-Georgia War. The former president led the formation of a coalition of Central European countries that supported Georgia and other states in their approach to Russia. PiS’s policy aimed to strengthen Poland’s ties with historically significant countries, driven by shared concerns of protecting energy security, preventing the expansion of the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and countering neighboring countries’ imperial aspirations.

By 2022, the PiS leadership had hardened its narrative again in an effort to boost its support ahead of the following year’s election. In the words of Jarosław Kaczyński, “If we win, we will have to rework relations with the European Union. It cannot—and will not—be the case that the union does not recognize treaties, agreements, or contracts toward us.”13 Krzysztof Sobolewski, the PiS secretary general, added, “All possibilities also include [each EU member state’s] right of veto, which can be used broadly [or] narrowly, and this applies to important issues as well. . . . The European Commission is going beyond the [EU] treaties anyway.”14

It is also worth noting that under the last PiS government, Poland became the subject of an infringement procedure launched by the commission that resulted in fines worth €557 million ($604 million).15 The party had undermined Poland’s judicial independence through changes to the Constitutional Tribunal, the National Council of the Judiciary, and the Supreme Court and assaulted the country’s media freedom, including by using Poland’s public broadcaster for partisan objectives.

FOREIGN POLICY POSITIONS

Poland’s constitution officially declares the country to have a parliamentary system, but most political analyses recognize it as a de facto semipresidential system.16 Article 133 of the constitution authorizes the president to ratify and sever international agreements. Yet, this article is not very specific, leading to conflicts over competencies. One such instance occurred in 2008 during a dispute between Prime Minister Donald Tusk and then president Kaczyński over the latter’s role at an EU summit. The president wanted to use his constitutional prerogative to represent the country’s foreign policy, while the prime minister opposed the idea.

In preparation for the 2023 election, PiS introduced a law that requires the president’s formal approval for governmental positions toward the EU. This move indicates the significance of foreign policy and the president’s role in shaping it.

PiS’s foreign policy is similar to that of Hungary’s right-wing Fidesz party: a projection of the party leader’s political will, rather than a coherent strategy. This approach often refers to sound moral arguments but is contradicted by the actions of the leader, who seems more inclined to gamble rather than strategize for success.17

IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM

PiS has proved unable to produce a coherent immigration policy. Despite Poland recording the EU’s highest number of third-country entrants for the past six years, including refugees from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, PiS has not developed a clear position on immigration.18 Since 2021, the party has been pushing back against asylum seekers who attempt to cross the border from Belarus into Poland outside legal border crossings. Notably, PiS aimed to restrict access to asylum for those already on Polish territory, even though a Polish court deemed this policy to be unlawful.19

PiS has routinely rejected any solidarity mechanism that would envision a redistribution of migrants among EU member states and require Poland to share the responsibility for dealing with them. PiS representatives have been vocal about their opposition to EU asylum mechanisms, arguing that “forced relocation” would violate the sovereignty of the member states.20 This position led to several legal actions, including a 2020 ruling by the European Court of Justice that Poland had not fulfilled its obligations under EU law.

To further strengthen its antimigration narrative, PiS organized a referendum, held alongside the 2023 election, to ask citizens whether they were in favor admitting “thousands of illegal immigrants from the Middle East and Africa.”21 Most political parties boycotted the referendum, and the turnout did not meet the necessary threshold for the vote to be binding.

More broadly, PiS does not promote the integration of immigrants and refugees, except those it considers culturally similar in terms of their national—and, in effect, racial—profile. Therefore, when in government, PiS granted Ukrainian refugees access to public services, such as education and healthcare.

RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

PiS supports Kyiv in the Russia-Ukraine war, despite a strong internal drive in the party before the 2022 invasion to ally with pro-Russia parties in other EU member states. This support for Kyiv aligns with the backing of the overwhelming majority of Polish society for Ukraine’s fight for freedom.22 Poland has welcomed Ukrainian refugees, provided military supplies to Kyiv, and granted access to Poland’s logistics for all NATO and EU allies that have requested it.

For logistical reasons to do with transportation connections between Poland and Ukraine, the European Commission coordinated its response to the invasion with the former PiS government, despite an ongoing conflict with Poland over the rule of law. In mid-March 2022, Morawiecki and Kaczyński joined Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala and former Slovenian prime minister Janez Janša on the first foreign leaders’ trip to Kyiv after the invasion. At the same time, Orbán was campaigning for unilateral peace—widely understood to mean that Ukraine needed to succumb to Russian pressure.

PiS has criticized not only Russia but also Poland’s Western partners, especially Germany, for actions or inactions that, in the party’s view, allowed Russia to invade Ukraine. In 2022, Morawiecki addressed France’s President Emmanuel Macron and past and present German governments by saying, “You have debated so much with [Russian President Vladimir] Putin. What did you achieve? You don’t negotiate with criminals. Would you have negotiated with Hitler? . . . Germany’s policy over the previous dozen years has led to the fact that Russia today has the power, resulting from its monopoly on the sale of raw materials.”23

PiS advocated sanctions against Russia but was slow to implement its own sanctions policy, especially in the energy sector, where Poland continued to import Russian fossil fuels.24 The party also adopted a strong protectionist policy by introducing an import ban on Ukrainian grain to protect Polish farmers. Morawiecki stated that “Poland will not allow itself to be flooded by Ukrainian grain. . . . No matter what the Brussels bureaucrats decide, we will not be opening our borders.”25 Similarly, truckers from Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries, such as the Czech Republic, blocked border crossings with Ukraine to protest against cheap competition from their Ukrainian counterparts.

NATO

PiS has a firmly Atlanticist approach to foreign and security policy. The party emphasizes the importance of NATO for the European security system and the role of the United States in delivering credibility for the alliance. The party has advocated closer cooperation between the EU and NATO, considering them essential pillars of Poland’s national security. PiS has supported and engaged in all NATO operations since the party’s founding.

Along with other Polish parties, PiS approved of NATO’s strategy to reinforce its Eastern flank and has often endorsed the Bucharest Nine format, which brings together nine allies in Eastern Europe. The PiS government also committed to NATO’s target for each ally to spend the equivalent of 2 percent of its gross domestic product on defense and nearly doubled Poland’s defense expenditure after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022.

EU ENLARGEMENT

PiS advocates EU enlargement and endorses EU assistance for the democratic transformations of the countries closest to accession. Speaking in 2023, Poland’s then minister of foreign affairs Zbigniew Rau affirmed that “Poland’s tradition of resisting the dictatorship of political powers and our attachment to the principle of sovereign freedom and equality of states . . . requires that we oppose determining [the] final borders of the European Union and NATO by consistently promoting the open door policy and supporting the membership aspirations of both the Eastern European countries and [those in] the Western Balkans.”26 PiS considers future EU enlargement to be an element of Poland’s national security strategy to counter Russia and increase regional stability.

ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE

PiS has been a strong proponent of energy diversification and of a gradual transition from coal and lignite to natural gas, renewable energy, and nuclear power. The party has aligned with other Central and Eastern European countries in favor of including nuclear power in the EU’s green energy policy. However, as Poland is heavily dependent on coal, the party was initially reluctant, and sometimes even hostile, toward the EU’s European Green Deal, a series of initiatives that aims to set the union on the path to a green transition. PiS was especially critical of the Fit for 55 package, which seeks to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions in the EU by at least 55 percent by 2030, because of concerns about the economic costs of an urgent transition.27

At the same time, PiS tried to communicate the EU’s green policy goals to key interest groups, including coal miners, by informing them about upcoming shutdowns of coal mines. The party went back and forth on this issue but was unable to communicate the new objectives without facing a severe social backlash.

DEMOCRACY AND MINORITY RIGHTS

PiS endorses democracy as an expression of the majority in a given nation-state. Therefore, the party’s narrative has suppressed, or even been hostile toward, rule-of-law checks by supranational authorities like the EU as well as minority rights. While in government, the party claimed to have a democratic mandate to replace Poland’s post-1990 elite, reestablish the rule of law, and protect selected minorities.

At the same time, PiS supported the police’s repression of civil society through the targeting of protests by women, LGBTQ individuals, and small and medium-sized enterprises. PiS-sponsored political action limited citizens’ access to public institutions, including entry into the Polish parliament, and the ability of independent nongovernmental organizations and the press to operate freely. PiS undermined access to fair trials by systematically derailing the judicial system and gradually taking control of the media.

Ministers appointed by PiS’s former coalition partner, Sovereign Poland, also initiated several policies that put Poland at odds with the EU, including the promotion of so-called LGBTQ-free zones. Other senior party officials have often claimed that the EU’s values have been hijacked by oppressive and nondemocratic forces that are hostile to Poland’s sovereignty and cultural identity.

Author

Wojciech Przybylski is the president of the board of the Res Publica Foundation in Warsaw and the editor of Visegrad Insight.

NOTES

1 “VIII kadencja: Kluby i koła” [Eighth Term: Clubs and Circles], Polish Parliament, https://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm8.nsf/kluby.xsp.

2 “IX kadencja: Kluby i koła” [Ninth Term: Clubs and Circles], Polish Parliament, https://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm9.nsf/kluby.xsp.

3 Waldemar Stelmach, “Konfederacja spotka się z Morawieckim” [Confederation Will Meet With Morawiecki], RMF 24, November 23, 2023, https://www.rmf24.pl/polityka/news-konfederacja-spotka-sie-z-morawieckim-jest-oswiadczenie-lide,nId,7167055#crp_state=1.

4 “Przemówienie programowe premier Beaty Szydło” [Program Speech by Prime Minister Beata Szydło], MamPrawoWiedziec, November 18, 2015, https://mamprawowiedziec.pl/czytelnia/artykul/przemowienie-programowe-premier-beaty-szydlo.

5 Robert Csehi and Edit Zgut, “‘We Won’t Let Brussels Dictate Us [sic]’: Eurosceptic Populism in Hungary and Poland,” European Politics and Society 22, no. 1 (2021): 53–68, https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2020.1717064.

6 Wojciech Przybylski, “Chaotic Hypocrisy,” Visegrad Insight, May 18, 2017, https://visegradinsight.eu/chaotic-hypocrisy/. American political scientist Stephen Krasner defined “organized hypocrisy” as the routine violation of long-standing norms by sovereign states: Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691007113/sovereignty.

7 Eliza Olczyk and Joanna Miziołek, “Jarosław Kaczyński dla „Wprost”: Każdy średnio rozgarnięty człowiek może załatwić aborcję za granicą” [Jarosław Kaczyński for “Wprost”: Any Person With Average Brains Can Arrange an Abortion Abroad], Wprost, May 23, 2021, https://www.wprost.pl/kraj/10449780/jaroslaw-kaczynski-dla-wprost-kazdy-moze-zalatwic-aborcje-za-granica.html.

8 “Nationalists Vow Joint Votes in European Parliament but Fall Short of Forming New Alliance,” Euronews, https://www.euronews.com/embed/1759100.

9 “Kaczyński w Karpaczu ostro o Niemcach” [Kaczyński in Karpacz Harshly About the Germans], Business Insider, September 7, 2022, https://businessinsider.com.pl/wiadomosci/kaczynski-w-karpaczu-ostro-o-niemcach-tlumaczy-tez-dlaczego-poparl-wejscie-do-ue/00yqqw9.

10 “A Strong Poland in Europe,” Political Council of the Law and Justice Party, June 28, 2003.

11 Mikołaj J. Tomaszyk, “10 lat członkostwa Polski w Unii Europejskiej – próba bilansu z perspektywy politologicznej” [10 Years of Poland’s EU Membership—an Attempt at Balance From a Political Science Perspective], Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej 8 (2014): 197–212, https://cejsh.icm.edu.pl/cejsh/element/bwmeta1.element.ojs-doi-10_14746_rie_2014_8_14.

12 Beata Master, “Unia Europejska w programach głównych polskich ugrupowań politycznych po 2004 roku” [The European Union in the Programs of the Main Polish Political Parties After 2004], Studia Politicae Universitatis Silesiensis, 2014,

http://cejsh.icm.edu.pl/cejsh/element/bwmeta1.element.ojs-issn-2353-9747-year-2014-volume-12-article-5476/c/5476-3590.pdf.

13 “Jarosław Kaczyński w "Sieci" o relacjach z KE” [Jarosław Kaczyński in “Sieci” About Relations With the EC], wPolityce, August 7, 2022, https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/609543-kaczynski-o-relacjach-z-ke-ustepstwa-nic-nie-daly.

14 “Sekretarz generalny PiS o relacjach z UE” [Secretary General of PiS on Relations With the EU], Polska Agencja Prasowa, August 8, 2023, https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/news%2C1392902%2Csekretarz-generalny-pis-o-relacjach-z-ue-bedziemy-stosowali-zasade-zab-za.

15 Nicolas Camut, “EU Court Finds Poland Guilty in Rule-of-Law Dispute,” Politico, June 5, 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-court-finds-poland-guilty-in-rule-of-law-dispute/.

16 Oleksii Sydorchuk, “The impact of semi-presidentialism on democratic consolidation in Poland and Ukraine,” Demokratizatsiya, January 1, 2014, https://demokratizatsiya.pub/archives/22_1_BR32H62T75550458.pdf.

17 Adam Jasser, “Poland’s Claim to Be the New European ‘Centre of Gravity’ Gets a Reality Check,” Visegrad Insight, April 28, 2023, https://visegradinsight.eu/polands-claim-to-be-the-new-european-centre-of-gravity-gets-a-reality-check/.

18 “Poland Issues EU’s Most Residence Permits to Immigrants for Fifth Year Running,” Notes from Poland, August 11, 2022, https://notesfrompoland.com/2022/08/11/poland-issues-eus-most-residence-permits-to-immigrants-for-fifth-year-running/.

19 Lydia Gall, “Polish Court Rules Pushback of Asylum Seekers Unlawful,” Human Rights Watch, June 27, 2022, https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/27/polish-court-rules-pushback-asylum-seekers-unlawful.

20 Stefano Fella, “Poland: Developments Since 2015 and Relations With the EU,” United Kingdom Parliament, October 13, 2023, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9868/.

21 “Polish Government Plans Referendum on Rejecting ‘Thousands of Illegal Immigrants,’” Euronews, August 13, 2023, https://www.euronews.com/2023/08/13/polish-government-plans-referendum-on-rejecting-thousands-of-illegal-immigrants.

22 Moira Fagan et al., “Poles and Hungarians Differ Over Views of Russia and the U.S.,” Pew Research Center, October 2, 2023, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2023/10/02/poles-and-hungarians-differ-over-views-of-russia-and-the-us/.

23 “Morawiecki do Macrona” [Morawiecki to Macron], Dziennik Gazeta Prawna, April 4, 2022, https://www.gazetaprawna.pl/wiadomosci/swiat/artykuly/8393843,morawiecki-masakry-rosjanie-ludobojstwo.html.

24 Zosia Wanat, “Poland Finds It’s Tough to Go Cold Turkey on Russian Energy,” Politico, April 25, 2022, https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-russia-energy-oil-gas-coal-ukraine-war-sanctions-prime-minister-mateusz-morawiecki/.

25 Edit Inotai, Claudia Ciobanu, and Svetoslav Todorov, “Hungary and Poland Vow to Introduce Ukraine Grain Ban as EU-Brokered Deal Expires,” BalkanInsight, September 15, 2023, https://balkaninsight.com/2023/09/15/hungary-and-poland-vow-to-introduce-ukraine-grain-ban-as-eu-brokered-deal-expires/.

26 “Minister of Foreign Affairs on the Principles and Objectives of Poland’s Foreign Policy in 2023,” Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 13, 2023, https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/minister-of-foreign-affairs-on-the-principles-and-objectives-of-polands-foreign-policy.

27 “Fit for 55: Delivering on the Proposals,” European Commission, https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/delivering-european-green-deal/fit-55-delivering-proposals_en.

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